Under G.S. 14-208.16, a registered sex offender may not reside “within 1,000 feet of the property on which any public or nonpublic school or child care center is located.” What’s the right way to measure those 1,000 feet? As the crow flies? Property line to property line? Building to building?
Crimes and Elements
State v. Glisson and Multiple Conspiracies
When a group of confederates undertake to commit a series of criminal acts, is there one conspiracy or multiple conspiracies? The case of State v. Glisson, ___ N.C. App. ___, 796 S.E.2d 124, (Feb. 7, 2017), dealt with that issue. The answer, it turns out, is fact-specific and less than crystal clear.
Charging R/D/O: Alleging the Duty the Officer Was Discharging
I was teaching a class about charging documents recently when the conversation turned to the rule that a charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in violation of G.S. 14-223 must describe the particular duty that the officer was discharging at the time of the resistance. A member of the class asked whether it would suffice to describe the duty as “protecting and serving.” I gave my best guess about the answer but I thought I would see how others react to the question. So take the poll below, then read the rest of the post for a little history about the rule, a summary of a recent case, and a discussion of authority about the sufficiency of a general description like “protecting and serving.”
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Merger and Felony Murder: A 2017 Update
Last week I blogged about the basic rules for felony murder prosecutions in North Carolina. I promised to return this week with an update on the felony murder rule and the merger doctrine. This post, like Jeff’s 2009 article, focuses on the merger rule that bars charges of felony murder that are based upon killings resulting from certain types of felony assaults. It does not address the merger rule that requires the court to arrest judgment on the underlying felony when a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder.
The Basics of Felony Murder
I can’t be the only person who was surprised to learn in my first year of law school that a person who never intended to kill someone else could be convicted of first degree murder. Even an accidental killing can result in first-degree murder charges if it occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony. The classic example of this theory of murder, known as felony murder, is the defendant who agrees to serve as get-away driver while his friends rob a business. Once inside the business, one of the robbers brandishes a gun. The owner of the business, who is confronted by one of the robbers, suffers a heart attack and dies. The defendant and his co-conspirators all are prosecuted for and convicted of first-degree murder based on the felony murder rule. See People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
Today’s post will review the basics of North Carolina’s felony murder rule. Next week’s post will explore recent developments regarding when the so-called merger rule may apply to bar charges of felony murder that arise from a single assault that injures and kills a single victim.
When Does Paddling Become Child Abuse?
Many–perhaps even most–parents paddle, spank, or otherwise use physical force to discipline their children. This kind of discipline is generally viewed by law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and the courts as a parental prerogative and not as criminal child abuse. Yet there are limits on the degree of physical force that a parent may lawfully employ and the degree of injury a parent may lawfully inflict. A parent who acts with malice, uses grossly inappropriate force or who causes lasting injury may be prosecuted for child abuse. A recent court of appeals case demarcates the boundaries of permissible parental discipline and sets forth standards for determining when physical discipline by parents constitutes criminal child abuse.
Is It Armed Robbery if a Defendant Has a Gun but Doesn’t Expressly Menace the Victim?
Last week, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina decided State v. Wright, a case that answers an interesting question: Does a defendant commit armed robbery when he takes a victim’s property after displaying a gun, even if he doesn’t point the gun at the victim or expressly threaten to shoot the victim — and even if the victim denies having being scared?
Mistrial Leads to Double Jeopardy Violation in State v. Schalow
In State v. Schalow (Dec. 20, 2016), the trial court’s error in declaring a mistrial led to a successful claim of double jeopardy by the defendant and allowed him to avoid further prosecution for attempted murder. Schalow sheds light on the relatively obscure (at least to me) law of mistrials and double jeopardy.
When Is There Sufficient Evidence that a Check Writer Knew that He or She Had Insufficient Funds?
If a person writes a check and the check bounces, is that enough to charge the person with the misdemeanor offense of writing a worthless check? What about if the recipient of the check notifies the check writer that the check bounced and the check writer doesn’t pay off the check? This post explores when a criminal charge is a permissible response to a worthless check.
Proving a Minor’s Sexual Purpose for Sexual Assault Crimes
A recent Court of Appeals opinion turned on a point of law that sometimes trips up folks in sexual assault cases: When a juvenile is alleged to have committed a sexual assault requiring proof of a sexual purpose, the State has to prove more than the act itself.