blankShea Denning

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Grand Jurors, Impartiality, and Disqualification

In North Carolina, a person must be indicted by a grand jury or must waive the right to indictment before he or she may prosecuted in superior court for a felony offense. N.C. Const. Art. 1, § 22. The right to a grand jury determination of whether a person must stand trial for a felony has been characterized as “one of the greatest safeguards of the freedom of the citizen.” State v. Barker, 107 N.C. 913, 919 (1890)

Grand juries consist of 18 members who typically serve 12-month terms, with nine grand jurors rotating off the grand jury every six months. At least 12 grand jurors must be present for the grand jury to lawfully conduct its business.

In contrast to the time-consuming voir dire associated with the selection of petit jurors for individual criminal trials, selection of grand jurors is a relatively brief process. The superior court judge presiding over the first session of criminal superior court after each January 1 and July 1 reviews questionnaires completed by grand jurors to determine whether those jurors randomly selected from the pool of summoned jurors meet the qualifications set forth in G.S. 9-3. G.S. 15A-622(b). The judge then considers hardship excuses related to the person’s inability to carry out the service of a grand juror. The judge does not inquire into potential grand jurors’ experiences, predilections, or knowledge of those involved in the case – issues frequently explored during the selection of trial jurors. Because the matters to be presented to the grand jury are not pre-determined, it is not possible to suss out a juror’s possible connection to or knowledge of those matters in advance of grand juror’s selection.

After impaneling the grand jury, the presiding judge appoints one of the grand jurors as its foreperson. G.S. 15A-622(e). In selecting that person, the judge may consider qualities reasonably related to that leadership role such as a grand juror’s education, work experience, ability to follow instructions, and prior grand jury experience. See State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 459 (1989). The foreperson presides over grand jury hearings and may excuse individual grand jurors from attending particular sessions. See G.S. 15A-622(d); 15A-623(b).

Once the grand jury is impaneled and the foreperson selected, its work is done in secret. See G.S. 15A-623(e). Only the grand jurors may be present in the grand jury room during deliberations and voting. G.S. 15A-623(d).

So what happens when a grand juror turns out to have a connection with a witness or potential defendant or independent knowledge related to the crime alleged in a bill of indictment?

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State v. Chambers and the Substitution and Discharging of Alternate Jurors Pursuant to G.S. 15A-1215(a)

Criminal law practitioners may recall that in 2021 the General Assembly amended G.S. 15A-1215(a) to permit the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations have begun in a criminal trial. S.L. 2021-94. When those changes became effective for jurors selected on or after October 1, 2021, North Carolina joined the federal courts and several other states that permit this practice.

The practice was, however, challenged within a few years of enactment. And the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Chambers, 292 N.C. App. 459 (2024), held that notwithstanding G.S. 15A-1215(a), the state constitutional requirement for unanimous verdict of twelve jurors in a criminal case prohibited the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations begin. Two weeks ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, upholding the statute as constitutional. This post will review the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Chambers, No. 56PA24, ___ N.C. ___ (2025), and consider how trial courts must handle alternate jurors in future trials.

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Procedures for Criminal Bench Trials in Superior Court

The North Carolina Constitution historically mandated trial by jury in all criminal cases in superior court. See N.C. Const. Art. I, Section 24 (2014) (“No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court. The General Assembly may, however, provide for other means of trial for misdemeanors, with the right of appeal for trial de novo.”); State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 79 (1971) (“In this State, the only exception to the rule that ‘nothing can be a conviction but the verdict of a jury’ . . .  is the constitutional authority granted the General Assembly to provide for the Initial trial of misdemeanors in inferior courts without a jury, with trial De novo by a jury upon appeal. . . . It is equally rudimentary that a trial by jury in a criminal action cannot be waived by the accused in the Superior Court as long as his plea remains ‘not guilty.’”); State v. Bunch, 196 N.C. App. 438, 440 (2009), aff’d, 363 N.C. 841 (2010) (“Unlike the right to a jury trial established by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the right to a jury trial pursuant to Article I, Section 24, cannot be waived.”); see also State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749, 750–51 (1884) (“The constitution (Art. I, §13) provides that “no person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court. The legislature may, however, provide other means of trial for petty misdemeanors with the right of appeal.’”). Thus, a defendant who wished to proceed to trial in superior court had to do so before a jury. There was no option for a criminal trial in superior court in which the judge served as the finder of fact – a procedure known as a bench trial. The state constitution was, however, amended effective December 1, 2014 (for criminal offenses arraigned in superior court on or after that date) to allow a defendant in a noncapital case to waive the right to a jury trial with the consent of the trial judge. S.L. 2013-300.

As a result, Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution currently provides:

No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court, except that a person accused of any criminal offense for which the State is not seeking a sentence of death in superior court may, in writing or on the record in the court and with the consent of the trial judge, waive jury trial, subject to procedures prescribed by the General Assembly. The General Assembly may, however, provide for other means of trial for misdemeanors, with the right of appeal for trial de novo.

G.S. 15A-1201 prescribes the procedures for waiving jury trial in superior court in favor of a bench trial. G.S. 15A-1201(b) provides that when a defendant — with the consent of the trial judge — waives the right to trial by jury, the whole matter of law and fact “shall be heard and judgment given by the court.” Those determinations include aggravating factors in impaired driving cases under G.S. 20-179 and aggravating factors in structured sentencing cases under G.S. 15A-1340.16.

So how is it done?

