Jury Argument — Part II (May 14, 2012)
Jessica Smith
In a prior post on this topic, I addressed permissible jury argument. In this post and one that follows [editor’s note: coming next week], I address impermissible argument. The courts […]
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May 14, 2012
In a prior post on this topic, I addressed permissible jury argument. In this post and one that follows [editor’s note: coming next week], I address impermissible argument. The courts […]
READ POST "Jury Argument — Part II (May 14, 2012)"May 8, 2012
I’ve had a whole bunch of phone calls lately raising the same basic issue: suppose that a prosecutor is aware that an officer has been dishonest or has engaged in […]
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As part of its ongoing coverage of the John Edwards trial, The News and Observer reported today that Edwards’ lawyer cross-examined former Edwards aide Andrew Young by reading from pages […]
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Under G.S. 14-208.18, it is a crime for certain sex offenders “to knowingly be at” certain locations, including “[o]n the premises of any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors.” The court of appeals recently decided State v. Harris, a case concerning an indictment for that offense. The court’s opinion makes some interesting points, so I’ll set out the indictment, and then administer a quiz.
The indictment alleged that the defendant
did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously on the premises of Winget Park Elementary School, located at . . . Charlotte, North Carolina. A place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors and defendant is a registered sex offender.
On appeal, the defendant identified several alleged defects in the indictment. So here’s the quiz: which of the following problems, if any, did the court of appeals view as requiring relief for the defendant?
a. The omission of “go” or “be” from the phrase “did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously on the premises
b. The failure to allege “knowingly,” which is the mens rea term used in G.S. 14-208.18
c. The lack of any antecedent for the phrase “[a] place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors”
d. The failure to specify that the defendant’s reportable conviction was for an offense in Article 7A of Chapter 14
e. None of the above, the court determined that the indictment was sufficient
The answer is after the break.
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I’m guessing that the criminal defense bar thinks that they have more strikes than hits in post-conviction proceedings. But a recent Court of Appeals case reminds us that it is […]
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