Law enforcement has authority to seize a person’s motor vehicle in several circumstances. Motor vehicles may be seized as evidence of a crime or for containing evidence of a crime, or as a consequence of being charged with certain offenses, including specified drug offenses, larcenies, and motor vehicle offenses. For some individuals charged with impaired driving or felony speeding to elude arrest, their vehicles may be seized and are subject to forfeiture pursuant to G.S. 20-28.3. In these cases, subsection (m) requires expedited scheduling and imposes additional requirements before the case can be continued. This post examines when subsection (m) applies, what it requires, and what may happen if it’s not followed.
Motor vehicle seizures. Broadly speaking, there are two justifications for seizing motor vehicles in criminal cases. One is where the vehicle itself is evidence of a crime or it contains evidence of a crime. This authority stems from G.S. 15-11.1, permitting law-enforcement to seize and keep property which may be useful or necessary as evidence in a criminal trial. The other is where the vehicle is used as an instrumentality of certain offenses. The list of offenses that subject a vehicle to seizure and forfeiture includes felony larceny/armed robbery (G.S. 14-86.1), alcoholic beverage violations (G.S. 18B-504), prearranged speed competitions (G.S. 20-141.3), street takeovers (G.S. 20-141.10), felony drug violations (G.S. 90-112), wildlife and marine fisheries violations (G.S. 113-137), and impaired driving/felony speeding to elude arrest (G.S. 20-28.2). The calendaring provisions in G.S. 20-28.3(m) only apply to vehicles seized and subject to forfeiture pursuant to G.S. 20-28.2.
Narrower still. Vehicle seizure and forfeiture pursuant to G.S. 20-28.3 apply to all varieties of felony speeding to elude (found in G.S. 20-141.5(b) and (b1)). But the calendaring provisions in subsection (m) only apply to district court trials. Because superior court retains jurisdiction over all felonies for trial (G.S. 7A-271), this means G.S. 20-28.3(m) only applies to impaired driving misdemeanors. Even within impaired driving offenses, G.S. 20-28.3 does not apply in every circumstance. There are only two subsets of individuals charged with impaired driving whose vehicles are subject to seizure and forfeiture:
- individuals who, at the time of the impaired driving charge, were driving while their drivers license was revoked because of a prior impaired driving license revocation, as defined in G.S. 20-28.2(a); and
- individuals who, at the time of the impaired driving charge, were driving without a valid drivers license and were not covered by an automobile liability policy.
Expedited scheduling. Where subsection (m) applies, it requires the district court trial to be set on the arresting officer’s next court date, or within 30 days, whichever comes first. Once set, the case “shall not be continued” without a written motion to continue being filed, with notice given to the opposing party prior to the motion being heard. The judge must make a finding of a “compelling reason” for the continuance, and the motion and finding must be attached to the court case record. If the defendant is found guilty, the forfeiture hearing “shall be heard by the judge immediately, or as soon thereafter as feasible.” (If the defendant is acquitted, there is no forfeiture hearing, and the motor vehicle is released pursuant to G.S. 20-28.4).
Appeal. If the defendant appeals their conviction to superior court, subsection (m) also addresses petitions for pretrial release of vehicles (which are otherwise established by subsections (e), (e1), (e2), and (e3)). It permits certain parties who have not previously been heard on a petition for pretrial vehicle release under subsections (e1) or (e3) to have a hearing. It also directs that the provisions of subsection (e) (petitions for pretrial vehicle release by nondefendant vehicle owners) apply pending trial in superior court. Finally, subsection (m) provides that release of a motor vehicle continues, under the same conditions, pending the resolution of the case in superior court if the motor vehicle was released pursuant to subsection (e) in district court.
Interests protected. At first glance, it may appear that subsection (m) is intended to protect the defendant’s interest in a speedy resolution of the case where their motor vehicle is seized and subject to forfeiture. After all, towing and storage fees cannot be waived if a vehicle is released, even in cases where the defendant is acquitted. But subsection (m) does not differentiate between the state and the defense in its heightened requirements for seeking and receiving a continuance. It also favors holding the forfeiture hearing “immediately” upon the defendant’s conviction or “as soon thereafter as feasible.” This push for a quick resolution of the vehicle seizure applies to both parties and is not waivable. This may be because there is another interest at hand: that of the county board of education. If the motor vehicle is forfeited, the proceeds go to the county school fund – minus costs, existing liens, and the towing and storage fees (G.S. 20-28.5(b)). In these circumstances, the longer a motor vehicle is stored pre-forfeiture, the less local schools receive from the sale.
