North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

A common evidence question that arises is how to properly authenticate digital communications. We have written on the topic in several blogs: How Can a Party Show Authorship of a Social Media Post or Other Electronic Communication?, Authenticating Photographs Obtained from Social Media Platforms, Business Records: Posts, Chats, and Texts, New Guidance on Authenticating Social Media, Admissibility of Electronic Writings: Emails, Text Messages, and Social Networking Posts, and more.

Last year, I created a chart to highlight the ingredients of authentication our appellate courts found to be adequate or inadequate as a foundation for surveillance video (also see the accompanying blog, Surveillance Video- When It Comes In and When It Doesn’t). I’ve received positive feedback on the chart and practitioners have asked for more evidence content in this format. For a second installment, I chose digital communications.

I have been covering developments around the legalization of hemp in North Carolina since 2018. Never did I suspect then that I would still be working on the topic all this time later, but here we are. My last post on In Re: J.B.P. covered the then most recent developments around probable cause and the odor of cannabis. That opinion was withdrawn and has yet to reissue, but subsequent cases have basically affirmed the logic on which the case was decided. This month, the Court of Appeals released State v. Ruffin, COA24-276,  ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025), weighing in on evidentiary challenges to opinion evidence identifying a substance as marijuana, as well as on jury instructions for marijuana cases. This post examines these and other recent legal developments impacting the state’s criminal cannabis law. Read on for the details.

The defendant in State v. Greenfield, No. COA23-597 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025), argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence and allowing argument about an attempted armed robbery charge for which he had previously been acquitted. The Court of Appeals posited that evidence is inadmissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause only when it falls within the scope of the collateral estoppel doctrine, which precludes relitigation of an issue of fact previously determined by a final judgment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by failing to intervene in the closing argument here, but its formulation of the rule begs the question: under what circumstances will double jeopardy require the exclusion of evidence? This post attempts to answer that question.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution limits the use of testimonial hearsay statements by an unavailable witness at a criminal trial, as does its state counterpart in Article I, Sec. 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. A hearsay statement is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. A statement is testimonial if the primary purpose of the statement was to establish past facts for use at a later prosecution. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245 (2015). The Confrontation Clause does not protect against the admission of nontestimonial statements (although hearsay statements still must meet an exception or exemption). In a recent decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court analyzed a challenge to the admission of the defendant’s phone records offered by the State at trial. Overruling the Court of Appeals on the point, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the phone records were nontestimonial as purely machine-generated data.” The case is a good reminder of the distinctions between testimonial and nontestimonial statements and may have implications for future confrontation issues. Read on for the details.

This post summarizes a criminal law decision published by the U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 21, 2025.

As regular readers know, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), this past June. The decision undercut the reasoning used by North Carolina courts to justify the practice of permitting substitute analysts to offer an independent opinion about the forensic report of another, nontestifying analyst (as discussed here and here). Until this week, no North Carolina court had applied Smith. The wait is now over. In State v. Clark, NCCOA-1133, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Dec. 3, 2024), the Court of Appeals delved into the impact of Smith on North Carolina law, ultimately granting the defendant a new trial for a Confrontation Clause violation. This post discusses the Clark decision and its implications for the future of substitute analysts in the state.

I recently gave a criminal law case update to a group of judges.  I had quite a few cases that I planned to cover in relatively short order. I started with Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), in which the United States Supreme Court held that statements from an absent laboratory analyst that a testifying analyst conveyed to support his expert opinion about the chemical composition of the substances seized from the defendant were hearsay. For that reason, their admission at the defendant’s trial on drug charges raised Confrontation Clause concerns. To my chagrin, twenty minutes later, I was still talking about Smith, attempting to helpfully respond to a barrage of questions from trial court judges about the practical import of the decision for various kinds of testimony frequently proffered by the State during a criminal trial. Those questions included the following:

• The substitute analysts I see don’t typically rely on another analyst’s report. Instead, they examine the underlying testing data and reach an opinion based on that. Is that testimony admissible?
• May a supervising analyst who reviewed the testing done by and conclusions of another analyst pursuant to laboratory protocols testify to the conclusions the supervising analyst reached about the identity of the substance?
• Suppose a new analyst retests a substance. Will he or she be able to establish a sufficient chain of custody for the substance tested given that the substance was initially received and examined by an analyst who is not available to testify?

This post will review what we knew about substitute analyst testimony before Smith was decided, will recap the Court’s analysis in Smith (analyzed in detail here), and will provide some thoughts about Smith’s import that may inform a court’s analysis of the questions posed above.

My colleagues have covered the retroactivity rules many times before on the blog but the analysis for determining the retroactivity of new federal rules has changed in the last few years. Considering that and the recent Confrontation Clause rule for substitute analyst testimony announced in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. ___; 144 S.Ct. 1785 (2024) (summarized here), an update is in order. Today’s post reviews the federal retroactivity analysis and examines how it may be applied to Smith. Read on for the details.

In Part I of my Spring 2024 cannabis update, I discussed the search and seizure issues arising in North Carolina courts around cannabis. Part II explores drug identification evidence issues surrounding marijuana prosecutions and examines potential challenges defenders might raise. This post will also cover recent developments on the state, federal, and tribal levels impacting cannabis.

Video evidence authentication has received a fair amount of treatment on this blog. The topic remains an area of practical significance given the prevalence of video evidence in criminal trials and how common it is for the prosecution’s case to hinge on the admission of video. We are increasingly a video-focused society. Between home security cam, doorbell cam, body-worn cam, in-car cam, pole cam, and even parking lot cam, juries increasingly expect to see video, whether the incident in question occurred outside a home, near a business, or on the roadside.

In this post, I will focus on surveillance video.