Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible unless the only reason for introducing the evidence is to show the defendant’s propensity for committing the crime. In a trial involving a defendant’s sexual assault of children, the prosecutor told the jury, “[t]he best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.” Is that an inaccurate statement of law? The Court of Appeals recently held that it was. This post considers the rule – that incorrect statements of law in closing argument are improper – and its application in this case, State v. Anderson, No. COA23-821 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug 6, 2024).
Crimes and Elements
Grants Pass: Local Government Authority and the Constitutionality of Laws Against Camping or Sleeping in Public
According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, well over half a million people are unhoused on any given night in America. Given the magnitude of the crisis, local governments face immense challenges in addressing the underlying causes of homelessness while managing public health and safety concerns. Some local governments, including many in North Carolina, have adopted anti-camping and/or anti-sleeping ordinances as part of their response.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently considered whether the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause barred an Oregon city’s adoption of ordinances restricting camping on public property in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 603 U. S. ____ (2024). One of us previewed the case and commented on the oral arguments a few months ago. On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court upheld the city’s public camping laws, concluding that their enforcement does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. This blog post analyzes the Court’s decision and offers guidance to local governments regarding anti-sleeping and anti-camping ordinances.
[Editor’s note: This post is cross posted on Coates’ Canons, the School of Government’s local government law blog.]
Legislative Amendments to Larceny Laws
Sticky-fingered Sam goes to the local shoe store to purchase a new pair of shoes. The last pair of shoes in her size are priced at $150. Deciding that these are too expensive, Sam removes a sticker from a box of shoes on the clearance shelf priced at $30 and places the sticker on the box of the shoes she wants. Sam takes the $150 shoes to the register with the $30 sticker on them, pays the lower price, and leaves. Has Sam committed a larceny? Has Sam committed the crime of larceny from a merchant under G.S. 14-72.11?
Sam’s acts do constitute larceny and are similar to the acts of the defendant in State vs. Hill, 291 N.C. App. 633 (2023). However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s use of a price label sticker from another product did not represent larceny by product code (a form of larceny from a merchant) under G.S. 14-72.11(3). The court acknowledged that there is another larceny statute that would have been more appropriate for this circumstance. In response to Hill, the North Carolina General Assembly has amended the laws related to larceny and retail theft to bring more clarity about its scope. This post discusses the holding in State v. Hill and examines the newly amended laws applicable to these specific types of larceny.
Kidnapping by Pursuit: Evading Criminal Liability in State v. Andrews.
In a case decided earlier this month, the Court of Appeals overturned the defendant’s conviction for kidnapping when the evidence showed only an unsuccessful carjacking. See State v. Andrews, No. COA23-675 (N.C. Ct. App. July 2, 2024). Given the particular facts of the case – the defendant threatened the victim with a firearm, the victim fled in his car, and the defendant gave chase in his van – the Court of Appeals might have concluded that a car chase does not constitute the sort of confinement, restraint, or removal that G.S. 14-39 (kidnapping) was intended to address. Instead, it held that the defendant’s high-speed pursuit of the victim was a restraint that was not sufficiently distinct from that inherent in the attempted armed robbery. Citing double jeopardy concerns, the Court of Appeals reversed the kidnapping conviction. This post examines the opinion in Andrews.
Backing Away from Bruen? Supreme Court Upholds Law Barring Restraining Order Subjects from Possessing Guns
On June 21, the Supreme Court decided a highly-anticipated Second Amendment case. In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. __ (2024), the Court considered a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it a felony for people subject to certain domestic violence protective orders to possess firearms. Rahimi was the Court’s first opportunity to apply the revolutionary history-focused approach to Second Amendment analysis it announced in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). In an 8-1 decision, with Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority, the Court upheld the challenged statute. Several Justices wrote significant concurrences while Justice Thomas, the author of Bruen, dissented. This post summarizes Rahimi, considers whether the case amounts to a retreat from Bruen, and addresses Rahimi’s applicability to North Carolina DVPOs. The post also considers the implications of Rahimi on pending Second Amendment cases, including those challenging felon disqualification.
Bruen Comes to North Carolina
My colleague Jeff Welty has covered the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York Rife and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and subsequent lower court cases several times before on the blog. Under Bruen, “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 17. To overcome this presumptive protection, “the government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. If the government fails to come forward with evidence showing the challenged rule is consistent with “the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” the rule is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Id. at 24.
The Court of Appeals recently applied that rule in the context of G.S. 14-269.2, North Carolina’s law prohibiting possession of weapons on educational property. In State v. Radomski, COA23-340; ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 21, 2024); temp. stay allowed, ___ N.C. ___ (June 7, 2024), a unanimous panel held that the law was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant on the facts of the case. This is the first successful Bruen challenge to a state criminal law. Today’s post examines the holding and implications of the decision, and offers suggestions to defenders on how to raise, litigate, and preserve such claims.
Grant’s Pass, Homelessness, and the Constitutionality of Anti-Sleeping and Anti-Camping Ordinances
Homelessness is a challenging problem. Some cities have attempted to address it, in part, by prohibiting sleeping or camping in public places. The Supreme Court of the United States is currently considering whether, and under what circumstances, such ordinances are constitutional. I recently listened to the oral arguments in the case. Those who are currently litigating violations of anti-sleeping or anti-camping ordinances may be interested in this summary of the issues, as may those responsible for shaping municipal policy.
Spring 2024 Cannabis Update (Part II)
In Part I of my Spring 2024 cannabis update, I discussed the search and seizure issues arising in North Carolina courts around cannabis. Part II explores drug identification evidence issues surrounding marijuana prosecutions and examines potential challenges defenders might raise. This post will also cover recent developments on the state, federal, and tribal levels impacting cannabis.
One Unbroken Chain of Events: The Doctrine of Continuous Transaction in State v. Jackson
Robbery is larceny from the person by violence or intimidation. The exact relationship between the taking and the violence is vexing. There is authority for the proposition that the use of force must be such as to induce the victim to part with the property. State v. Richardson, 308 N.C. 470, 476, 302 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1983). A recent opinion of the Court of Appeals reminds us, however, that the violence need not coincide with the taking when there is a continuous transaction. See State v. Jackson, No. COA23-636, 2024 WL 1172327 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2024). In such cases, the evidence may support a conviction for robbery, even if the victim is incapacitated, unconscious, or dead. This post explores the doctrine of continuous transaction.
Recordings by Government Officials
This post is co-authored with SOG faculty member Kristina Wilson and is cross-posted to the Coates’ Canons blog.
When and how can state and local government officials and employees record government meetings or their interactions with citizens? Does it matter if the recording is done openly or secretly? Recording may be tempting, particularly where there is a controversial matter at issue. The ability to record can be a useful tool, but there are several laws that government actors need to know if they want to use this tool legally and effectively. This post focuses on the issues surrounding government officials and employees recording oral communications outside of the law enforcement context. A later post will examine the issues surrounding video recording.