Nearly five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a case arising from the police interrogation of a middle school student in Chapel Hill. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that police officers must consider a juvenile’s age when determining whether they must read juveniles their Miranda rights before questioning them. The ruling represents a major shift in Miranda jurisprudence by establishing a different standard for evaluating police interrogations of juveniles – the reasonable child standard. In the years since J.D.B., however, lower courts have not clearly defined how the reasonable child standard impacts the assessment of whether a juvenile was “in custody.” The application of this new standard also raises questions about how North Carolina courts evaluate custody determinations in the school setting. These and other issues are addressed in “Applying the Reasonable Child Standard to Juvenile Interrogations After J.D.B. v. North Carolina” (No. 2016/01), a new Juvenile Law Bulletin.
Search and Seizure
North Carolina Court of Appeals Issues Ruling on a Strip Search by Law Enforcement Officers
In 2013, I wrote two posts on strip searches by law enforcement officers, which are available here and here. This post discusses the first published North Carolina appellate court strip search case since these posts: State v. Collins, 2016 WL 385690 (N.C. App., Feb. 2, 2016).
Advising a Defendant Who Does Not Speak English of His Implied Consent Rights
I almost missed this one. While I regularly monitor the published opinions of our state’s appellate courts, I generally skip the unpublished decisions. So I initially overlooked the court of appeals’ opinion in State v. Martinez, ___ S.E.2d ___ (N.C. App. Jan. 5, 2016) (first released as unpublished, but later published), which addresses a recurring question in DWI cases: Must a defendant who does not speak English be advised of statutory implied consent rights in a language that he or she understands?
Understanding Whether a Seizure Occurs When an Officer’s Vehicle Blocks Another Vehicle
In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), the United States Supreme Court reformulated the definition of a seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. This post discusses this case and its application to a particular issue: whether an officer’s blocking another vehicle with the officer’s vehicle is a seizure of the vehicle occupants.
Body Cameras and the Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment
Many law enforcement officers, including those in five of North Carolina’s six largest cities, are or soon will be wearing body cameras. The prevailing view is that the use of such cameras doesn’t constitute a Fourth Amendment search because the cameras record only what an officer is already able to see. This post considers whether the increasing adoption of body cameras and other data-collection technologies could eventually result in body camera recordings being considered searches under the so-called mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment.
Update on U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling in Rodriguez v. United States Concerning Extension of Traffic Stops
Last April, the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), significantly limited the scope of a traffic stop. The officer in Rodriguez completed a traffic stop for driving on the shoulder of a highway after checking the vehicle registration and driver’s licenses of the driver and passenger, conducting a warrant check, returning all documents, and issuing the driver a warning ticket. The officer then asked the driver for consent to walk his drug dog around the vehicle, but the driver refused to give his consent. Nonetheless, the officer told the driver to turn off the ignition, leave the vehicle, and wait for a second officer. When the second officer arrived, the first officer walked his drug dog around the car, and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. A search of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine. Seven to eight minutes had elapsed from the time the officer issued the written warning until the dog’s alert.
N.C. Court of Appeals Rules That Affidavit For Search Warrant to Search Residence Failed to Link Residence to Drug Activity That Had Occurred Elsewhere
Last week a three-judge panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Allman (5 Jan. 2016), ruled (2-1) that a search warrant to search a residence for drugs was not supported by probable cause because the affidavit failed to link the residence to drug activity that had occurred elsewhere. This post discusses some of the interesting issues in this case, including possible state supreme court review.
The Latest on McNeely and Implied Consent
Here I go again (perhaps on my own) with another update on the state of implied consent after Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). These updates occur more often than teeth-cleanings and may be awaited with the same degree of anticipation. But given that there’s a split of authority developing between the states, and North Carolina courts have not yet weighed in, I think these are developments worth following.
Eyewitness Identification Reform Act Extended to Show-Ups
Effective December 1, S.L. 2015-212 extends the Eyewitness Identification Reform Act, G.S. 15A-284.52, to cover show-ups. But the bill leaves the status of photographic show-ups in doubt and contains a strange provision regarding law enforcement officers as eyewitnesses. This post unpacks the new law.