The U.S. Supreme Court held in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) that any contested fact that increases the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly amended G.S. 20-179 to require judges in superior court cases to submit contested aggravating factors during impaired driving sentencing to the jury. Practically, this means that after a person is found guilty of impaired driving, if they are contesting properly alleged aggravating factors, there must be a sentencing hearing before the jury to determine any aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The North Carolina Supreme Court considered in State v. King, ___ N.C. ___, 906 S.E.2d 808 (2024) what happens if a judge finds contested aggravating factors without submitting them to the jury.
DWI
State v. C.K.D.: Knoll What?
I have written before about the cache associated with a handful of unpublished opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Sure, they aren’t binding, but they can be persuasive. My guess is that the Court’s December 2023 opinion in State v. C.K.D.. No. COA23-204, 2023 WL 8748032, ___ N.C. App. ___, 895 S.E.2d 923 (2023) (unpublished), has been used as a persuasive tool in more than a few impaired driving cases since it was decided.
The C.K.D. Court upheld the dismissal of impaired driving charges based on the detention of the defendant for 11 hours following his initial appearance pursuant to an impaired driving hold. The Court determined that (1) there was no clear and convincing evidence that the defendant who had registered a 0.17 alcohol concentration posed a danger, and (2) holding the defendant for 11 hours irreparably prejudiced the defendant’s case by depriving him of the opportunity to have others observe his condition, even though the defendant indicated he did not wish to call anyone to witness his condition in the jail or to assume responsibility for him as a sober, responsible adult. I was a bit surprised by the outcome. I would have thought that the alcohol concentration standing alone would have been sufficient to support the hold. I also would have thought that the defendant’s failure to attempt to contact anyone from jail would have defeated his claim of irreparable prejudice. As noted, I would have been wrong on both counts.
This post will discuss C.K.D., explore how it differs from other court of appeals decisions following Knoll, and consider what the takeaways may be for magistrates imposing such holds.
State v. Forney: Chewing Gum, Breath Tests, and Prejudice
In impaired driving cases, the results of a breath test of the defendant are admissible at trial when the testing is performed in accordance with statutory requirements and applicable administrative regulations. G.S. 20-139.1(b). When the testing is not carried out as required, however, the results are inadmissible. See State v. Davis, 208 N.C. App. 26, 34 (2010).
Among the testing requirements is that the law enforcement officer carrying out the test observe the defendant to determine that he or she “has not ingested alcohol or other fluids, regurgitated, vomited, eaten, or smoked in the 15 minutes immediately prior to the collection of a breath specimen.” See 10A NCAC 41B .0101(6) (defining “observation period” and specifying further that “[d]ental devices or oral jewelry need not be removed”); 10A NCAC 41B .0322 (requiring that observation periods be met before breath test is conducted). The purpose of the observation period is to ensure that the test results reflect the concentration of alcohol in a sample of the person’s deep lung breath rather than an alcohol concentration based on alcohol in the person’s mouth.
Last week, the Court of Appeals in State v. Forney, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ____ (January 16, 2024), considered whether tests results from a defendant who had chewing gum in his mouth during the observation period were admissible under G.S. 20-139.1(b).
State v. Woolard: DWI, Probable Cause, and Motions Procedures
Because the State’s ability to prove impairment in prosecutions for driving while impaired often turns on whether the officer had probable cause to arrest — and thereafter test — the defendant, probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is a frequently litigated issue in DWI cases. While for many years there was a dearth of case law exploring the hard calls in this area, that trend has changed. In several arguably close cases over the past decade, the appellate courts have considered whether impaired driving arrests by law enforcement officers were supported by probable cause. See State v. Parisi, 372 N.C. 639 (2019) (driver’s admission to drinking, his red and glassy eyes, his odor of alcohol, and multiple indicators of impairment on field sobriety tests established probable cause; affirming court of appeals’ opinion reversing trial court); State v. Lindsey, 249 N.C. App. 516 (2016) (odor of alcohol on driver’s breath, red and glassy eyes, admission to drinking, and five clues of impairment from horizontal gaze nystagmus test provided probable cause; affirming trial court order denying motion to suppress); State v. Overocker, 236 N.C. App. 423 (2014) (light odor of alcohol and consumption of three alcoholic drinks in four-hour period were insufficient to establish probable cause; affirming trial court order granting motion to suppress); and State v. Townsend, 236 N.C. App. 456 (2014) (driver’s odor of alcohol, positive results on portable breath test, bloodshot eyes, and signs of impairment while performing field sobriety tests established probable cause; affirming trial court’s denial of motion to suppress).
