Daniel Spiegel

News Roundup

Hundreds of Venezuelan immigrants were summarily deported from the United States to a prison in El Salvador last weekend. Federal authorities relied on President Trump’s executive order invoking the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 in removing the immigrants without due process protections. The administration stated that the immigrants were members of a violent gang, Tren de Aragua, and that their alignment with the Venezuelan government and entry into the U.S. constituted an invasion by a hostile nation. Advocates for the deported Venezuelans deny their involvement with the gang and stress that the three previous times that the AEA was invoked, it was during clear times of war (the War of 1812, WWI, and WWII).

Judge James Boasberg, a federal judge in Washington, had ordered that the flights carrying the immigrants be turned around, but this did not occur, and the court is now engaged in an inquiry to determine whether the Trump administration should be held in contempt. After Trump called for the impeachment of the judge, Chief Justice John Roberts of the United States Supreme Court made a public statement that the appellate process, rather than impeachment, is the proper way to address adverse court rulings.

Read on for more criminal law news.

Read more

Can Law Enforcement Review Ankle Monitor Location Data Without a Warrant?

Last September, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Thomas, No. COA23-210, __ N.C. App. __ (2024), a case involving law enforcement’s retrieval of ankle monitor location data gathered while the defendant was on post-release supervision.

This is the first North Carolina appellate case to address whether it is constitutional for law enforcement to retrieve ankle monitor data without a warrant. This post will discuss the reasoning in Thomas and its implications for related questions.

Read more

News Roundup

After a two-week evidentiary hearing last February, and closing arguments delivered in August, Superior Court Judge Wayland Sermons Jr. issued a 120-page order concluding that racism significantly affected the 2009 Johnston County trial of Hasson Bacote that resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Bacote first challenged his sentence fifteen years ago under the now-repealed Racial Justice Act. In his order, Judge Sermons stated that the evidence showed a “consistent picture of the role race has played in jury selection throughout Johnston County and Prosecutorial District 11, and in the capital cases tried by [the] prosecutor…” After Governor Cooper commuted Bacote’s sentence to life imprisonment last December, it was unclear what would happen with the pending litigation. Judge Sermons evidently concluded that it was appropriate to make a ruling, stating that the voluminous “statistical, cultural, historical, social science, and other evidence produced in the [Bacote] case” would serve as a guide to courts considering the particular facts of future cases. Attorneys for the State said they planned to appeal the ruling.

Read on for more criminal law news.

Read more

The Confidential Informant File: What Is It and When Must It Be Disclosed to the Defense?

I recently completed a series of posts on issues surrounding confidential informants (“CI’s”), discovery, and motions to reveal the CI’s identity. In this “bonus” post, I will discuss a related question: what is the “CI file” and when must the State turn it over to the defense? Let’s say the defense is successful in compelling … Read more

News Roundup

In the waning weeks of his four-year term, President Biden announced commutations of 37 of 40 federal death sentences. With the exception of three individuals convicted of crimes involving “terrorism” or “hate-motivated mass murder,” Biden decided that the remaining federal death row prisoners should receive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. In 2021, Biden declared a moratorium on federal capital punishment to study protocols, and before that, he pledged action to end the death penalty at the federal level. The families of the victims reacted to the commutations with a range of emotions.

Read more

Confidential Informants, Motions to Reveal Identity, and Discovery: Part VI, Motions to Suppress and the “Two Officer Rule”

For the final installment of this series on confidential informants, motions to reveal identity, and discovery, we will look at a unique statute in North Carolina concerning when the identity of a confidential informant (CI) must be revealed: G.S. 15A-978(b). This statute only applies to motions to suppress, rather than trial. Recall back to Part I of this series, which addressed Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Roviaro established the basic factors to consider when deciding whether the State must disclose the identity of the CI to the defendant to ensure a fair trial. Another U.S. Supreme Court case decided ten years later, however, McCray v. State of Ill., 386 U.S. 300 (1967), addressed the separate but related question of when the defendant is entitled to learn the CI’s identity to have a fair opportunity to litigate a motion to suppress.

At a motion to suppress, the considerations are somewhat different from trial. The last several posts addressed the question of when testimony from the CI is material in determining whether or not the defendant is guilty. In contrast, the question at the motion to suppress stage is not the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The question in CI cases is usually whether a search or seizure violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The issues to be decided may be whether law enforcement had good reason to rely on information provided by the CI, whether law enforcement corroborated the information, or whether the officers are being truthful about their interactions with the CI. G.S. 15A-978(b) addresses a related, but narrow question: can we rely on the officer’s assertion that the CI exists?

Read more

News Roundup

After a plea deal between 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the U.S. government was declared void by order of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, a military judge has now ruled that the plea agreement is valid, the AP reports. The plea agreement calls for a sentence of life imprisonment for Mohammed and his two-codefendants. The Defense Secretary had declared that the deal could not be struck without his approval and that the decades-old proceedings should continue through to trial and possible death sentences. Some families of 9/11 victims and lawmakers also opposed the plea deal. However, the military judge has ruled that it is too late to strike the deal because it was negotiated with proper government authorization and the top official at Guantanamo approved it.

