In every case where a person is charged with felony speeding to elude arrest pursuant to G.S. 20-141.5(b) or (b1), the motor vehicle driven is subject to seizure and forfeiture. This is also true in DWI cases where, at the date of offense, the defendant’s driver’s license was revoked for an impaired driving revocation or the defendant did not have a valid license nor insurance. When in district court, these cases have expedited calendaring requirements (discussed here). This is in part to preserve the vehicle’s value while the case is pending. Upon seizure, the vehicle is usually first towed to a local storage facility, then transferred to the facilities of a state contractor within a few days. There are fees for towing, as well as accruing fees for storage. Whether the motor vehicle is released to its owner, a lienholder, or forfeited to the county board of education, these towing and storage fees must be paid. Often, these fees are paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle. While expediting the underlying case towards resolution is one way to minimize these fees, another is release of the vehicle before case disposition. This post addresses the circumstances under which a vehicle may be fully released pretrial and does not have to be brought back for a later forfeiture hearing.
Procedure
2025 Expunction Guide Available for Free!
With a teaser like that, who could resist reading more? The 2025 edition of my online guide to expunctions is now available on the School of Government’s website at https://www.sog.unc.edu/resources/microsites/relief-criminal-conviction/. It is a free resource on expunctions and other forms of relief from the consequences of a criminal conviction. Compared to previous years, the 2024 legislative session was relatively quiet on the expunction front, but the General Assembly made some important changes, discussed briefly below and in more detail in the revised guide.
Shifting the Landscape for the Domestic Violence 48-Hour Rule?
The “48-hour rule,” as it is known in domestic violence cases, has been covered on this blog numerous times over the years (see here, here, and here). The rule shifts the responsibility of setting conditions of pretrial release from magistrates to judges in certain cases involving allegations of domestic violence. The rule is set out in G.S. 15A-534.1, which provides that a judge—rather than a magistrate—must set a defendant’s pretrial release conditions during the first forty-eight hours after arrest for certain offenses.
Judicial officials and practitioners who handle criminal domestic violence cases should be familiar with both the statute and the long-standing ruling in State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483 (1998), that required dismissal of charges where G.S. 15A-534.1 was violated. Last year, the court of appeals decided State v. Tucker, 291 N.C. App. 379 (2023), which takes a different approach to determining the outcome of a domestic violence case that involves a 48-hour violation. This brief post details the facts of both cases and what Tucker suggests for domestic violence cases moving forward.
Indictment Technicalities: Gone Today and Here Tomorrow
Singleton was supposed to make things simpler. As previously reported, in that case our Supreme Court attempted to eliminate some “obsolete technicalities” of the common law by abrogating the jurisdictional indictment rule, whereby a defective pleading deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. My colleague Danny Spiegel called it a sea change. The Court of Appeals decided two cases in September that illustrate continuing complexity in this area. In State v. Pierce, COA23-348 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2024), the court held the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to accept a pro se defendant’s waiver of indictment, despite a statutory prohibition on such uncounseled waiver. And in State v. Wilkins, COA23-839 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2024), the court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to a fatally defective indictment. This post considers those two cases.
Violation of Conditions Before Release
I recently taught a session at the magistrates’ conference about arrestable conditions of pretrial release. The session sparked a lot of discussion about the law surrounding pretrial conditions for in-custody defendants. It is well understood that when a defendant violates pretrial release conditions after being released from custody, the law allows several mechanisms for enforcement, including revocation of pretrial release, arrest of the defendant, and the setting of new, potentially stricter conditions of pretrial release. What’s less clear is (1) whether or not conditions of release are enforceable if a defendant has not yet been released, and (2) if they are, what tools judicial officials have for enforcement. This post addresses these questions.
State v. McLean Clarifies the Timeframe for Giving Oral Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals
Attorneys practicing in criminal superior court are likely familiar with the process of giving notice of appeal to the appellate division. Under Rule 4(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant can give notice by either (1) giving oral notice of appeal “at trial,” or (2) by filing a written notice of appeal within 14 days after entry of judgment and serving it on the State. A recent case explains what counts as “at trial” for purposes of giving notice of appeal. Under State v. McLean, COA 23-100, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Aug. 6, 2024), oral notice of appeal is considered made “at trial” and therefore timely as long as it is given within the session of superior court, which is typically one week. “[T]he period of time for Defendant to provide timely notice of appeal at trial commenced following sentencing and ended when the court session adjourned sine die.” McLean Slip op. at 8 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Although the defendant in McLean gave oral notice of appeal the morning after the pronouncement of the judgment in his case, the timing of the notice was proper, because the session had not yet ended. This post examines the holding and implications of the McLean decision.
Outsourcing Reasonableness: Redefining Defensive Force in State v. Phillips.
Coke claimed the common law was the perfection of reason. Our Supreme Court began its recent opinion in State v. Phillips, No. 281A23 (N.C. Aug. 23, 2024), by citing Coke, albeit for a different proposition (i.e., a person’s home is his castle). Construing G.S. 14-51.2, our Supreme Court held that the legislature has abrogated the common law rule that prohibited excessive force in defense of the home. The trial court erred therefore in instructing the jury that the defendant homeowner did not have the right to use excessive force. This post examines the recent opinion in Phillips.
Advice for Defenders Handling H & I Felonies in District Court
Shea wrote about changes to the law around the practice of entering low-level felony pleas in district court last fall, here. More and more districts have begun adopting the practice of accepting guilty pleas to class H and I felonies in district court since then. In light of the expansion of the practice across North Carolina, I wanted to remind defenders of the rules and best practices when entering a felony guilty plea in district court. Read on for the details.
Character is Destiny: Improper Argument in State v. Anderson
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible unless the only reason for introducing the evidence is to show the defendant’s propensity for committing the crime. In a trial involving a defendant’s sexual assault of children, the prosecutor told the jury, “[t]he best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.” Is that an inaccurate statement of law? The Court of Appeals recently held that it was. This post considers the rule – that incorrect statements of law in closing argument are improper – and its application in this case, State v. Anderson, No. COA23-821 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug 6, 2024).
Posting a Cash Bond: Who Gets the Money After a Defendant’s Case is Complete?
When a person is arrested, a law enforcement officer must take that person before a judicial official without unnecessary delay. G.S. 15A-501(2). Subject to certain statutory exceptions, defendants charged with most non-capital offenses are entitled to pretrial release. G.S. 15A-533(b).
G.S. 15A-534 requires that at least one of five conditions of pretrial release be imposed before a defendant can be released. One type of release condition a judicial official may impose on a defendant is a secured bond. A bail bond may be secured in one of three ways: a cash deposit of the full amount of the bond, a mortgage by the defendant pursuant to G.S. 58-74-5, or by at least one solvent surety.
Judicial officials frequently impose secured bonds and accept cash in satisfaction of those bonds. However, people posting those cash bonds—whether it be the defendant or a person posting on behalf of the defendant—may not always fully understand the procedure surrounding cash bonds. This post addresses the common question of who is entitled to a refund of the cash at the conclusion of the case and how a person can preserve their interest in the cash pending the outcome of the case.