The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment generally guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers in person. If a witness was available for an earlier trial or other proceeding and the defendant had an opportunity and motive to cross-examine the witness there, the witness testimony from the earlier proceeding may be admitted at a later criminal trial without offending the Confrontation Clause if the witness is unavailable at the time of trial. We have known for some time that this “prior opportunity for cross-examination” can be met at various stages of a criminal proceeding. See State v. Rollins, 226 N.C. App. 129 (2013) (testimony from plea hearing provided prior opportunity for cross); State v. Ross, 216 N.C. App. 337 (2011) (same for testimony at probable cause hearing); State v. Ramirez, (2003) (same for testimony at bond hearing, although the case was decided under hearsay rules and not expressly as a confrontation issue); State v. Chandler, 324 N.C. 172 (1989) (same for testimony from a prior trial); State v. Giles, 83 N.C. App. 487 (1986) (same for testimony from a juvenile transfer hearing). In all those cases, though, the defendant was present at the earlier proceeding, was represented by counsel, and the earlier proceedings could naturally be viewed as a part of the underlying criminal case. In State v. Joyner, 2022-NCCOA-525, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2022), the Court of Appeals expands the concept of prior opportunity to cross to a civil hearing where the defendant did not attend the hearing and was not entitled to counsel. Read on for the details. Continue reading
Tag Archives: cross examination
In my previous post, I wrote about who goes first when presenting evidence at a suppression hearing or trial, and the circumstances under which the normal order of presentation could be changed. This post addresses the obvious follow-up question: who goes last?
In a routine (non-capital) jury trial, which side gets the all-important final word with the jury before they start deliberating?
The rule itself is simple and straightforward. If the defense offers any evidence, then the state gets the final argument (plus an opening address); if the defense does not offer any evidence, then the defense gets the final argument (plus an opening address). See G.S. 7A-97; N.C. Gen. R. Prac. Super. & Dist. Ct. 10.
That sounds pretty clear. But what exactly does it mean to say that the defense “offered evidence” at trial? That’s where things start to get a little more interesting. Continue reading →
Can the defense question a State’s witness about pending charges? May the State question the defendant or defense witnesses on their pending charges? The Rules of Evidence allow impeachment by conviction of a crime under Rule 609, but nothing in the rules speaks to impeachment by evidence of pending charges specifically. The question comes up frequently enough that I wanted to write about it. Read on for the answer. Continue reading →
As blog readers well know, the new Crawford confrontation clause rule provides that absent an exception or a waiver of rights, testimonial hearsay statements of a declarant who does not testify at trial may not be admitted unless the witness is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity for cross-examination. This is a tough rule for the prosecution because even if it can show unavailability (e.g., the witness is now dead), without a prior trial the prosecution rarely can show a prior opportunity for cross examination. But under a new court of appeals decision in State v. Ross, that just changed. In Ross, the court held that a victim’s testimony at a probable cause hearing provided a prior opportunity for cross-examination that satisfied the Crawford rule.
Ross involved the following facts. Early one morning Pedro Amaro and his wife, Angelica Besies, were awoken by a knock at the door. Amaro found the defendant at the door and recognized the defendant as the person who had sold him a shotgun a day or two earlier. Shortly after Amaro let the defendant inside, he heard a gunshot, felt heat at the back of his head, and his vision began to blur. He then heard his wife scream from the bedroom and heard another gunshot. The defendant had entered the bedroom and pointed his gun at Besies’ head. Besies struggled with the defendant and ended up shot in the hand. Amaro eventually subdued the defendant by holding him on the floor while Besies called 911. Four officers then arrived and secured the defendant, who claimed that he went to the residence to collect money that Amaro owed him from a drug deal. Amaro and Besies were brought to the hospital for treatment and upon their release were themselves arrested on numerous drug-related charges.
In addition to being charged with various offenses in connection with the Amaro/Besies home invasion, the defendant also was charged with several offenses, including first-degree murder, that occurred a few days earlier. None of these other charges involved Amaro or Besies. All of the charges against the defendant were later joined for trial. But before that happened, Besies, who was in custody on the drug charges, testified at the defendant’s probable cause hearing on the home invasion charges. Some months later Besies posted bond and was released from jail. When the defendant’s case came on for trial, Besies’ lawyer did not know her whereabouts. Amaro, who was still in custody, said she was in Mexico. In Besies’ absence, the prosecution offered, and the trial judge admitted, her statements at the probable cause hearing. The defendant was convicted of, among other things, attempted first degree murder, felony assault, and attempted armed robbery, all in connection with the home invasion. He was acquitted on the murder and other charges that were joined with the home invasion charges for trial.
