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Violation of Conditions Before Release

I recently taught a session at the magistrates’ conference about arrestable conditions of pretrial release. The session sparked a lot of discussion about the law surrounding pretrial conditions for in-custody defendants. It is well understood that when a defendant violates pretrial release conditions after being released from custody, the law allows several mechanisms for enforcement, including revocation of pretrial release, arrest of the defendant, and the setting of new, potentially stricter conditions of pretrial release. What’s less clear is (1) whether or not conditions of release are enforceable if a defendant has not yet been released, and (2) if they are, what tools judicial officials have for enforcement. This post addresses these questions. 

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State v. McLean Clarifies the Timeframe for Giving Oral Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals

Attorneys practicing in criminal superior court are likely familiar with the process of giving notice of appeal to the appellate division. Under Rule 4(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant can give notice by either (1) giving oral notice of appeal “at trial,” or (2) by filing a written notice of appeal within 14 days after entry of judgment and serving it on the State. A recent case explains what counts as “at trial” for purposes of giving notice of appeal. Under State v. McLean, COA 23-100, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Aug. 6, 2024), oral notice of appeal is considered made “at trial” and therefore timely as long as it is given within the session of superior court, which is typically one week. “[T]he period of time for Defendant to provide timely notice of appeal at trial commenced following sentencing and ended when the court session adjourned sine die.” McLean Slip op. at 8 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Although the defendant in McLean gave oral notice of appeal the morning after the pronouncement of the judgment in his case, the timing of the notice was proper, because the session had not yet ended. This post examines the holding and implications of the McLean decision.

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Outsourcing Reasonableness: Redefining Defensive Force in State v. Phillips.

Coke claimed the common law was the perfection of reason. Our Supreme Court began its recent opinion in State v. Phillips, No. 281A23 (N.C. Aug. 23, 2024), by citing Coke, albeit for a different proposition (i.e., a person’s home is his castle). Construing G.S. 14-51.2, our Supreme Court held that the legislature has abrogated the common law rule that prohibited excessive force in defense of the home. The trial court erred therefore in instructing the jury that the defendant homeowner did not have the right to use excessive force. This post examines the recent opinion in Phillips.

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Advice for Defenders Handling H & I Felonies in District Court

Shea wrote about changes to the law around the practice of entering low-level felony pleas in district court last fall, here. More and more districts have begun adopting the practice of accepting guilty pleas to class H and I felonies in district court since then. In light of the expansion of the practice across North Carolina, I wanted to remind defenders of the rules and best practices when entering a felony guilty plea in district court. Read on for the details.

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Character is Destiny: Improper Argument in State v. Anderson

Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible unless the only reason for introducing the evidence is to show the defendant’s propensity for committing the crime. In a trial involving a defendant’s sexual assault of children, the prosecutor told the jury, “[t]he best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.” Is that an inaccurate statement of law? The Court of Appeals recently held that it was. This post considers the rule – that incorrect statements of law in closing argument are improper – and its application in this case, State v. Anderson, No. COA23-821 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug 6, 2024).

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Posting a Cash Bond: Who Gets the Money After a Defendant’s Case is Complete?

When a person is arrested, a law enforcement officer must take that person before a judicial official without unnecessary delay. G.S. 15A-501(2). Subject to certain statutory exceptions, defendants charged with most non-capital offenses are entitled to pretrial release. G.S. 15A-533(b).

G.S. 15A-534 requires that at least one of five conditions of pretrial release be imposed before a defendant can be released. One type of release condition a judicial official may impose on a defendant is a secured bond. A bail bond may be secured in one of three ways: a cash deposit of the full amount of the bond, a mortgage by the defendant pursuant to G.S. 58-74-5, or by at least one solvent surety.

Judicial officials frequently impose secured bonds and accept cash in satisfaction of those bonds. However, people posting those cash bonds—whether it be the defendant or a person posting on behalf of the defendant—may not always fully understand the procedure surrounding cash bonds. This post addresses the common question of who is entitled to a refund of the cash at the conclusion of the case and how a person can preserve their interest in the cash pending the outcome of the case.

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NC Supreme Court Holds that Media Entities May Seek Access to Law Enforcement Recordings by Filing a Petition

In March 2021, several news organizations filed a petition in Alamance County Superior Court seeking the release of law enforcement recordings of an “I Am Change” march that took place in Graham, North Carolina in October 2020. Marchers and law enforcement had clashed, and several people were arrested. The superior court held a hearing and ultimately ordered all of the requested recordings released without redaction.

After assessing the eight statutory considerations, the superior court explained that even though the release of the recordings would reveal highly sensitive and personal information that could harm a person’s reputation or safety, it did “not have the authority to [c]ensor this information absent a legitimate or compelling [] state interest to do so.”  In re The McClatchy Co., No. 29A23, ___ N.C. ___ (May 23, 2024). The court noted that it gave “great weight to transparency and public accountability with regard to police action” and that failure to release the information could “undermine the public interest and confidence in the administration of justice.” Id. The Graham Police Department (GPD) appealed.

The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, vacated the release order and remanded for additional findings of fact. The petitioners appealed. On appeal, the GPD argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because the media companies were required to file a civil action rather than a petition. See In re Custodial L. Enf’t Agency Recording, 288 N.C. App. 306, 311 (2023) (so holding).

The North Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Allen, rejected GPD’s contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioners filed a petition instead of a complaint. The Court then proceeded to hold that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its authority in ordering release, explaining that a trial court granting such release may place any conditions or restrictions on the release that it deems appropriate.

This post will review G.S. 132-1.4A, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion in In re The McClatchy Co., ___ N.C. ___ (May 2024) [hereinafter McClatchy], and will consider McClatchy’s import for those seeking and considering release.

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A Pink Shirt on Wednesday: State v. Singleton and the End of the Common Law Jurisdictional Indictment Rule

In its last batch of opinions, issued May 23, 2024, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided two indictment cases: State v. Singleton, No. 318PA22, __ N.C. __ (2024), and State v. Stewart, No. 23PA22, __ N.C. __ (2024). Stewart closely follows a recent precedent (In re J.U., 384 N.C. 618 (2023), discussed here), holding that nonconsensual sexual contact necessarily implies force, so an indictment alleging nonconsent need not also allege “the element of force.” Stewart, Slip Op. 8. Singleton, however, is by far the more significant. Beyond finding no defect in the indictment under review, the Supreme Court there announced the demise of the common law rule that an indictment that fails to allege all the elements of the offense is jurisdictionally defective. This post examines the new framework of indictment defects inaugurated by Singleton.

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When May the State Use Evidence of a Defendant’s Silence Before Trial?

A couple of weeks ago, I wrote about the prohibition against the State commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify, or, in other words, a defendant’s silence at trial. Such comments are disallowed as they abridge a defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence. This post addresses a related issue:  When and how may the State in a criminal trial use evidence of a defendant’s silence before trial to establish a defendant’s guilt or impeach a defendant’s credibility? (This is not the first time we have written about this topic on the blog. Jessie Smith did so here in 2012; nevertheless, a few relevant cases have been decided since then, and I thought it would be helpful to revisit the issue.)

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Sufficient to Allege: Short-circuiting Short-forms in State v. Singleton and State v. Crowder

Statutes prescribing simplified charging language were intended to alleviate the burdensome pleading requirements of the common law.  See Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.1(c).  Indeed, where a short-form pleading is statutorily authorized, it is not necessary to allege all the elements of the offense.  See State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 259, 307 S.E.2d 339, 350 (1983).  But how closely must a short form track the language prescribed by statute?  The Court of Appeals recently decided a couple of cases that address the issue.  This post considers those cases.

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