self-defense

Common Character Evidence Questions in Self-Defense Cases

Character evidence is one of the most challenging areas of evidence law to navigate, as Jessie Smith observes here. Jessie’s blog features a useful chart to apply Rules 404 and 405 and also links to the bench book chapter.

I find it helpful to see these rules in action with concrete examples. A common context in which the character evidence rules come into play in criminal cases is self-defense cases. This post discusses several common questions that arise, as well as some adjacent issues.

Let’s use a simple hypothetical:

The defendant is charged with shooting the victim outside of a bar after an argument about whether the victim approached the defendant’s girlfriend. The defendant claims that the victim came at him first with a knife.

The questions below deal with what the defendant can elicit about the victim and what the State can elicit about the defendant. As we work through the examples, remember that Rule 404 addresses when character evidence is admissible or inadmissible, and Rule 405 addresses the method of proof for the character evidence (reputation/opinion evidence or specific instances of conduct).

Rules 404 and 405 are included at the end of the post for reference.

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Encounters with Lions: Evidence of Gang Affiliation in State v. Ervin

A defendant who claims self-defense is generally permitted to offer evidence of the victim’s prior violent conduct if known to the defendant at the time defensive force was used. Such evidence is relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the need to use force. In State v. Ervin, No. COA24-650 (N.C. Ct. App. April 2, 2025), the trial court excluded as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence offered by the defendant to show his state of mind at the time he killed his girlfriend’s brother, namely, evidence that the victim was in a gang. The Court of Appeals found no error, stating that evidence the defendant feared for his life because the victim was in a gang “does little to support his theory of self-defense.” This post examines the opinion in Ervin.

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Confession and Avoidance: Self-defense in State v. Myers

The defendant presented competent evidence tending to show that he was acting in self-defense when he shot Raquan Neal, the Court of Appeals recently said in State v. Myers, No. COA24-435 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2024), and the trial court’s failure to instruct on self-defense was error. Reciting both the common law and the statutory test for self-defense, the opinion in Myers seems to represent a straightforward application of settled law – except for one thing. The defendant “testified he was not trying to kill Neal.” Myers, Slip Op. 3. Under the common law, a defendant was not privileged to use deadly force unless he believed at the time that it was necessary to kill his assailant. Prior cases found no error in the trial court’s denying an instruction on self-defense when the defendant thus disavowed the requisite intent. This post considers the opinion in Myers.

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State v. McKoy and Opening the Door

Suppose the defendant is on trial for murder.  He argues he shot the victim in self-defense.

The State elicits testimony from the victim’s father that the victim, who lived at home with his parents, was “always a happy guy.” The father states that he does not allow guns in his home and that, to his knowledge, the victim did not have a gun with him on the day he was shot or have a gun at any other time.

Counsel for the defendant then asks the father:  After your son died, did you see pictures on his cell phone of him with his friends holding guns?

The State objects. The defendant argues that, while the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible, the State opened the door to its admission.

How should the trial court rule?

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The Common Law is Dead; Long Live the Common Law!

In State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185, 868 S.E.2d 67 (2022), our Supreme Court held that Section 14‑51.3 “supplants the common law on all aspects of the law of self-defense addressed by its provisions,” and “the only right to perfect self-defense available in North Carolina [is] the right provided by statute.”  Id. at 191, 868 S.E.2d at 72-73.  At the same time, it interpreted the felony disqualifier provision of Section 14-51.4 – consistently with “common law principles” – to require a causal nexus between the felony and the use of force.  Id. at 197, 868 S.E.2d at 77.  The common law is apparently not so easily dispensed with.  This post – my first contribution to this forum – addresses the persistence of the common law in the area of self-defense.  My colleague Phil Dixon provided color commentary on McLymore here.  My colleague John Rubin discussed the felony disqualifier provision (and anticipated the holding in McLymore) here.

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Court of Appeals Rules on Pretrial Self-Defense Immunity Hearings

Last month, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Austin, ___ N.C. App. ___, 2021-NCCOA-494 (Sept. 21, 2021), and a summary of the opinion is available here. Austin addressed several noteworthy self-defense issues, including the sufficiency of the state’s evidence to rebut the presumption of reasonable fear under the “castle doctrine” statutes added in 2011 and whether the trial court’s jury instructions on that issue were proper.

But first, the court had to decide whether the statutory language conferring “immunity from liability” meant that the defendant was entitled to have this issue resolved by the judge at a pretrial hearing. That’s a question I’ve been asked fairly often over the past few years, and my sense is that prior to Austin there were divergent practices on this point around the state.

This post takes a closer look at that portion of the court’s opinion, and explores what we now know and what we still don’t.

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Fundamental Principles of Statutory Self-Defense

The common law right to use defensive force in North Carolina rests on three fundamental principles: necessity, proportionality, and fault. Ordinarily, when a person uses defensive force, the force must be reasonably necessary to prevent harm; the force must be proportional to the threatened harm; and the person using defensive force must not be at fault in the conflict. See John Rubin, The Law of Self-Defense § 2.1(b), at 14–15 (UNC School of Government, 1996). North Carolina’s new statutes on defensive force continue to rely on these principles. As under the common law, the statutes do not always refer to these principles in describing the circumstances in which a person may use defensive force. But, as this post is intended to show, the basic principles of necessity, proportionality, and fault remain central to the statutory rights.

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Another Self-Defense Decision on a Troublesome Doctrine

In State v. Harvey, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (June 14, 2019), a five to one majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the unpublished decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 817 S.E.2d 500 (2018), holding that the trial judge properly refused to instruct the jury on perfect and imperfect self-defense in a homicide case. In so ruling, the majority in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals relied on the “belief” doctrine created by our courts over the last 25 years. The opinions, four in all, show that our courts are continuing to wrestle with the implications of that doctrine.

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The Statutory Law of Self-Defense in North Carolina

Several years ago (some might say that’s an understatement) I wrote The Law of Self-Defense in North Carolina, in which I looked at over 200 years’ worth of North Carolina court opinions on self-defense and related defenses, such as defense of others and defense of habitation. The book’s approach reflected that North Carolina was a common law state when it came to self-defense. The right to act in self-defense depended primarily on the authority of court decisions. The General Assembly’s adoption in 2011 of three defensive force statutes—G.S. 14-51.2, G.S. 14-51.3, and G.S. 14-51.4—changed that. An understanding of the law of self-defense in North Carolina now must begin with the statutory law of self-defense.

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