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Updated Chapters in Superior Court Judges’ Benchbook

Three chapters in the criminal law section of the Superior Court Judges’ Benchbook recently have been updated. Among those chapters is Joinder and Severance, which addresses the joinder and severance of both offenses and defendants for trial, including the factors used to assess whether joinder is appropriate, the applicable procedural rules, and potential remedies for failure … Read more

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NCSC Project:  Preserving the Future of Juries & Jury Trials

The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) recently published a report addressing “unprecedented challenges” facing juries and jury trials. The report opined that these challenges include both affirmative attacks on juries and jury trials due to unpopular verdicts as well as enervation on the part of the public regarding civil engagement generally and jury service specifically. Follow-on effects are an erosion of public trust in the jury system and jury pools that are less representative of the communities from which they are selected, according to the report’s authors. The report also highlighted the decline in the number of jury trials in criminal and civil cases, which it said meant that younger lawyers gain less trial experience. The authors posited that when those lawyers become trial judges, they are less prepared to oversee jury trials, creating a “feedback loop . . . leading to even fewer trials and greater pressure to settle or plea bargain cases.” The overarching identified concern was that the jury system might become a “marginalized part of the justice system, with fewer people participating and less public trust in the outcomes.” The report went on to identify four critical vulnerabilities related to the future of juries and jury trials and recommended strategies to address them.

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When May a Trial Judge Reject a Plea Entered Pursuant to a Plea Agreement?

A trial judge has broad discretion regarding whether to accept a defendant’s guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence. G.S. 15A-1023(b). In that circumstance, the judge must advise the parties whether he or she approves of the arrangement and will dispose of the case accordingly. If the judge rejects the arrangement, the judge must so inform the parties, refuse to accept the plea, and advise the State and the defendant that neither is bound by the rejected arrangement. The judge must tell the parties why he or she rejected the arrangement and give them an opportunity to modify it to meet the judge’s approval. The parties are not required to modify the arrangement, and, upon rejection of the arrangement, the defendant is entitled to have the case continued to the next session of court.

The judge’s rejection of the arrangement must be noted in the record, but such a rejection does not appear to preclude another judge from later accepting the arrangement. (The notation of the trial court’s discretionary decision arguably is not a discretionary order of the sort that would require changed circumstances to justify modification by another judge. See generally Michael Crowell, One Trial Judge Overruling Another, Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2015/06 (UNC School of Government December 2015) (discussing the general rule that one trial judge may modify an order entered by another trial judge on a matter of discretion only if there has been a substantial change in circumstances)).

Those rules apply to a plea agreement in which the State has agreed to recommend a sentence. But what about arrangement where the State makes no such recommendation? Does the trial court retain discretion to reject those?

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State v. Fearns Finds Second Judge Lacked Authority to Enter Order When Hearing Was Held by First Judge

A few weeks ago, I wrote about the circumstances in which one judge may pick up case-related duties that another judge is unable to complete. Yesterday, the court of appeals decided a case in this area, determining in State v. Fearns, COA23-650, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2025), that a judge lacked authority to enter an order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss when the hearing on that motion was held by another judge. This post will discuss Fearns.

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What happens when the original judge is no longer available?

Questions sometimes arise in criminal cases about whether a new judge may pick up duties initially undertaken by another judge who is no longer available.  Consider the following scenarios.

  1. Trial begins with Judge A presiding. Judge A falls ill on day 3 of trial. May Judge B substitute as the presiding judge?
  2. Judge A presided over a suppression hearing in December 2024, just before her term expired at the end of the year. Judge A announced her ruling in open court and directed the prevailing party to prepare an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judge A did not sign the order before her term expired. May Judge B enter an order containing findings of fact and memorializing Judge A’s ruling?
  3. Judge A also presided over a probation violation hearing in December 2024. She determined that the defendant violated the terms of his probation, and she modified the judgment, announcing her ruling in court. She did not sign the judgment before her term expired. May Judge B sign the judgment memorializing Judge A’s decision?

The answers to the questions posed above are, respectively (1) yes, (2) no, and (3) maybe. Keep reading to learn why.

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Justice Riggs, Seat 6, and Holdover Status

In September 2023, then-Governor Roy Cooper appointed Allison Riggs to fill a vacancy on the North Carolina Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice Michael Morgan. As an appointee, Associate Justice Riggs was eligible to hold the seat (Seat 6) until January 1 following the next general election held more than 60 days after the vacancy occurred. In Riggs’ case, that election was held on November 5, 2024. In the normal course of events, the results of that election would have been certified in December 2024 and the prevailing candidate would have taken office on January 1, 2025. The election did not, however, follow the usual path.

The vote tally for Seat 6 was unusually close. After a recount, Riggs maintained a slim 734 vote lead over her challenger, current Court of Appeals Judge Jefferson Griffin. Judge Griffin filed election protests challenging votes cast by more than 60,000 individuals, alleging on various grounds that these persons were ineligible to vote in this election. The North Carolina State Board of Elections (“State Board”) assumed jurisdiction over Griffin’s protests and rejected his challenges. Griffin thereafter sought relief from the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the State Board removed the matter to federal court. The federal court abstained from reaching the merits and remanded the matter to the North Carolina Supreme Court on January 6. The next day (three days before the State Board was to certify the election results) the state supreme court granted Griffin’s motion for a temporary stay barring the State Board from certifying the results.

There is a lot in this situation to unpack, but I wanted to address a top-line issue: Given that the election has not been certified, who holds Seat 6? And what happens for other elected and appointed officers when their terms expire and no successor has yet been elected and qualified or appointed?

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