Most search warrants are for homes or offices. Some are for vehicles. Less often, a search warrant is for a person. See generally G.S. 15A-241 (defining a search warrant as an order authorizing the search of “designated premises, vehicles, or persons”). When a search warrant authorizes the search of a person, how intensive may the search be? Specifically, may the executing officer conduct a strip search?
Jeff Welty
Court of Appeals Rules Pattern Jury Instruction Inadequate in Felony Indecent Exposure Case
Last month, the court of appeals ruled that the pattern jury instruction for felony indecent exposure was inadequate given the facts of the case before it. The case is State v. Hoyle.
Carpenter, Search Warrants, and Court Orders Based on Probable Cause
In Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, __ S.Ct. __, 2018 WL 3073916 (June 22, 2018), the Supreme Court ruled that when the government obtains long-term, historical cell site location information (CSLI) about a person, it conducts a Fourth Amendment search and so “the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.” I previously blogged about Carpenter here.
That post referenced the possibility of using a court order supported by probable cause in lieu of a search warrant. The idea behind that suggestion was that some of the statutory execution procedures associated with search warrants are an awkward fit for this type of order. For example, G.S. 15A-252 requires that an officer executing a warrant must “read the warrant and give a copy of the warrant application . . . to the person to be searched, or the person in apparent control of the premises . . . to be searched.” In a case involving CSLI, is the officer supposed to read the warrant to Verizon? Or to the suspect, even though he or she will not be present at the search? But since I wrote my prior post, I’ve been asked several times whether using a court order based on probable cause in place of a search warrant would really be permissible. This post attempts to answer that question.
Search Warrants Authorizing Law Enforcement Computer Hacking and Malware
Suppose that law enforcement becomes aware of criminal activity taking place through a website, like the distribution of child pornography or the sale of illegal drugs. Can officers use computer hacking techniques and malware to identify users who accessed the website? Would the officers need a search warrant to do that? What kind of a search warrant? This post tackles those questions.
How Can We Improve This Blog?
It’s hard to believe, but this blog is almost ten years old. Google Analytics reports that thousands of people use the blog every day, and as far as we can tell, the community seems to be a great mix of citizens, officers, lawyers, magistrates, and judges. We sincerely appreciate everyone who reads the blog, and … Read more
Easy Come, Easy Go: Legislature Removes Affidavit Requirement for Citizen-Initiated Criminal Process
About a year ago, I wrote this post, discussing what was then a new provision in G.S. 15A-304(b): “[A]n official shall only find probable cause based solely on information provided by a person who is not a sworn law enforcement officer if the information is provided by written affidavit.” This year, the General Assembly reversed course and removed the affidavit requirement.
Examining Applicants under Oath before Issuing Search Warrants
Suppose that Officer Oxford is investigating a murder. Oxford believes that Steve Smith is the killer, and that the murder weapon is in Smith’s house. Oxford approaches Magistrate Martin with a search warrant application. The heart of the application is Oxford’s sworn affidavit, which lays out the evidence establishing probable cause. G.S. 15A-245(a) provides that “[b]efore acting on the application, the issuing official may examine on oath the applicant.” Should Magistrate Martin swear Oxford and ask Oxford to explain the case? Or should Martin ask Oxford to sit quietly while Martin reviews the written application?
Supreme Court Rules that Obtaining Cell Site Location Information Is a Search
On Friday, the Supreme Court issued a long-awaited opinion in Carpenter v. United States. The Court held that when law enforcement obtains long-term cell site location information from a suspect’s service provider, it conducts a Fourth Amendment search that normally requires a warrant. Although the majority opinion states that it “is a narrow one,” the dissenting Justices and some scholars see it as a seismic shift that may have many aftershocks. I’ll summarize the case and then use former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s famous approach to address the “known knowns,” the “known unknowns,” and the “unknown unknowns” after Carpenter.
Questioning Oneself: Direct Examination of a Self-Represented Defendant
I was reading a WRAL article about the District Attorney wife-hiring trial taking place in Raleigh when the following passage caught my attention: “Superior Court Judge Paul Ridgeway said that, if [former District Attorney] Wallace Bradsher testifies, he cannot simply deliver a monologue from the witness stand and must pose questions to himself to give prosecutors a chance to object to potential testimony.” I hadn’t previously considered how testimony from a self-represented defendant would work. I looked into it, and this post summarizes what I learned.
What Everyone Needs to Know about Knock and Talks
Knock and talks are a common, useful, and sometimes controversial law enforcement tool. I thought that I would put together a post that summarizes the principal legal issues that they present.