I recently taught on the basics of drug law in North Carolina and was reminded just what a tricky area it can be. Chapter 90 of the N.C. General Statutes is a dense, complex, and ever-evolving set of laws proscribing controlled substances. There are many substances, offenses, enhancements, and sentencing rules to know, as well as evidence issues and offense-specific case law. One thorny area involves the law of drug mixtures. While practitioners handling felony drug cases may be aware of the rules here, they may come as a surprise to others. Some applications of the law in this area can produce unexpected results for the unwary defendant. Today’s post examines the rules of drug mixtures and their implications in North Carolina. Continue reading
Tag Archives: controlled substances
Effective immediately, there is a new exception to G.S. 90-113.22 (possession of drug paraphernalia) and G.S. 90-113.22A (possession of marijuana paraphernalia). Pursuant to S.L. 2019-159, it is “not unlawful” for a drug user to possess or use “testing equipment for identifying or analyzing the strength, effectiveness, or purity” of drugs, or for an “organization that promotes scientifically proven ways of mitigating health risks associated with drug use” to possess or distribute such equipment. Read on to find out what’s behind the change. Continue reading →
Chances are you’ve heard of CBD products. Many cities around North Carolina have stores specializing in CBD products, and it’s widely available online and in ‘vape’ shops. It’s marketed for its health benefits and is touted as a safe and legal (if largely unregulated) treatment for a variety of conditions, from depression to inflammation to cancer and acne. I was recently asked to look at the law surrounding CBD products, and this post summarizes what I found. Continue reading →
A considerable amount of digital ink has been expended on this blog discussing the rules for identifying drugs at trial and related issues, although it has been several years since we covered it. It’s an important and potentially dispositive issue in drug trials. Consider the following fact pattern:
The defendant is charged with possession of methamphetamine. During her arrest and processing, she tells the officer that she has “meth” on her person, which is seized by the officers. At trial, the officer testifies to her statement about the nature of the substance, and the alleged meth is itself introduced at trial. However, no chemical analysis is introduced, nor is there any expert testimony about the substance, and the defendant presents no evidence. At the close of the State’s evidence, the defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of the identity of the alleged drugs. Should the motion be allowed? Read on for the answer. Continue reading →
An ancient maxim of the law is ignorantia juris non excusat, or ignorance of the law does not excuse. Put another way, it is presumed that the public knows the laws, and a defense of ignorance is typically not allowed. This principle is at the heart of the recent decision by the state supreme court in State v. Miller, ___ N.C. ___, (June 9, 2017). Continue reading →
This session, the General Assembly made some changes to the statute governing the fingerprinting of criminal defendants. Inside and outside the School of Government, people are divided about whether the statute now requires officers to arrest, rather than cite, individuals for misdemeanor marijuana possession offenses. Continue reading →
Today, the court of appeals reversed a defendant’s drug convictions because the indictments identified the controlled substances in question using terms that are widely used to describe the drugs, but that are neither the chemical names listed in the controlled substance schedules nor – according to the court – “trade names” for the drugs. Because more and more drug cases involve pharmaceuticals that have many names, it is worth reviewing the case. Continue reading →
I’ve recently been asked several variants of this question: If a suspect sells drugs to an undercover officer on multiple occasions over a few days or weeks, can the drug quantities involved in each sale be aggregated to reach the trafficking threshold? That led me to spend some time looking at the more general issue of when multiple caches of drugs can be combined. This post lays out the law. Continue reading →
When a person is arrested while in possession of drugs and is taken to the jail in handcuffs, may the person properly be convicted of possessing drugs in a confinement facility? The question has divided courts across the country. Last week, a majority of the court of appeals concluded that the answer is yes. State v. Barnes, __ N.C. App. __ (2013) (Ervin, J.) (McGee, J., dissenting).
Facts. The defendant was arrested for DWI, and while he was being processed at the jail, a bag containing 4.05 grams of marijuana fell out of his pants. He was eventually convicted of, inter alia, possession of marijuana at a confinement facility in violation of G.S. 90-95(e)(9).
Mens rea issue. The court first addressed the defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, as there was no evidence that he intended to bring the drugs to a confinement facility. The court of appeals disagreed, unanimously on this issue, ruling that the offense is a general intent crime, requiring only that the defendant knowingly possessed drugs at a confinement facility, which he did.
Voluntariness issue. The issue that divided the court was the defendant’s argument that he did not commit the offense voluntarily, as he was brought to the jail under arrest. Although agreeing that criminal liability generally requires a voluntary act, the majority nonetheless rejected the claim. It noted that the statutory language defining the offense says nothing about voluntariness, and that the apparent purpose of the statute – to minimize drugs in jails – would be best served by giving it broad application. But the heart of the opinion stated that a majority of other jurisdictions (7 out of 10 cited in the opinion) have upheld convictions for similar crimes under similar circumstances, and endorsed the reasoning of many of those courts that “a defendant who is arrested with controlled substances in his possession has options other than simply taking the controlled substances with him into the confinement facility. For example, the defendant always has an opportunity to disclose the existence of these controlled substances to the arresting officer before he ever reaches the jail.”