Expedited sale. Generally, for the vehicle to be forfeited and sold, either the defendant must be convicted, or 60 days must have passed since the defendant failed to appear at trial and the defendant’s order for arrest has not otherwise been set aside (G.S. 20-28.2(b), (b1)). However, before the resolution of the case, and without the defendant failing to appear, the vehicle may be sold pursuant to G.S. 20-28.3(i) “Expedited Sale of Motor Vehicles in Certain Cases” if:
- 90 days have passed since the date of seizure, and the fair market value of the vehicle is less than $1500;
- the towing and storage fees have exceeded 85% of the vehicle’s fair market value, regardless of the vehicle’s fair market value or the amount of time the vehicle has been seized; or
- the motor vehicle owner(s) consent to the sale.
When this happens, the proceeds are first used to pay all outstanding towing and storage fees. The remaining proceeds are then held by the clerk of superior court. If forfeiture is later ordered by the court, the remaining proceeds go to the county school fund in the same manner as if the vehicle was sold at the resolution of the case. If the court determines the motor vehicle would not have been subject to forfeiture, the remaining proceeds are used to satisfy any liens, and then any remaining balance would be returned to the motor vehicle owner(s). In the event a case has been improperly delayed, expedited sale can work as a safety measure preventing the complete depletion of the vehicle’s value by the towing and storage fees.
Improper delay. At the outset of an impaired driving charge where there’s been a motor vehicle seizure, the judicial official might set the first court date outside of the arresting officer’s court date or 30 days, as required by subsection (m). If that circumstance comes to the attention of the parties or a judicial official, the parties or judicial official might act to communicate with the other parties and move to secure an earlier court date to meet the subsection’s requirements. If the arresting officer’s court date, or 30 days, has already passed, it may still be preferable to move the court date to the soonest possible session to meet the expediency interest supported by subsection (m). The next requirement in subsection (m) provides for additional conditions to be met before the case can be continued. If a case has been continued without a written motion or a recorded finding of a “compelling reason,” it can be more challenging to determine an appropriate remedy, if any. These circumstances can be very fact dependent, and because there is no official record in district court, it can be difficult to reconstruct the circumstances of a prior court date. Were all parties and counsel present? Was everyone prepared to proceed, but the matter wasn’t reached? Was the continuance opposed, or mutually requested by the state and defense?
The statute and caselaw do not currently address a remedy for improperly setting the initial court date or continuing the case. As written, there must be a finding of a “compelling reason” for a continuance to be granted. One response to the delay caused by the case being set outside the time limits or improperly continued may be to further heighten the showing needed to continue the case again if a party objects to further delay.
Suppression. Suppression of evidence is a remedy sometimes available in impaired driving cases. However, there is generally a nexus between the statutory or constitutional violation and the evidence suppressed. See State v. Shadding, 17 N.C. App. 279 (1973) (breath tests suppressed where defendant was not informed of their implied consent rights); State v. Hatley, 190 N.C. App. 639 (2008) (breath tests suppressed where a witness was denied access to observe chemical testing); State v. White, 232 N.C. App. 296 (2014) (post-checkpoint evidence suppressed where checkpoint violated statutory requirement to have written checkpoint policy in place); see also G.S. 15A-974 (requiring suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a substantial statutory violation). A violation of subsection (m) would not result in gathering additional evidence, nor is it necessarily tied to evidence such as the results of chemical analysis. Without a connection between a violation of G.S. 20-28.3(m) and evidence to be suppressed, it’s unlikely suppression is an appropriate remedy.
Dismissal. Another remedy sometimes requested is dismissal of the criminal case. The most comparable current caselaw that requires dismissal of impaired driving charges is Knoll and its progeny (discussed here and here). Similarly to Knoll, dismissal is not likely to be an appropriate remedy based solely on a violation of statutory requirements. Rather, the defense would have to demonstrate prejudice – that their right to prepare a defense, or another constitutional right, was denied. In State v. Liskew, 711 S.E.2d 876 (2011) (unpublished), the Court of Appeals considered dismissal based on double jeopardy grounds where the defendant’s vehicle was improperly seized at the outset of the case. The court rejected the argument that seizing the vehicle illegally amounted to punishment barring further prosecution. Where a vehicle was properly seized, it’s unlikely that mere noncompliance with the calendaring requirements would necessitate dismissal. Dismissal also appears unavailable as a remedy where improperly delayed scheduling results in an expedited sale. To show prejudice (the motor vehicle would not have otherwise been forfeited and would have been returned), either the defendant must be acquitted or the case dismissed, removing dismissal as a remedy.