Latest posts in category Crimes and Elements on North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

December is an exciting time of year. Some people are focused on the upcoming holidays, others on the chance of snow flurries. Here at the School of Government, we’re paying […]

In an earlier blog post, I summarized North Carolina’s harm reduction immunity laws, including our safe syringe exchange law, G.S. 90-113.27, our Good Samaritan law, G.S. 90-96.2, and others.  North […]

December 1 is approaching, which means that many of the changes enacted by the General Assembly this session will be taking effect soon. Among the pending changes are those enacted by Iryna’s law (H 307), which I covered in greater detail in an earlier blog post. This follow-up post focuses on the new category of “violent offenses.”

I’m pleased to share that the eighth edition of North Carolina Crimes: A Guidebook on the Elements of Crime is now available.

Under G.S. 14-34.10, it is a felony for any person to discharge a firearm within any occupied enclosure, such as a motor vehicle, with the intent to incite fear in another. G.S. 14-34.10. In State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025), the Court of Appeals held that the plain language of this statute was satisfied by a defendant who fired a gun from inside his car, injuring a victim in another car. More recently, in State v. Hardaway, No. COA24-538 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025), the Court of Appeals, over a doubtful concurrence, found itself bound by Jenkins. This post considers the statutory construction of G.S. 14-34.10 in Jenkins and Hardaway.

The legislature enacted a raft of changes this summer to motor vehicle and criminal law. This post examines three session laws that enhanced criminal penalties and revised regulations for motor vehicle offenses and operation. The changes cover broad ground, including changing vehicle inspection requirements, authorizing speed-measuring cameras, and heightening penalties for certain motor vehicle offenses that result in injury. Read on to learn more.

Several times a year, I teach different groups about criminal domestic violence laws in North Carolina. Last year, I highlighted the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV) under G.S. 14-32.5 in many of the sessions, but there were many unresolved questions. Earlier this month, the General Assembly passed Session Law 2025-70 (Senate Bill 429) which, among other things, answers many of those questions. This post reviews the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and the pending changes to the law.

A few weeks ago, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed into law, S.L. 2025-71. The bill makes quite a few changes to the criminal law. It creates new crimes, like a larceny offense specific to gift cards; enhances the penalties for existing crimes, including certain racing and reckless driving offenses; and creates sentencing enhancements when a gun is used in connection with specified drug crimes and offenses involving breaking or entering. Today’s post focuses on the bill’s amendment to G.S. 14-51, which addresses “first and second degree burglary.” Does the amendment quietly remove the  element of burglary that requires the offense to be committed in the nighttime?

Back in February, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Nanes, COA24-487, ___ N.C. App. ___; 912 S.E.2d 202 (Feb. 19, 2025) (summarized here). The case considered and ultimately rejected facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to G.S. 14-415.1, our state prohibition on possession of firearms by a felon. Nanes squarely rejected the idea that G.S. 14-415.1 was facially unconstitutional but left open the possibility that the statute may be unconstitutional as applied to a different defendant. In State v. Ducker, COA24-373, ___ N.C. App. ___ ; ___ S.E.2d ___(May 7, 2025) (summarized here), the Court of Appeals closed the door on that possibility, ruling that Second Amendment rights do not apply to convicted felons and rejecting the need for a felony-by-felony analysis for as-applied Second Amendment challenges. Both Nanes and Ducker also considered and rejected related claims under Article I, Sec. 30 of the North Carolina Constitution. Today’s post examines these decisions.

After State v. Singleton, 386 N.C. 183 (2024), an indictment is not rendered facially invalid by failure to allege all the elements of a crime. One issue that remains unresolved is the consequence of failure to allege the State’s theory. Two post-Singleton cases decided last year found reversible error when the trial court instructed the jury on a theory not alleged in the indictment. See State v. Wilson, 910 S.E.2d 407 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2024); State v. Little, 296 N.C. App. 424 (2024). More recently, in State v. Tate, No. COA24-450 (N.C. Ct. App. June 18, 2025), the Court of Appeals cited Singleton in support of its conclusion that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on a theory that was not alleged in the indictment. This post examines the opinion in Tate.