Joseph L. Hyde

News Roundup

The biggest story in criminal law this week was undoubtedly the arrest of Justin Timberlake, former member of The Mickey Mouse Club and NSYNC, on charges of driving while intoxicated. A police officer in Sag Harbor, New York, reportedly observed a gray 2025 BMW run a stop sign, and when the officer pulled the car over, he found the Prince of Pop Justin Timberlake (the title is shared with Justin Bieber and Bruno Mars) behind the wheel. According to the arrest report filed Tuesday, Timberlake had bloodshot eyes and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and was unsteady on his feet. He performed poorly on field sobriety tests. NBC News reports that Timberlake told the officer he had one martini. His wife Jessica Biel is reportedly not happy about her husband’s arrest.

Read on for more criminal law news.

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A Pink Shirt on Wednesday: State v. Singleton and the End of the Common Law Jurisdictional Indictment Rule

In its last batch of opinions, issued May 23, 2024, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided two indictment cases: State v. Singleton, No. 318PA22, __ N.C. __ (2024), and State v. Stewart, No. 23PA22, __ N.C. __ (2024). Stewart closely follows a recent precedent (In re J.U., 384 N.C. 618 (2023), discussed here), holding that nonconsensual sexual contact necessarily implies force, so an indictment alleging nonconsent need not also allege “the element of force.” Stewart, Slip Op. 8. Singleton, however, is by far the more significant. Beyond finding no defect in the indictment under review, the Supreme Court there announced the demise of the common law rule that an indictment that fails to allege all the elements of the offense is jurisdictionally defective. This post examines the new framework of indictment defects inaugurated by Singleton.

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Sufficient to Allege: Short-circuiting Short-forms in State v. Singleton and State v. Crowder

Statutes prescribing simplified charging language were intended to alleviate the burdensome pleading requirements of the common law.  See Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.1(c).  Indeed, where a short-form pleading is statutorily authorized, it is not necessary to allege all the elements of the offense.  See State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 259, 307 S.E.2d 339, 350 (1983).  But how closely must a short form track the language prescribed by statute?  The Court of Appeals recently decided a couple of cases that address the issue.  This post considers those cases.

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One Unbroken Chain of Events: The Doctrine of Continuous Transaction in State v. Jackson

Robbery is larceny from the person by violence or intimidation.  The exact relationship between the taking and the violence is vexing.  There is authority for the proposition that the use of force must be such as to induce the victim to part with the property.  State v. Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 476, 302 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1983).  A recent opinion of the Court of Appeals reminds us, however, that the violence need not coincide with the taking when there is a continuous transaction.  See State v. Jackson, No. COA23-636, 2024 WL 1172327 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2024).  In such cases, the evidence may support a conviction for robbery, even if the victim is incapacitated, unconscious, or dead.  This post explores the doctrine of continuous transaction.

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Within the Four Corners: Scouring Indictments for Missing Elements in State v. Jackson and State v. Coffey.

Two recent opinions from the Court of Appeals illustrate the remarkable controversy currently underway over the specificity required of indictments.  In State v. Coffey, No. COA22-883, 2024 WL 675881 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2024), our Court of Appeals ruled an indictment for felony obstruction of justice was facially defective for failure to allege an essential element of the offense: the purpose of hindering or impeding a judicial or official proceeding or investigation.  By contrast, in State v. Jackson, No. COA22-280, 2024 WL 925480 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2024), our Court of Appeals ruled an indictment for habitual misdemeanor assault was sufficient though it failed explicitly to allege an element: causing physical injury.  This post attempts to reconcile the divergent analytical approaches taken in Coffey and Jackson.

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Aggregating Value: A Prosecutor’s Guide to the New G.S. 15A-1340.16F

A new statute, effective next month (March 1, 2024), will give prosecutors greater power to combine the value of stolen property to justify a harsher sentence for certain financial crimes.  S.L. 2023-151, § 2(a).  Section 15A-1340.16F provides that if a person is convicted of two or more of the same financial crimes – embezzlement, false pretenses, or elder exploitation – the crimes may be “aggregated for sentencing” if: (1) the crimes were committed against more than one victim or in more than one county, and (2) the crimes were based on the same act or transaction or series thereof connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.  The statute lays out a comprehensive arrangement for pleading, procedure, and punishment.  This post explores the new law.

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The Surest Point of All the Law: Evolving Standards in State v. Lancaster

Reminiscent of the Wars of the Roses, our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in State v. Lancaster, __ N.C. __, 895 S.E.2d 337 (2023), concerns an offense first codified in 1328 during the reign of Edward III.  The common law crime of going armed to the terror of the public, our Supreme Court there held, does not require allegation or proof that the conduct occurred on a public highway; hence, there was no facial defect in an indictment omitting this putative element.  Other elements not explicitly stated in the same indictment – for the purpose of terrifying, in a manner that would naturally terrify – were “clearly inferable.”  This post examines Lancaster to ascertain the direction of our Supreme Court’s avowed retreat from archaic pleading requirements.

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Is Rule 608(b) a Rule of Exclusion?

In State v. Hamilton, No. COA22-847 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023), the Court of Appeals held the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant about statements he made in open court “was an inappropriate form of impeachment.”  Slip Op. p. 13.  In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals cited, among other things, Evidence Rule 608(b).  That rule generally bars evidence of specific instances of a witness’s conduct for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility; however, specific instances of conduct may be inquired into on cross-examination if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 608 cmt.  This post examines the use of Rule 608(b) in Hamilton to determine how a prosecutor can avoid improper impeachment.

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Questions of Law: Untangling Admissibility in State v. Gibbs.

Is fentanyl an opiate?  That’s the question the prosecutor asked a witness in State v Gibbs.  The trial court overruled the defendant’s objection, and the witness was permitted to testify that fentanyl was both an opioid and an opiate.  In an unpublished opinion (“Gibbs I”), the Court of Appeals ruled this was error, reversing a conviction for trafficking by possession.  Our Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals.  In a concise, per curiam opinion, our Supreme Court declared that whether fentanyl is an opiate is a question of law, and it remanded for reconsideration.  In a subsequent unpublished opinion (“Gibbs II”), the Court of Appeals determined that fentanyl is an opiate as a matter of law.  Reasoning that there was no need for an expert witness to testify on the issue, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no error in the defendant’s conviction for trafficking.  Of course, whether such testimony is necessary does not resolve whether this particular evidence was admissible.  Gibbs is an evidence case, but the rule it illustrates is elusive.  This post examines Gibbs to ascertain whether the prosecutor asked a permissible question.

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