motions to suppress

Confidential Informants, Motions to Reveal Identity, and Discovery: Part VI, Motions to Suppress and the “Two Officer Rule”

For the final installment of this series on confidential informants, motions to reveal identity, and discovery, we will look at a unique statute in North Carolina concerning when the identity of a confidential informant (CI) must be revealed: G.S. 15A-978(b). This statute only applies to motions to suppress, rather than trial. Recall back to Part I of this series, which addressed Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Roviaro established the basic factors to consider when deciding whether the State must disclose the identity of the CI to the defendant to ensure a fair trial. Another U.S. Supreme Court case decided ten years later, however, McCray v. State of Ill., 386 U.S. 300 (1967), addressed the separate but related question of when the defendant is entitled to learn the CI’s identity to have a fair opportunity to litigate a motion to suppress.

At a motion to suppress, the considerations are somewhat different from trial. The last several posts addressed the question of when testimony from the CI is material in determining whether or not the defendant is guilty. In contrast, the question at the motion to suppress stage is not the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The question in CI cases is usually whether a search or seizure violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The issues to be decided may be whether law enforcement had good reason to rely on information provided by the CI, whether law enforcement corroborated the information, or whether the officers are being truthful about their interactions with the CI. G.S. 15A-978(b) addresses a related, but narrow question: can we rely on the officer’s assertion that the CI exists?

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State v. Woolard: DWI, Probable Cause, and Motions Procedures

Because the State’s ability to prove impairment in prosecutions for driving while impaired often turns on whether the officer had probable cause to arrest — and thereafter test — the defendant, probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is a frequently litigated issue in DWI cases. While for many years there was a dearth of case law exploring the hard calls in this area, that trend has changed. In several arguably close cases over the past decade, the appellate courts have considered whether impaired driving arrests by law enforcement officers were supported by probable cause. See State v. Parisi, 372 N.C. 639 (2019) (driver’s admission to drinking, his red and glassy eyes, his odor of alcohol, and multiple indicators of impairment on field sobriety tests established probable cause; affirming court of appeals’ opinion reversing trial court); State v. Lindsey, 249 N.C. App. 516 (2016) (odor of alcohol on driver’s breath, red and glassy eyes, admission to drinking, and five clues of impairment from horizontal gaze nystagmus test provided probable cause; affirming trial court order denying motion to suppress); State v. Overocker, 236 N.C. App. 423 (2014) (light odor of alcohol and consumption of three alcoholic drinks in four-hour period were insufficient to establish probable cause; affirming trial court order granting motion to suppress); and State v. Townsend, 236 N.C. App. 456 (2014) (driver’s odor of alcohol, positive results on portable breath test, bloodshot eyes, and signs of impairment while performing field sobriety tests established probable cause; affirming trial court’s denial of motion to suppress).

Last December, the North Carolina Supreme Court added to that list with its opinion in State v. Woolard, ___ N.C. ___, 894 S.E.2d 717 (2023) reversing, upon certiorari review, the trial court’s determination that an arresting officer lacked probable cause for impaired driving. This post will review Woolard, its holding, and its path to the state’s highest court.

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May a Judge Rule on a Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Under a Search Warrant That He or She Issued?

Suppose a superior court judge issues a search warrant authorizing the search of a suspect’s house for drugs. Officers execute the warrant, find drugs, seize them, and charge the suspect with drug offenses. The charges end up in superior court, where the suspect – now the defendant – moves to suppress, arguing that the search warrant application lacked probable cause and that the judge who issued the warrant erred in doing so. Is it OK for the judge who issued the warrant to hear such a motion?

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Blanket Objection by State to Fact-Findings Sufficient to Trigger De Novo Review in DWI Case

If you decide to read yesterday’s court of appeals opinion in State v. Miller, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 17, 2016) do yourself a favor and skip to page 9.  Not having the benefit of this advice, I got lost on page 3. At first, I thought my printer had malfunctioned, since page 3 seemed to be saying the same thing as page 2. But there’s no problem with my printer. I can’t say the same for the procedural history in this case. Tortured is not a sufficiently negative adjective to describe its path. Fortunately, things pick up half way through the opinion and an important rule emerges:  The State may obtain a de novo hearing in superior court under G.S. 20-38.7(a) without setting forth the specific findings of fact to which it objects.

So that’s the rule. Unless the senior resident superior court judge says otherwise.  You’re going to have to read the rest of this post to make sense of that.

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More About Those Weird DWI Motions Procedures

You represent a defendant charged with DWI. You move to suppress evidence in district court. The district court enters a preliminary determination in your favor. The State appeals. The superior court disagrees with the district court and remands the case with instructions to deny your motion. Your client pleads guilty. You appeal to superior court. You want the court of appeals to consider the merits of your motion. What should you do to preserve that right?

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No Checkpoint Policy? No Checkpoint Evidence.

Regular and well-publicized checkpoints are an important component of the State’s effort to curtail impaired driving. Checkpoints provide specific as well as general deterrence. A handful of impaired drivers typically are arrested at any given checking station and subsequently prosecuted for impaired driving. Many more drivers than are stopped hear about the checkpoint. That publicity … Read more

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The Long Arm of the Law is a Bit Longer for DWIs

Local law enforcement officers have a little bit of extra territorial jurisdiction when it comes to investigating impaired driving.  That grant of extra territorial jurisdiction (as opposed to extraterritorial jurisdiction, which city officers already had) was created by the Motor Vehicle Driver Protection Act of 2006 and codified in G.S. 20-38.2. General Rules. G.S. 15A-402 … Read more

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Four hour delay to obtain search warrant an exigency, at least for now

The court of appeals decided its first post-Missouri v. McNeely alcohol exigency case yesterday.  The court in State v. Dahlquist determined that the four to five hours that the arresting officer estimated would have elapsed had he first traveled to the intake center at the jail to obtain a search warrant and then taken the … Read more

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Whose Burden is it?

The State’s failure to accord a defendant his or her statutory implied consent rights as set forth in G.S. 20-16.2 may render the results of any ensuing breath test inadmissible. When a defendant moves to suppress breath test results based on such a violation, questions frequently arise regarding whether the State bears the burden of demonstrating compliance … Read more