North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

Several criminal statutes include the provision that a person who commits the offense prescribed is guilty of a designated class of offense “unless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment.” E.g., G.S. 14-33(c). Two recent cases illustrate the application of such provisions. In State v. French, No. COA24-704 (N.C. Ct. App. July 2, 2025), the Court of Appeals upheld three consecutive sentences for greater and lesser assaults, despite the inclusion in the relevant statutes of a some-other-provision-of-law clause. By contrast, in State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug 6, 2025), the Court of Appeals reversed an additional sentence for discharging a firearm within an enclosure because G.S. 14-34.10 contains a some-other-provision-of-law clause. This post examines the intent and scope of the SOPL clause.

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I’m happy to announce the availability of the Second Edition of Probation Violations in North Carolina. The book is available in the School of Government bookstore, here. Even though the […]

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The legislature enacted a raft of changes this summer to motor vehicle and criminal law. This post examines three session laws that enhanced criminal penalties and revised regulations for motor vehicle offenses and operation. The changes cover broad ground, including changing vehicle inspection requirements, authorizing speed-measuring cameras, and heightening penalties for certain motor vehicle offenses that result in injury. Read on to learn more.

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Today’s post reviews the latest Structured Sentencing Statistical Report from the North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission.

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Under G.S. 15A-1380.5, a law that existed from late 1994 to late 1998, North Carolina defendants sentenced to life without parole for offenses committed between October 1, 1994, and November 30, 1998, are entitled to a judicial review of their sentence after 25 years of imprisonment. I’ve written about it on the blog twice before, here and here, and those posts cover the statutory framework and background. Now that the review window has opened for most, if not all, of the affected inmates—and with many now undergoing their second and subsequent reviews—we’re beginning to see appellate case law that both clarifies and raises questions about how the process is meant to work.

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Post-release supervision has been mandatory for all felonies since 2011. But rarely if ever does anyone mention it when advising a defendant about a waiver of counsel or the consequences of a guilty plea. It’s not clearly statutorily required to do so. But the PRS is real, especially for crimes that require registration as a sex offender, where the term of supervised release is five years. G.S. 15A-1368.2(c). Is it a problem that it doesn’t get mentioned? Yes, according to a recent case from the Court of Appeals.

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There are six sentencing levels for Driving While Impaired (DWI) convictions. A defendant is only exposed to the three most severe levels (A1, 1, and 2) if a judge or jury finds the existence of one or more “grossly aggravating factors” beyond a reasonable doubt. These factors are listed in G.S. 20-179(c). One of them is “[d]riving by the defendant at the time of the offense while the defendant's driver's license was revoked pursuant to G.S. 20‑28(a1).” Rather than applying to all revocations, G.S. 20-28(a1) applies when person’s license is revoked for an “impaired driving revocation.”  At first glance, it appears any time a person is convicted of DWI, if their license was revoked for an impaired driving revocation, this grossly aggravating factor would apply and elevate their sentencing exposure—but that may not be the case. Read on for more.

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This post is about the recurring issue of the requirement for a court to make findings of “good cause shown and stated” to preserve its jurisdiction to act on an alleged probation violation after the case has expired. The appellate courts have vacated many probation revocations for a lack of the required findings. The few affirmed cases show how to do things properly. Turns out, it’s not a demanding requirement.

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Author’s Note: The Court of Appeals withdrew the State v. Watlington decision—on which this post is partially based—on April 7, 2025 and reissued the decision on April 16, 2025. The relevant section of this post has been modified from its original. It has long been held that the allowable unit of prosecution for an offense is within the discretion of the legislature. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).  When the legislature does not clearly express legislative intent, the court must determine the allowable unit of prosecution. State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439 (1988). North Carolina courts have resolved issues related to units of prosecution in some contexts—including kidnapping, possession of firearms, and theft crimes—while there are questions that remain unanswered in other contexts. Some answers are clearer and more direct than others. I previously wrote a bulletin reviewing case law on permissible units of prosecution for certain offenses against the person, possession offenses, and theft offenses. Since then, the courts have specified units of prosecution for a few more offenses. This post provides more insight into those offenses and reviews the rule of lenity in navigating the unresolved.

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Under G.S. 15A-1346(b), a sentencing court has the authority to order a probationary sentence to run consecutively to an undischarged term of imprisonment. Probation officers refer to that as a “contingent” sentence, because for them, it is—the start of the probation is contingent on the person’s release from prison. A contingent probationary sentence can be helpful when, for example, a defendant owes a lot of restitution, and the court wants to make sure there’s plenty of time on probation remaining after the defendant finishes any active sentences. To be clear, this is not a matter of whether the suspended term of imprisonment, if revoked, will run concurrently with or consecutively to some other term of imprisonment. This is about when the period of probation itself begins. A recent Court of Appeals decision changes things.

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