Read on for more criminal law news.

Read more

Confidential Informants, Motions to Reveal Identity, and Discovery: Part V, Asserting a Defense Theory

This is Part V of a multi-part series on confidential informants (“CI’s”), motions to reveal the identity of CI’s, and discovery.

As discussed in earlier posts in this series (here and here), the defense is more likely to win a motion to reveal the identity of CI when the defendant is able to tie the potential CI testimony to a particular theory of defense and explain how it furthers that defense. In the landmark case of Roviaro v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court listed a variety of ways in which the CI’s testimony might be helpful for the defense and ruled that the CI’s identity must be turned over. However, North Carolina appellate courts have repeatedly stated that the defense cannot merely speculate about how the CI’s testimony might be relevant; the defense must clear an initial hurdle of showing how the testimony might resolve a material conflict at trial in order to prevail on a motion to reveal the identity of the CI. See State v. Dark, 204 N.C. App. 591, 593 (2010); State v. Watson, 303 N.C. 533 (1981). While defenders may invoke their federal due process rights in challenging whether this should be a requirement, they should be aware of what North Carolina appellate courts are demanding.

An interesting strategic implication of Dark and Watson is that in CI cases, the defense may benefit from committing to a particular theory of defense and “showing its cards” to the state in a pretrial hearing. Defenders are often reluctant to call their client to the stand, even in a pretrial hearing, unless the defendant’s testimony appears to be necessary or exceptionally persuasive. Defenders may be concerned about the risk of damaging cross-examination and the possibility that the testimony of an unsavvy client might hurt the case, even where the client is telling the truth (discussions of this dilemma in the media can be found here and here). In cases where there is a viable motion to reveal the identity of the CI, though, the risk will sometimes be worth the possible reward. The prospect of winning a dismissal, a concession in plea negotiations, or suppression of key evidence may counterbalance a tendency by the defense to avoid putting the client on the stand in a pretrial hearing.

Read more

News Roundup

The State of Missouri put Marcellus Williams to death Tuesday, despite opposition from St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney Wesley Bell and the victim’s family, the Associated Press reports. Williams was convicted of the murder of Lisha Gayle in 1998. Gayle was stabbed to death during a home burglary in which her purse and her husband’s laptop were stolen. The case received international attention due to concerns that Williams may have been innocent. According to The Innocence Project, the case against Williams depended heavily on two witnesses with legal and financial motives rendering their testimony unreliable. Questions were also raised relating to the forensic evidence in the case. The murder weapon appeared to be improperly handled by a staff member from the prosecutor’s office and there was a lack of physical evidence linking Williams to the crime scene.

In 2017, former Missouri Governor Eric Greitens paused Williams’ execution and appointed a board to investigate further. However, current Governor Mike Parson disbanded the board before it issued a final report. Just last month, a new plea deal was accepted by a judge between the Prosecuting Attorney and Williams vacating the death sentence and imposing life without the possibility of parole. However, the State Attorney General, Andrew Bailey, intervened, objecting to the plea and sending the controversy to the State Supreme Court. The State Supreme Court set aside the deal and ordered an evidentiary hearing. Williams raised issues pertaining to bias in jury selection and mishandling of the evidence at the hearing but was ultimately unsuccessful. In declining to delay the execution, Governor Parson stressed that no jury nor court at the trial or appellate level had found merit in Williams’ claims to innocence. Though three Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court voted to halt the execution, the Court denied the emergency request.

Outside of Missouri, four other states scheduled executions within the span of a week, an uncommonly high number, as the number of executions per year is trending down nationwide.

Read on for more criminal law news.

Read more

A Common Calendaring Concern: The Unilateral Reset

A question that arises with some frequency is whether the district attorney is free to unilaterally “reset” a matter in superior court by changing the trial date after a date has been set by the court.

At the outset, it’s important to distinguish between the scenario in which the State intentionally resets a case and that where a clerical error results in a case being unintentionally left off a trial calendar. Where the omission arises from an administrative error, the delay will likely be attributed to the State as part of any future speedy trial analysis, and it may be considered negligent, or at least “neglectful,” delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); State v. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. 387, 395 (1985). But what about when the State intentionally resets a case after it has been scheduled for a particular trial date? In this scenario, the court has set a trial date, but when it comes time for the State to publish the trial calendar, the case is missing because the State intentionally omitted it or moved it to another setting.

Depending on where you practice, you may be thinking, “Of course the DA cannot unilaterally reset the case. The trial date was established by court order, and neither party is free to disregard a court order.” Alternatively, you may be thinking, “Doesn’t the DA have calendar control?” See G.S. 7A-61 (“the district attorney shall prepare the trial dockets”). See generally, Michael Crowell, Control of the Calendar in Criminal District Court, UNC Sch. of Gov’t (July  2010).

Read more