North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

My colleague Joe Hyde blogged last week about the Court of Appeals’ determination in State v. Tate, __ N.C. App. ___ (June 18, 2025), that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on a theory that was not alleged in the indictment. I’m returning to Tate this week to discuss another aspect of the Court’s holding, namely its determination that the defendant’s confrontation clause rights were not violated when an expert from the State Crime Lab testified to an opinion that was based in part on DNA test results generated by private third-party laboratory. This post will unpack the court’s analysis of that issue and will consider what it might mean for testimony by substitute analysts more generally.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution limits the use of testimonial hearsay statements by an unavailable witness at a criminal trial, as does its state counterpart in Article I, Sec. 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. A hearsay statement is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. A statement is testimonial if the primary purpose of the statement was to establish past facts for use at a later prosecution. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245 (2015). The Confrontation Clause does not protect against the admission of nontestimonial statements (although hearsay statements still must meet an exception or exemption). In a recent decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court analyzed a challenge to the admission of the defendant’s phone records offered by the State at trial. Overruling the Court of Appeals on the point, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the phone records were nontestimonial as purely machine-generated data.” The case is a good reminder of the distinctions between testimonial and nontestimonial statements and may have implications for future confrontation issues. Read on for the details.

As regular readers know, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), this past June. The decision undercut the reasoning used by North Carolina courts to justify the practice of permitting substitute analysts to offer an independent opinion about the forensic report of another, nontestifying analyst (as discussed here and here). Until this week, no North Carolina court had applied Smith. The wait is now over. In State v. Clark, NCCOA-1133, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Dec. 3, 2024), the Court of Appeals delved into the impact of Smith on North Carolina law, ultimately granting the defendant a new trial for a Confrontation Clause violation. This post discusses the Clark decision and its implications for the future of substitute analysts in the state.

I recently gave a criminal law case update to a group of judges.  I had quite a few cases that I planned to cover in relatively short order. I started with Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), in which the United States Supreme Court held that statements from an absent laboratory analyst that a testifying analyst conveyed to support his expert opinion about the chemical composition of the substances seized from the defendant were hearsay. For that reason, their admission at the defendant’s trial on drug charges raised Confrontation Clause concerns. To my chagrin, twenty minutes later, I was still talking about Smith, attempting to helpfully respond to a barrage of questions from trial court judges about the practical import of the decision for various kinds of testimony frequently proffered by the State during a criminal trial. Those questions included the following:

• The substitute analysts I see don’t typically rely on another analyst’s report. Instead, they examine the underlying testing data and reach an opinion based on that. Is that testimony admissible?
• May a supervising analyst who reviewed the testing done by and conclusions of another analyst pursuant to laboratory protocols testify to the conclusions the supervising analyst reached about the identity of the substance?
• Suppose a new analyst retests a substance. Will he or she be able to establish a sufficient chain of custody for the substance tested given that the substance was initially received and examined by an analyst who is not available to testify?

This post will review what we knew about substitute analyst testimony before Smith was decided, will recap the Court’s analysis in Smith (analyzed in detail here), and will provide some thoughts about Smith’s import that may inform a court’s analysis of the questions posed above.

My colleagues have covered the retroactivity rules many times before on the blog but the analysis for determining the retroactivity of new federal rules has changed in the last few years. Considering that and the recent Confrontation Clause rule for substitute analyst testimony announced in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. ___; 144 S.Ct. 1785 (2024) (summarized here), an update is in order. Today’s post reviews the federal retroactivity analysis and examines how it may be applied to Smith. Read on for the details.

This post summarizes Smith v. Arizona and United States v. Rahimi from the Supreme Court of the United States, decided on June 21, 2024. These summaries, prepared by Phil Dixon (Smith) and Jeff Welty (Rahimi) will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.

My colleague, Phil Dixon, blogged about the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Joyner, 284 N.C. App. 681 (2022), here. In Joyner, the court ruled that the State did not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause when it introduced the victim’s testimony from a civil 50C hearing at the defendant’s criminal trial. Last year, the court decided State v. Smith, 287 N.C. App. 614 (2023) (unpublished), a case that provides an interesting counterpoint to Joyner. In Smith, the State recorded the victim’s testimony from the probable cause hearing in district court and moved to admit the testimony at trial in superior court after the victim became unavailable. The trial court admitted the testimony, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that the opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the probable cause hearing was not “adequate” to comport with constitutional requirements, vacated the convictions for first-degree kidnapping and human trafficking, and ordered a new trial.

Although the opinion is unpublished, the State did not seek further review, and the Smith decision has important implications for practitioners. This post examines those issues and offers advice for defenders when the State attempts to introduce recorded testimony from a probable cause hearing at trial.

I mentioned in a recent News Roundup that the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Smith v. Arizona. The case tees up a question that has been lingering since at least 2012: Does the Confrontation Clause permit the admission of substitute forensic analyst testimony? This issue arises when a forensic report is prepared for use in a criminal case, but the testing analyst is not available for trial. Instead of admitting the report through the original analyst, the State calls a different expert—one not necessarily involved in the original testing—to offer an opinion about the accuracy of the report. North Carolina generally allows such testimony, but there is a split among jurisdictions on the issue. Smith has the potential to alter the legal landscape here and elsewhere regarding the use of substitute analyst testimony, so today’s post dives into the legal issues and potential impact of the case.

Two weeks ago, I wrote about the foundational requirements for introducing a defendant’s medical records in a DWI trial. Soon after I posted, a reader asked whether introducing those records through an affidavit from a records custodian violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him or her. My answer is, generally speaking, no.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment generally guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers in person. If a witness was available for an earlier trial or other proceeding and the defendant had an opportunity and motive to cross-examine the witness there, the witness testimony from the earlier proceeding may be admitted at a later criminal trial without offending the Confrontation Clause if the witness is unavailable at the time of trial. We have known for some time that this “prior opportunity for cross-examination” can be met at various stages of a criminal proceeding. See State v. Rollins, 226 N.C. App. 129 (2013) (testimony from plea hearing provided prior opportunity for cross); State v. Ross, 216 N.C. App. 337 (2011) (same for testimony at probable cause hearing); State v. Ramirez, (2003) (same for testimony at bond hearing, although the case was decided under hearsay rules and not expressly as a confrontation issue); State v. Chandler, 324 N.C. 172 (1989) (same for testimony from a prior trial); State v. Giles, 83 N.C. App. 487 (1986) (same for testimony from a juvenile transfer hearing). In all those cases, though, the defendant was present at the earlier proceeding, was represented by counsel, and the earlier proceedings could naturally be viewed as a part of the underlying criminal case. In State v. Joyner, 2022-NCCOA-525, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2022), the Court of Appeals expands the concept of prior opportunity to cross to a civil hearing where the defendant did not attend the hearing and was not entitled to counsel. Read on for the details.