Last week, the court of appeals decided State v. Bedient, a significant post-Rodriguez opinion on traffic stops. The court ruled that an officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend a stop by a few seconds to ask the driver for consent to search. This post summarizes and analyzes the case.
reasonable suspicion
North Carolina Supreme Court Affirms Post-Rodriguez Court of Appeals Ruling in State v. Warren
Last April, 2015, the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), significantly limited the scope of a traffic stop. The Court ruled that an officer may not extend a completed traffic stop for any period of time, no matter how brief, to conduct a dog sniff—absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (or consent). The Court rejected the government’s argument that an officer may incrementally prolong a traffic stop, which some lower courts, including North Carolina’s, had justified as a de minimis intrusion. The Court reasoned that a dog alert is not a permissible part of a traffic stop because it detects evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, which is not part of an officer’s traffic mission. The Court, however, clearly indicated that if a dog sniff or other non-traffic-related activity does not add any time to the stop (in this case, it added 7–8 minutes), then the dog sniff or other activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment, as it previously had ruled in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Frisking a Person for a Weapon When a State Allows Carrying a Concealed Weapon with a Permit
Sometimes a legislature enacts a statute that has consequences beyond the direct impact of the statute’s provisions. West Virginia’s statute allowing the carrying of a concealed weapon with a permit may be such an example, based on the February 23, 2016, ruling of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Robinson. The court ruled that a West Virginia officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk because there was insufficient evidence of dangerousness, relying in part on a person’s right in West Virginia to carry a concealed weapon with a permit. And this ruling may impact cases in other states, such as North Carolina, that have a statute similar, although not identical, to West Virginia’s. This post discusses this ruling and its potential impact in North Carolina state courts.
Revisiting State v. Jackson, the Pedestrian Evasion Case
Last summer, I wrote about State v. Jackson, __ N.C. App. __, 758 S.E.2d 39 (2014), in which the court of appeals ruled that an officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a pedestrian who engaged in what the officer viewed as suspicious and evasive behavior. Last month, the state supreme court reversed the court of appeals. The opinion is here; my summary and analysis of it is below.
The DWI Year in Review, Part II
Whether there was probable cause to arrest the driver is a hotly litigated issue in cases involving impaired driving. Unfortunately, there aren’t all that many appellate opinions addressing the hard calls in this area. Instead, many resemble State v. Tappe, 139 N.C. App. 33, 38 (2000), which found probable cause based on “defendant’s vehicle crossing the center line, defendant’s glassy, watery eyes, and the strong odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath.” It is difficult to imagine a court ruling otherwise. A few years ago, the court of appeals decided a tougher issue in Steinkrause v. Tatum, 201 N.C. App. 289 (2009), aff’d, 364 N.C. 419 (2010) (per curiam), concluding that the “fact and severity” of the defendant’s one-car accident coupled with a law enforcement officer’s observation that she smelled of alcohol provided probable cause to believe she was driving while impaired. This past year, the court issued two significant published opinions on probable cause for impaired driving—State v. Overocker, __ N.C. App. __, 762 S.E.2d 921 (Sept. 16, 2014), and State v. Townsend, __ N.C. App. __, 762 S.E.2d 898 (Sept. 16, 2014),—as well as opinions in State v. Veal, __ N.C. App. __, 760 S.E.2d 43 (July 1, 2014), and State v. Wainwright, __ N.C. App. __, 770 S.E.2d 99 (2015), better defining the threshold for reasonable suspicion of DWI.
Keeping It between the Lines
Officer Fife is driving one car length behind Briscoe Darling at noon on a sunny day when he sees the tires on the right side of Darling’s car touch the fog line that borders Darling’s lane to the right. Darling drives on the fog line for a couple of seconds before his tires re-enter the unmarked portion of the lane. A half mile later, Darling’s tires again touch the fog line for a few seconds.
Officer Fife is driving one car length behind Charlene Darling at noon on a sunny day when he sees the tires on the right side of Darling’s car cross over the fog line that borders Darling’s lane to the right. Darling immediately moves her car back into the unmarked portion of the lane.
Officer Fife is driving one car length behind Mitch Darling at 9 a.m. on a cold winter morning when he sees the tires on the right side of Darling’s car cross over the fog line that border’s Darling’s lane to the right. After a few seconds, Darling moves his car back into the unmarked portion of the lane. Officer Fife is aware that the road the two are traveling is icy in spots.
Officer Fife is a stickler for compliance with motor vehicle laws. He believes it is his duty to stop anyone who commits a traffic offense, no matter how minor. Which Darling or Darlings may he lawfully stop, and why?
When Reasonable Suspicion Is Dispelled
A traffic stop is valid if it is supported by reasonable suspicion. During a valid traffic stop, an officer may demand the driver’s license and registration, may run a computer check based on those documents, and so on. But what if the reasonable suspicion supporting the stop dissipates soon after the stop is made?
United States Supreme Court Rules that Reasonable Suspicion May Be Based on Reasonable Mistakes of Law
Shea blogged here about State v. Heien, the case in which the court of appeals ruled that having one burned-out brake light was not a violation of G.S. 20-129 and so did not support a vehicle stop. (The stop led to a consent search of the defendant’s vehicle, which led to the discovery of drugs and to drug trafficking charges.) The prosecution sought review in the state supreme court. That court assumed that the court of appeals was correct about the scope of the statute but determined (1) that an officer might reasonably think otherwise, given ambiguities in the statute, and (2) that reasonable suspicion may be based on a reasonable mistake of law. Conclusion (2) was the subject of a split of authority across the country, so the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the case. It issued its opinion yesterday.
Warrantless Stops 101 — Was the Stop Supported by Reasonable Suspicion?
In my first Warrantless Stops 101 post, I offered these basic questions to frame the analysis:
- Did a seizure occur?
- If so and it was a stop, was it supported by reasonable suspicion or other valid basis?
- If reasonable suspicion supported the stop, was the officer’s subsequent conduct sufficiently limited in scope?
- If the seizure was an arrest, was it supported by probable cause?
- If the arrest was supported by probable cause, was the search permissible?
My first post focused on whether a seizure occurred. This one looks at whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. If so, the stop itself is constitutional and the only remaining issue is whether the officer’s conduct exceeded the scope of the stop, a topic I’ll take up in a later post.