Singleton was supposed to make things simpler. As previously reported, in that case our Supreme Court attempted to eliminate some “obsolete technicalities” of the common law by abrogating the jurisdictional indictment rule, whereby a defective pleading deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. My colleague Danny Spiegel called it a sea change. The Court of Appeals decided two cases in September that illustrate continuing complexity in this area. In State v. Pierce, COA23-348 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2024), the court held the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to accept a pro se defendant’s waiver of indictment, despite a statutory prohibition on such uncounseled waiver. And in State v. Wilkins, COA23-839 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2024), the court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to a fatally defective indictment. This post considers those two cases.
indictment
Criminal Processes in the Context of the Pretrial Integrity Act
By now, court officials are familiar with the pretrial release laws as amended by the Pretrial Integrity Act. The application of G.S. 15A-533(b) regarding defendants charged with certain high-level felonies has been fairly straightforward. Application of the 48-hour provision, G.S. 15A-533(h), has not been as simple and has given rise to several questions, including what procedures to apply when a criminal process other than an arrest warrant is used.
Under the new law, when a defendant is arrested for a new offense while on pretrial release for a pending proceeding, a judge—rather than a magistrate—must set conditions of release for the new offense within the first 48 hours after arrest. This post addresses the application of this provision with regard to citations, summonses, orders for arrest, and indictments.
When (and If) an Order for Arrest Should Issue after Dismissal to the Grand Jury
It is no secret that probable cause hearings are rare throughout North Carolina, despite clear provisions for conducting them in the general statutes. See G.S. 15A-606, 611-614. The reasons for their rarity have been set forth on this blog as far back as 2009. Prosecutors often point to the volume of felony cases moving through district court and the impracticality of conducting a mini-trial with “all the trappings of a full adversary hearing” in explaining why they routinely bypass the procedure. See State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220, 224 (1978). However, skipping the PC hearing can create a gap, or bump, in the “regular” course of a criminal case, leading to various issues.
At the probable cause stage in district court, the defendant may waive the hearing, assert the right to a hearing and get one, or assert the right to a hearing and not get one. In this last scenario, the State, rather than engaging in the hearing, may choose to dismiss the case in district court and then recharge the matter in superior court by seeking an indictment. This practice is referred to as “voluntary dismissal to the grand jury” (VDGJ) or “dismissal for possible indictment.” The State’s bypassing of the probable cause hearing has never been deemed reversible error in North Carolina, as the defendant must demonstrate prejudice, which is rarely possible. See State v. Wiggins, 344 N.C. 18 (1993).
After voluntary dismissal to the grand jury, a crucial question arises as to whether an order for arrest (OFA) should issue upon indictment. The question is the subject of this blog post.
Prosecutors Beware: State v. Newborn Provides a Word of Caution for Felon In Possession Indictments
Author’s Note: The opinion discussed below was reversed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Newborn, 330PA21, ___ N.C. ___ (June 16, 2023). The North Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion is discussed here.
The first sentence of State v. Newborn, ___ N.C. App. ___, 2021-NCCOA-426 (Aug. 17, 2021) sums up the issue: “When the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon is brought in an indictment containing other related offenses, the indictment for that charge is rendered fatally defective and invalid, thereby depriving a trial court of jurisdiction over it.”
Even after I read it that straightforward statement, I questioned my understanding. This rule struck me as inconsistent with recent caselaw holding that the violation of statutory pleading rules for prior convictions does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. See State v. Brice, 370 N.C. 244 (2017). But (ipso facto) that is the rule for felon in possession indictments, which prosecutors ignore at the case’s peril.
Naming the Victim of a Sexual Assault
Suppose the State is prosecuting a defendant for the sexual assault of a young child. Though the child has been identified by name in the arrest warrant and investigative reports provided to the defendant, the State would prefer not to name the victim in the indictment. May it refer to the victim in that document as “Victim #1”?
Not-Quite-Defective Indictments
Ordinarily, a pleading that fails to accurately allege every element of the offense is defective and is treated as a jurisdictional nullity. See, e.g., G.S. 15A-924(a)(5) (“as a prerequisite to its validity, an indictment must allege every essential element of the criminal offense it purports to charge”); State v. Harris, 219 N.C. App. 590 (2012) (indictment is invalid and confers no jurisdiction on the trial court if it “fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense”).
The limited exception to this rule is the somewhat relaxed pleading standard for a citation, which may still be sufficient even if it fails to state every element, as long as it reasonably identifies the crime charged. Shea Denning and Jeff Welty covered that issue in a series of posts available here, here, and here.
Several recent cases from the Court of Appeals have offered a good reminder about another important corollary to the general rule for pleadings: although an indictment must “allege every element” in order to be valid, the state has quite a bit of flexibility in how that standard can be met.
Brawley, Belk’s, and Charging Crimes in Modern, Southern Style
Belk Department Stores are the Bloomingdales of North Carolina. If someone says they are going to Belk (or, more often, “Belk’s”), you know that they are heading into town to pick up some modern, southern style (or, more likely, something off the wedding registry). And if you hear that so-and-so stole something from your local Belk’s, you can generally picture the scene of crime, since, outside of the big cities, there is generally just one Belk’s in town. So when the court of appeals held last year that a Rowan County indictment alleging that the defendant stole shirts belonging to “Belk’s Department Stores, an entity capable of owning property,” was invalid because it failed to adequately identify the victim of the larceny, it may have left some people in Salisbury (where there is only one Belk’s) scratching their heads.
The state supreme court recently reversed that determination in a per curiam opinion that rejected this kind of technical pleading requirement for larceny of personal property.
State v. Brice: Pleading Rules for Habitual Offenses Are Not Jurisdictional
The court of appeals last year vacated Sandra Brice’s conviction for habitual misdemeanor larceny for stealing five packs of steaks valued at $70 from a Food Lion in Hickory. The reason? The indictment alleged the steak theft and Brice’s four prior convictions for misdemeanor larceny in a single count. That violated a statutory rule requiring that prior convictions be alleged in a separate count, and, in the court of appeals’ view, deprived the superior court of jurisdiction to enter judgment against Brice for habitual misdemeanor larceny, a felony offense. Earlier this month, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court’s judgment. Read on to find out why.
Ferguson and the Prosecutor’s Approach to the Grand Jury
Yesterday, the grand jury in St. Louis County, Missouri , declined to indict officer Darren Wilson in connection with the fatal shooting of Michael Brown. Some commentators have criticized the decision of the local prosecutor, Robert McCulloch, to present all the evidence to the grand jury, rather than only evidence that would support an indictment. I don’t think that’s a fair criticism, for reasons I explain below.
When Charging Murder, Is the Offense Date the Date of the Attack, or the Date of the Victim’s Death?
Suppose that Dan shoots Victor on January 1, and that Victor dies from his wounds, but not until January 3. When a magistrate issues an arrest warrant, or the grand jury returns an indictment, should the date of offense be listed as January 1, the date of the attack? Or January 3, the date of … Read more