The Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) is a binding compact that establishes the law that governs the interstate movement of juveniles who are involved in the juvenile justice system. One of the purposes of the ICJ is to “[r]eturn juveniles who have… been accused of an offense to the state requesting their return.” G.S. 7B-4001(b)(3). This is akin to the extradition process used in criminal matters. The proper procedure to return a juvenile who is accused of an act of delinquency in another state to that other state is found in the ICJ rules. This post walks through the procedure.
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GiveUNC: Help Support the SOG
Today is GiveUNC day, the university’s annual one-day fundraising event for alumni, faculty, staff, supporters, and fans of Carolina to contribute to UNC programs and causes that they find most meaningful and impactful. UNC Chapel Hill is truly a unique and remarkable place, and we could not do it without you. To quote from the … Read more
News Roundup
Hundreds of Venezuelan immigrants were summarily deported from the United States to a prison in El Salvador last weekend. Federal authorities relied on President Trump’s executive order invoking the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 in removing the immigrants without due process protections. The administration stated that the immigrants were members of a violent gang, Tren de Aragua, and that their alignment with the Venezuelan government and entry into the U.S. constituted an invasion by a hostile nation. Advocates for the deported Venezuelans deny their involvement with the gang and stress that the three previous times that the AEA was invoked, it was during clear times of war (the War of 1812, WWI, and WWII).
Judge James Boasberg, a federal judge in Washington, had ordered that the flights carrying the immigrants be turned around, but this did not occur, and the court is now engaged in an inquiry to determine whether the Trump administration should be held in contempt. After Trump called for the impeachment of the judge, Chief Justice John Roberts of the United States Supreme Court made a public statement that the appellate process, rather than impeachment, is the proper way to address adverse court rulings.
Read on for more criminal law news.
When May a Trial Judge Reject a Plea Entered Pursuant to a Plea Agreement?
A trial judge has broad discretion regarding whether to accept a defendant’s guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence. G.S. 15A-1023(b). In that circumstance, the judge must advise the parties whether he or she approves of the arrangement and will dispose of the case accordingly. If the judge rejects the arrangement, the judge must so inform the parties, refuse to accept the plea, and advise the State and the defendant that neither is bound by the rejected arrangement. The judge must tell the parties why he or she rejected the arrangement and give them an opportunity to modify it to meet the judge’s approval. The parties are not required to modify the arrangement, and, upon rejection of the arrangement, the defendant is entitled to have the case continued to the next session of court.
The judge’s rejection of the arrangement must be noted in the record, but such a rejection does not appear to preclude another judge from later accepting the arrangement. (The notation of the trial court’s discretionary decision arguably is not a discretionary order of the sort that would require changed circumstances to justify modification by another judge. See generally Michael Crowell, One Trial Judge Overruling Another, Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2015/06 (UNC School of Government December 2015) (discussing the general rule that one trial judge may modify an order entered by another trial judge on a matter of discretion only if there has been a substantial change in circumstances)).
Those rules apply to a plea agreement in which the State has agreed to recommend a sentence. But what about arrangement where the State makes no such recommendation? Does the trial court retain discretion to reject those?
When Can the Police Seize a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest, and How Long Can They Keep It?
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), holds that the contents of a cell phone may not be searched incident to arrest, but allows for the possibility that the phone itself may be seized incident to arrest. This post addresses when such a seizure is permissible and how long it may last.
News Roundup
The news story that captured my attention this week is not exactly, or not entirely, a criminal law story. Mahmoud Khalil, who helped lead pro-Palestinian protests at Columbia University, was arrested this week by ICE agents at the university-owned apartment where he lived. (Khalil apparently was a graduate student at the university until December.) Khalil is a lawful permanent resident of the United States – that is, a green card holder – but the agents indicated that his status would be revoked as a result of what the Trump administration views as his anti-Semitic advocacy. He remains in custody but has lawyered up, raising interesting questions about the government’s ability to revoke legal permanent residency based on speech. A federal judge has ordered that he not be deported pending further proceedings. The AP has more here and here. Keep reading for more news.
The End of the Super-Contingent Sentence
Under G.S. 15A-1346(b), a sentencing court has the authority to order a probationary sentence to run consecutively to an undischarged term of imprisonment. Probation officers refer to that as a “contingent” sentence, because for them, it is—the start of the probation is contingent on the person’s release from prison. A contingent probationary sentence can be helpful when, for example, a defendant owes a lot of restitution, and the court wants to make sure there’s plenty of time on probation remaining after the defendant finishes any active sentences. To be clear, this is not a matter of whether the suspended term of imprisonment, if revoked, will run concurrently with or consecutively to some other term of imprisonment. This is about when the period of probation itself begins. A recent Court of Appeals decision changes things.
News Roundup
A man is scheduled to be executed by firing squad this evening, which would be the first firing squad execution in the United States in the last 15 years. On Wednesday, Brad Sigmon’s final appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court was denied. In South Carolina, death row inmates may choose between firing squad, lethal injection, and electrocution. Sigmon said he felt forced to choose execution by firing squad over lethal injection because of a lack of information about the drugs used and the “fear of a tortuous death.” He also said he didn’t choose electrocution because he didn’t want to suffer “by being cooked alive.” Sigmon’s attorneys attempted to delay the execution to get a fuller hearing in court to learn more information about the drugs used in lethal injection, but their request was denied. Sigmon plans to ask Governor Henry McMaster for his sentence to be commuted, although no South Carolina governor has granted clemency since the death penalty restarted in 1976. Read on for more criminal law news.
State v. Fearns Finds Second Judge Lacked Authority to Enter Order When Hearing Was Held by First Judge
A few weeks ago, I wrote about the circumstances in which one judge may pick up case-related duties that another judge is unable to complete. Yesterday, the court of appeals decided a case in this area, determining in State v. Fearns, COA23-650, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2025), that a judge lacked authority to enter an order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss when the hearing on that motion was held by another judge. This post will discuss Fearns.
News Roundup
We have covered the extensive post-conviction and appellate proceedings of Richard Glossip’s death sentence many times before on the blog (most recently here). Glossip has been on death row in Oklahoma since his 1998 conviction for allegedly orchestrating the brutal killing of a hotel owner. On Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Glossip a new trial after finding that the prosecution knowingly failed to correct false and misleading testimony at trial. Specifically, the prosecution knew its star witness, Sneed, was lying when he denied having seen a psychiatrist and denied having been prescribed lithium, a medicine typically used to treat severe mental illnesses. Sneed admitted to killing the victim and agreed to testify against Glossip in exchange the State taking the death penalty off the table for Sneed’s role in the crime. According to the 5-3 majority: “Correcting Sneed’s lie would have undermined his credibility and revealed his willingness to lie under oath. . . Hence, there was a reasonable likelihood that correcting Sneed’s testimony would have affected the judgment of the jury.” Justices Alito and Thomas dissented, while Justice Barrett concurred and would have sent the case back to the Oklahoma appellate court (Justice Gorsuch recused himself from the case). If tried again, it would be Glossip’s third capital trial related to the killing. SCOTUSblog has the story here, or you can read the case for yourself here. Read on for more criminal law news.