Are you thinking about implementing a citation in lieu of arrest policy? Have you been implementing a policy and want to improve it? The UNC School of Government Criminal Justice Innovation Lab recently released a final report for the Citation Project, which included four recommendations for those interested in this work. This post summarizes the report and those recommendations.
Procedure
48-Hour Rule Refresher
Pretrial release is generally set by magistrates at a defendant’s initial appearance. As a special approach to setting conditions of pretrial release, the “48-hour rule,” as it is known in domestic violence cases, shifts that responsibility to judges. The rule comes from G.S. 15A-534.1, which provides that a judge rather than a magistrate must set a defendant’s pretrial release conditions during the first 48 hours after arrest for certain offenses. The 48-hour rule generates a lot of questions. Below, I have answered some fundamental questions that have arisen with this rule.
So Your Indictment May Be Flawed: What Now?
A non-lawyer might be forgiven for being somewhat confused by the rules governing indictments. The basics are summarized easily enough: a trial court’s jurisdiction depends on a facially valid indictment; an indictment is facially valid so long as it sufficiently alleges all the essential elements of the offense; and the essential elements consist of what the State must prove in order to obtain a conviction. But these basics are so pocked with exceptions, so piled with caveats, that few cases are resolved by reference to them alone. Our appellate courts have decided a few cases in the last several months which illustrate this complexity. This post attempts to provide a brief recurrence to fundamental principles applicable to indictments and to throw a lifeline to prosecutors who discover a potential defect during a trial. My colleagues have blogged pretty frequently about indictment issues, most recently Shea Denning addressing a recent opinion here.
N.C. Supreme Court Weighs in, Again, on Forfeiture of Counsel
In December, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided State v. Atwell, 2022-NCSC-135, ___ N.C. ___ (2022)—its third time weighing in on the issue of forfeiture of counsel. The defendant had had five court-appointed attorneys when the trial court determined that the defendant was engaging in delay tactics and entered an order of forfeiture. A majority of the Court of Appeals found no error. In reversing this decision, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the record did not show that the defendant engaged in the level of conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of forfeiture.
This post discusses State v. Atwell, forfeiture guidelines as set forth by the state Supreme Court, and suggested practices in dealing with forfeiture of counsel issues.
The Common Law is Dead; Long Live the Common Law!
In State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185, 868 S.E.2d 67 (2022), our Supreme Court held that Section 14‑51.3 “supplants the common law on all aspects of the law of self-defense addressed by its provisions,” and “the only right to perfect self-defense available in North Carolina [is] the right provided by statute.” Id. at 191, 868 S.E.2d at 72-73. At the same time, it interpreted the felony disqualifier provision of Section 14-51.4 – consistently with “common law principles” – to require a causal nexus between the felony and the use of force. Id. at 197, 868 S.E.2d at 77. The common law is apparently not so easily dispensed with. This post – my first contribution to this forum – addresses the persistence of the common law in the area of self-defense. My colleague Phil Dixon provided color commentary on McLymore here. My colleague John Rubin discussed the felony disqualifier provision (and anticipated the holding in McLymore) here.
Human Trafficking: New SOG Resource Explaining Your Obligation to Make a Report and How the Agency Responds
January recognizes the importance of knowing about human trafficking. The President has declared January Human Trafficking Prevention Month (see the proclamation here). The North Carolina Governor and the Chief Justice have both declared January Human Trafficking Awareness Month (see the Governor’s proclamation here and the Chief Justice’s proclamation here). The purpose of these declarations is both a recognition that human trafficking in the United States and North Carolina exists and to educate our citizens about this issue. Partnerships are required for a successful response to combat the crime of human trafficking, which involves both sex and labor trafficking. The national, state, and local responses involve the prevention of human trafficking, protection for victims and survivors, and the prosecution of traffickers.
Incapacity to Proceed (G.S. Chapter 15A) and Incompetency (G.S. Chapter 35A): Apples and Oranges?
Incapacity to proceed under North Carolina General Statutes (G.S.) Chapter 15A and incompetency proceedings under G.S. Chapter 35A involve, at least in part, a court inquiry into someone’s cognitive abilities. Incapacity to proceed is narrowly focused on a person’s cognition within a criminal legal proceeding. Incompetency is a bigger picture analysis, more broadly focused on the individual’s life and needs, with a bit of forward-looking involved. In that way, incompetency is concerned with both a person’s cognitive abilities and their functioning.
These proceedings are separate and distinct from one another. Yet, if a client has history or present involvement in both, the client’s attorney in one proceeding should know about and understand the other. That attorney may want, for example, to access information or introduce evidence from the other proceeding. The attorney will want to consider issues such as information sharing and confidentiality, and the admissibility or other uses of records from one proceeding in the other.
These issues may be the subject of future posts. First, however, we need to understand incapacity to proceed under G.S. Chapter 15A and incompetency under G.S. Chapter 35A. This post provides a primer on incapacity and incompetency proceedings and compares the standards for each.
State v. Diaz-Tomas Recognizes Broad Prosecutorial Discretion Following Dismissals With Leave
The North Carolina Supreme Court held last week in State v. Diaz-Tomas, ___ N.C. ___, 2022-NCSC-115 (November 4, 2022), that neither a criminal defendant nor the court has the right to compel a district attorney to reinstate criminal charges that were dismissed with leave pursuant to G.S. 15A-932 due to the defendant’s failure to appear. The case arose in Wake County, where the district attorney’s office reportedly would reinstate misdemeanor charges dismissed with leave under G.S. 15A-932 only if the defendant agreed to plead guilty and to waive his or her right to appeal to superior court for trial de novo. As a result, Diaz-Tomas’s only option for ending the indefinite license revocation that was imposed for his failure to appear is to plead guilty to the driving while impaired charges that were dismissed with leave. This post discusses the state supreme court’s analysis and considers how it might apply in other circumstances.
Fall 2022 Cannabis Update
It has not been long since my last cannabis update, but there are some interesting new developments to report, most notably on drug identification and marijuana. Read on for the details.
Artificial Intelligence and the Courts
The role of artificial intelligence (AI) in American life was a hot topic of discussion at a conference for judicial educators that I attended earlier this week. The conference launched with a screening of the documentary Coded Bias, which explores disparities in the data that inform algorithms for a range of computerized functions from facial recognition to loan eligibility to insurance risk. The documentary highlights the vast amount of data collected and controlled by a small number of large U.S. companies and the lack of regulation governing its use. A panel of experts spoke after the screening about what judges should know about AI. Several of those topics related to its use in preventing, investigating and punishing crime.