Dissent. Judge McGee dissented on the voluntariness issue, reasoning that “[t]he officer took Defendant to the confinement facility. Defendant had no ability to choose his own course of action regarding his location,” and so did not voluntarily possess the drugs at the jail. As to the majority’s suggestion that the defendant had the option of disclosing the presence of the drugs before reaching the jail, Judge McGee concluded that requiring the defendant to do so would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (The majority stated in a footnote that the defendant did not raise the Fifth Amendment issue but that, in any event, the dilemma was of the defendant’s own making and did not involve testimony under coercion.)
Further review. I couldn’t find any indication on the supreme court’s electronic docket that the defendant is seeking further review based on the dissent, but that would be a natural next step. So, stay tuned for further developments.
Side issue regarding conviction for simple possession. It’s worth mentioning briefly that the defendant argued, the State conceded, and the court of appeals ruled that the defendant should not have been convicted of both the confinement facility offense and the lesser-included offense of simple possession.
Cyclist Lance Armstrong has recently confessed to using performance enhancing drugs during each of his seven Tour de France victories. Public discussion has focused on whether his apology, during an interview with Oprah Winfrey, was genuine or not. I want to consider whether his conduct was criminal. (By “conduct,” I mean the doping and related activity, not the interview!)
There’s a North Carolina connection. This article observes that at Beech Mountain, near Boone, you can ride “the route Lance Armstrong used to train for his final Tour De France.” And in one of his autobiographies, Armstrong recounts a North Carolina ride that renewed his faith in cycling. (I think it was his first book, It’s Not About the Bike. As an aside, I think it’s a red flag when a person writes more than one autobiography.)
The full story of Armstrong’s systematic doping and his campaign to cover it up is told in this report from the United States Anti-Doping Agency, USADA. Briefly, the agency concludes that Armstrong masterminded “a massive team doping scheme, more extensive than any previously revealed in professional sports history” and engaged in a “fraudulent course of conduct that extended over a decade and leave no doubt that Mr. Armstrong’s career . . . was fueled from start to finish by doping.”
Obviously, Armstong and his foundation have also done a great deal of good, and the purpose of this post isn’t to assess Armstrong’s legacy. My personal view is that the doping and the lying are pretty much par for the course in professional sports, but that Armstrong’s willingness to threaten, sue, slander, and destroy the livelihoods of those who told the truth about his drug use will forever disgrace him.
Anyhow, the basic criminal law issues are these:
Perjury. Armstrong has repeatedly denied, under oath, using performance enhancing drugs. Fox News reports here that “Armstrong, by the USADA’s count, has made seven statements under oath . . . that could lead to criminal charges.” The facts seem to be quite clear-cut, but Armstrong may have some defenses unrelated to factual guilt, as I discuss below.
Obstruction of Justice. In addition to lying about his doping, Armstrong attempted to prevent others from telling the truth about his conduct and the conduct of others. He reportedly told one cyclist who testified in a doping case, “[y]ou made a mistake when you testified . . . I can destroy you,” told another witness that he would make his life a “living . . . hell,” and successfully used his stature within cycling to have another witness fired from his job. This type of conduct would support charges of obstruction of justice or witness intimidation.
Fraud. Armstrong received sponsorship money, race appearance fees, and prize money, all based in part on his representations that he was clean. He is already facing multiple civil suits alleging fraud, and criminal fraud charges, state or federal, may also be possibilities.
Controlled substance charges. Among the drugs Armstrong admitted using as part of his doping regimen was testosterone. Testosterone is a Schedule III controlled substance. Furthermore, it appears that Armstrong provided drugs to other riders on his team and/or pressured them to use drugs, meaning that he may be guilty of drug distribution and conspiracy, not merely simple possession.
Possible defenses or bars to prosecution. Some commentators that have considered the possibility of criminal charges against Armstrong have concluded that the statute of limitations is likely to bar prosecution. (For example, this Sports Illustrated article suggests that the statute of limitations may preclude any perjury or drug charges.) But those articles have generally focused on federal law, which has defined limitations periods for almost all criminal offenses. State laws vary. As readers of this blog know, North Carolina has no statute of limitations for felonies, and other states may also have long or no limitations periods. Given the many jurisdictions across which Armstrong’s conduct took place, including some foreign countries, it strikes me as likely that there are jurisdictions where prosecution remains possible. Furthermore, while it is true that the federal government not long ago publicly declined to prosecute Armstrong, that doesn’t pose a barrier to a new investigation. Jeopardy never attached, the government never entered into a non-prosecution agreement, and the available evidence now is very different. And of course, appropriate state or local authorities may also investigate.
To sum up, Armstrong’s doping-related conduct likely violated multiple criminal laws. I disagree with the comment by prominent defense lawyer Mark Geragos that “I am sure Lance’s lawyer has vetted [his confession to Oprah] and doesn’t see any criminal exposure.” It seems to me more likely that his legal team sees considerable potential criminal exposure, but simply concluded that confessing to Oprah wouldn’t make the danger any greater. Whether prosecuting Armstrong is a good use of resources is a separate question, but the legal basis for possible prosecution appears quite sound.
