Articles in the Procedure category - Page 56 of 77

In a prior post on this topic, I began outlining some impermissible types of jury argument. In this post, I’ll continue that discussion with the following additional listing of improper […]

In my previous post I wrote about In re Hamilton, a recent appellate case involving petitions to terminate sex offender registration. In Hamilton, the court of appeals held that a […]

A recent case from the court of appeals sheds some light on a frequently asked question about petitions for removal from the sex offender registry. The case, In re Hamilton, […]

In a prior post on this topic, I addressed permissible jury argument. In this post and one that follows [editor’s note: coming next week], I address impermissible argument. The courts […]

I’ve had a whole bunch of phone calls lately raising the same basic issue: suppose that a prosecutor is aware that an officer has been dishonest or has engaged in […]

As part of its ongoing coverage of the John Edwards trial, The News and Observer reported today that Edwards’ lawyer cross-examined former Edwards aide Andrew Young by reading from pages […]

Under G.S. 14-208.18, it is a crime for certain sex offenders “to knowingly be at” certain locations, including “[o]n the premises of any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors.” The court of appeals recently decided State v. Harris, a case concerning an indictment for that offense. The court’s opinion makes some interesting points, so I’ll set out the indictment, and then administer a quiz.

The indictment alleged that the defendant

did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously on the premises of Winget Park Elementary School, located at . . . Charlotte, North Carolina. A place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors and defendant is a registered sex offender.

On appeal, the defendant identified several alleged defects in the indictment. So here’s the quiz: which of the following problems, if any, did the court of appeals view as requiring relief for the defendant?

a. The omission of “go” or “be” from the phrase “did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously on the premises

b. The failure to allege “knowingly,” which is the mens rea term used in G.S. 14-208.18

c. The lack of any antecedent for the phrase “[a] place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors”

d. The failure to specify that the defendant’s reportable conviction was for an offense in Article 7A of Chapter 14

e. None of the above, the court determined that the indictment was sufficient

The answer is after the break.

Several earlier posts address the requirement that a defendant be notified of statutory rights related to implied consent testing before being requested to submit to a test of his breath, […]

Everyone knows that under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a prosecutor must disclose material exculpatory or mitigating evidence to the defense. But does Brady apply only prior to […]

I’m guessing that the criminal defense bar thinks that they have more strikes than hits in post-conviction proceedings. But a recent Court of Appeals case reminds us that it is […]