Last December, the North Carolina Supreme Court added to that list with its opinion in State v. Woolard, ___ N.C. ___, 894 S.E.2d 717 (2023) reversing, upon certiorari review, the trial court’s determination that an arresting officer lacked probable cause for impaired driving. This post will review Woolard, its holding, and its path to the state’s highest court.
State v. Burris and Blood Draws from Unconscious DWI Suspects
Four years after a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019), announced a State-favorable exigency rule for withdrawing blood from a suspected impaired driver who is unconscious, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Burris, COA22-408, ___ N.C. App. ___ (July 5, 2023), has applied the rule for the first time. This post will review the holding in Mitchell and the Court of Appeals’ analysis in Burris and will conclude with a summary of the Fourth Amendment limitations on implied consent testing.
How Does the Confrontation Clause Impact the Introduction of a Defendant’s Medical Records in a DWI Trial?
Two weeks ago, I wrote about the foundational requirements for introducing a defendant’s medical records in a DWI trial. Soon after I posted, a reader asked whether introducing those records through an affidavit from a records custodian violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him or her. My answer is, generally speaking, no.
Introducing a Defendant’s Medical Records in a DWI Trial
I have previously written about how the State may obtain the medical records of a person suspected of or charged with impaired driving. This post focuses on the requirements for admitting those records at trial.
Alcohol Concentration Restrictions on Restored Licenses and the Enforcement of Violations
When a person is convicted of driving while impaired under G.S. 20-138.1, the person’s license is revoked for one year. G.S. 20-17(a)(2); G.S. 20-19(c1). (A person who has one or more prior convictions for an offense involving impaired driving may be subject to a longer period of revocation, depending on when those offenses occurred.) At the conclusion of that one-year revocation period, the person may seek to have his or her license restored by furnishing proof of financial responsibility and by paying a restoration fee of $140.25. G.S. 20-7(c1), (i1). The license then may be restored with a restriction prohibiting the person from operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more at any relevant time after the driving. G.S. 20-19(c3). That restriction, listed on the driver’s license as Restriction 19, remains in effect for three years. This post addresses how such a restriction is enforced and the consequences for a substantiated violation.
State v. Rouse and Circumstantial Evidence of Driving
To prove impaired driving, the State must establish that the defendant drove a vehicle while impaired. A person drives when he or she is “actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or which has the engine running.” G.S. 20-4.01(25). Sometimes the State may establish driving through direct evidence. For example, a law enforcement officer or another witness may observe the defendant driving and may testify to that fact. In other cases, a law enforcement officer may encounter the person the officer believes was driving after the driving has concluded, perhaps in or near the car or at some other location. In those cases, the State may seek to establish driving based on circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals’ recent opinion in State v. Rouse, 2022-NCCOA-496, __ N.C. App. ___ (July 19, 2022), considers when such circumstantial evidence is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
2021 Statistical Report for Driving While Impaired Convictions Now Available
Last week, Jamie blogged about the 2021 Structured Sentencing Statistical Report from the North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission. As Jamie noted, that report contains detailed information related to felony and misdemeanor sentences imposed in Fiscal Year 2021, including the most commonly used felony grid cell, the number of convictions by district, average probation length, and typical sentencing outcomes for the most charged offenses. Because that report analyzes felony and misdemeanor convictions and sentences imposed under the Structured Sentencing Act, it does not include information about one of the most commonly charged misdemeanors in North Carolina: driving while impaired, which is sentenced under the sentencing scheme set out in G.S. 20-179. The Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission prepares a separate report each year analyzing those convictions, and the Driving While Impaired Convictions Statistical Report for Fiscal Year 2021 is available here. Read on for highlights from the report, which contains data about convictions under G.S. 20-179 from July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021.