On appeal, the defendant argued, in part, that the trial court violated the Crawford rule when it admitted Besies’ probable cause hearing testimony. Conceding that Besies was unavailable, the defendant argued that the probable cause hearing did not afford him an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine her. Specifically, he asserted that his opportunity for cross-examination was inadequate for three reasons: (1) that all of the charges had not yet been joined for trial; (2) that his lead trial counsel had not yet been appointed; and (3) that at the time of the hearing, defense counsel had not yet had an opportunity to review all of the discovery. As to the joinder issue, the court noted that the probable cause hearing took place with respect to the home invasion charges, the only charges for which the defendant was ultimately found guilty. Thus, it concluded “with respect to the charges on appeal, defendant’s motive to cross-examine Ms. Besies would have been the same as his motive at trial.” It went on to note that the defendant failed to identify any topics that defense counsel did not address at the probable cause hearing that would have been covered in cross-examination at trial. As to the issue of lead counsel, the court noted that the lawyer who represented the defendant at the probable cause hearing served as co-counsel at the defendant’s later trial. And finally, as to the discovery issue, it noted that “our courts have never held that discovery must be complete for a cross-examination opportunity to be adequate.” It did not further explore this issue. The court then concluded:
Here, defendant was represented by counsel at the probable cause hearing (who was one of his trial counsel), he had the same motive to cross-examine Ms. Besies as at trial, and his counsel did in fact cross-examine Ms. Besies. These circumstances are sufficient to establish an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Besies. The trial court, therefore, did not err in admitting Ms. Besies’ probable cause hearing testimony.
After string of disappointments in the Crawford arena, Ross is sure to please the prosecution. Aside from holding that probable cause hearings can constitute an adequate prior opportunity for cross-examination, the case opens the door to arguments that similar pre-trial examinations—such as depositions—serve the same purpose. Of course, Ross is a court of appeals decision and as we’ve seen with regard to other aspects of the Crawford analysis, litigation tends to continue beyond the intermediate appellate courts. Thus, while Ross is the law, the prosecution’s aggressive use of it is not without risk. As for the weakest link in the Ross analysis, I’d say it’s the way with the court dealt with the discovery issue. But I’d love to hear your thoughts. Post away!
Suppose that an eyewitness testifies for the state on direct examination that he saw the defendant snatch an old woman’s purse and run off. The defense cross-examines the witness about whether he’d used drugs shortly before the crime took place, hoping to show that the witness’s perception was impaired. If the witness asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, how should the court respond? Allowing the witness to assert the privilege unfairly limits the defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine the witness, but compelling the witness to answer unfairly requires the witness to incriminate himself.
Cases and commentators have suggested a variety of possible responses, including (1) permitting the witness to assert the privilege, (2) permitting the witness to assert the privilege, but striking some or all of the witness’s direct examination testimony in response, (3) permitting the witness to assert the privilege, but allowing the fact-finder to infer that the answer to the question would have been incriminating, and (4) requiring the witness to answer, on the theory that the witness waived the privilege by testifying on direct examination. The proper response may vary depending on whether the witness is also a party, e.g., the defendant, and on the nature of the question posed, e.g., whether the question relates to the facts of the case or only to the credibility of the witness. No single North Carolina case sets out a comprehensive approach to this issue, but we do have several relevant cases that provide some guidance.
A defendant who chooses to take the stand waives the privilege and may be compelled to answer relevant questions on cross-examination. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). The Brown Court held that a defendant who elects to take the stand is subject to cross-examination about matters “made relevant by her direct examination.” Id. at 154. The defendant’s decision to testify amounts to a Fifth Amendment waiver, and “the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.” Id. at 154-55. Lesser remedies, such as striking the defendant’s testimony, also appear to be proper, in the court’s discretion. Id. at 156 n.5. However, the waiver is not limitless: it does not extend to collateral matters relevant only to credibility. For example, if a defendant on trial for assault were asked on cross-examination about an unrelated fraud he perpetrated – a specific instance of dishonest conduct about which a court may permit cross-examination under Rule 608(b) – he could assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. As Rule 608(b) makes clear, “[t]he giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver o the privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.” Of course, whether a particular question is “made relevant by . . . direct examination” or “relate[s] only to credibility” may be a difficult issue in some instances, but the basic legal principles are fairly clear.
Under Brown, a non-party witness does not waive the privilege by testifying, at least if he or she is compelled to do so. (Whether a non-party witness who testifies without being subpoenaed waives his privilege by testifying is not clear from Brown.) Therefore, such a witness may not be compelled to provide incriminating answers on cross examination. However, if the cross examination concerns a non-collateral matter, his direct examination testimony may be stricken as a result of his assertion of the privilege; this is a matter of fairness to the opposing party, which is otherwise deprived of the right to cross examine. State v. Ray, 336 N.C. 463 (1994). If the witness asserts the privilege in connection with a collateral matter relevant only to credibility, Ray appears to say that striking the witness’s direct examination testimony is not proper. Furthermore, State v. Patterson, 59 N.C. App. 650 (1983), appears to indicate that the fact-finder should not be allowed to draw any inference from the witness’s assertion of the privilege. That leaves the opposing party without a remedy when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment as a shield against cross-examination addressed to credibility, a state of affairs criticized by some commentators. Of course, most fact-finders will probably go ahead with the prohibited inference anyhow, so the lack of a remedy may be more apparent than real.
Let’s return to the example from the beginning of this post. When the state’s eyewitness asserts the privilege in response to defense counsel’s question about drug use, what should happen? Assuming that the witness is under subpoena, he hasn’t waived the privilege by testifying on direct, and so can’t be compelled to answer. But because the question goes to the witness’s ability to perceive, not merely his credibility, it concerns a non-collateral matter, and the court may strike some or all of the witness’s direct examination testimony as a result.
