Rule 404(b): The Requirement of Temporal Proximity

May 21st, 2013
By Jessica Smith

As I noted in my last post on Rule 404(b) evidence, even when the evidence is relevant to an issue other than propensity or disposition, admissibility is “constrained by the requirements of similarity and temporal proximity.” State v. Beckelheimer, __ N.C. __, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012) (quoting State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154 (2002)). In this, my final post on Rule 404(b) evidence, I’ll explore the requirement of temporal proximity.

Temporal proximity is part of the analysis because, as a general rule, the probative value of the other crime, wrong, or act diminishes as the event becomes more remote. See, e.g., State v. Barnett, __ N.C. App. __, 734 S.E.2d 130, 134 (2012). There are no bright line rules regarding temporal proximity for purposes of Rule 404(b) admissibility. State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 623-24 (2008). Compare, e.g., State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 585, 587–91 (1988) (in a child sex case, a seven-year gap between the last act on the witness and the first act on the victim made the event too remote to show common plan or scheme), with State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 588–89 (1994) (in a murder case, an eight-year gap between a prior assault and the homicide at issue did not make the incident too remote for purposes of establishing identity). The North Carolina Supreme Court has instructed that remoteness must be considered in light of the specific facts of each case. State v. Beckelheimer, __ N.C. __, 726 S.E.2d 156, 160 (2012).

The proffered purpose of the 404(b) evidence affects the temporal proximity analysis. Beckelheimer, 726 S.E.2d at 160. For example, remoteness in time may be significant when the 404(b) evidence is introduced to show that the crime arose out of a common scheme or plan. State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 91 (2001); State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 588 (1994); State v. Mobley, 200 N.C. App. 570, 577 (2009). On the other hand it may be less significant when the evidence is proffered to show

  • modus operandi, Beckelheimer, 726 S.E.2d at 160;
  • state of mind, such as malice, State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 624 (2008);
  • motive, State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 448 (2009); State v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 682 (1991); or
  • lack of accident, Locklear, 363 N.C. at 448.

In these instances, remoteness goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Beckelheimer, 726 S.E.2d at 160; Locklear, 363 N.C. at 448; Maready, 362 N.C. at 624.

When the 404(b) acts occurred some time ago but show a pattern of similar activity over time, courts have found that the passage of time can actually reinforce rather than undercut the value of the evidence. State v. Shamsid–Deen, 324 N.C. 437, 445 (1989) (prior sexual acts occurring over a 20–year period were not too remote to be considered as evidence of defendant’s common scheme to abuse the victim sexually; “[w]hen similar acts have been performed continuously over a period of years, the passage of time serves to prove, rather than to disprove the existence of a plan”); State v. Khouri, __ N.C. App. __, 716 S.E.2d 1, 8-9 (2011) (in a child sex case, 404(b) evidence that the defendant sexually assaulted another child from 2001 to until she turned eighteen in 2007 was admissible where the defendant’s sexual assault on the child victim at issue began in 2007; once the defendant discontinued his acts on the first girl, he initiated contact with the victim). This rule applies with special force in second-degree murder cases where the 404(b) evidence is a pattern of prior motor vehicle offenses being offered to show malice. State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 622-24 (2008) (no plain error occurred when the trial judge admitted 404(b) evidence of the defendant’s six prior DWI convictions where four occurred in the sixteen years before the events at issue, including one within six months of the event at issue; the convictions “constitute part of a clear and consistent pattern of criminality that is highly probative of his mental state”). However, that does not mean that any combination of prior motor vehicle offenses will be admissible as part of a pattern of behavior to show malice for purposes of second-degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 208 N.C. App. 26, 43-46 (2010) (the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence of three of the defendant’s four prior DWI convictions to show malice; three of her convictions occurred eighteen or nineteen years prior to the accident at issue and one occurred two years prior; given the gap between the older convictions and the more recent one, there was not a clear and consistent pattern of criminality and the older convictions were too remote to be admissible).

The age of a conviction may be discounted for periods when the defendant’s activity was interrupted by, for example, a prison sentence or lack of access to victims. See, e.g., State v. Barnett, __ N.C. App. __, 734 S.E.2d 130, 134 (2012) (five year gap between incidents of rape was explained by the defendant’s lack of access to the victim for three years); State v. Brooks, 138 N.C. App. 185, 200 (2000) (17 year gap between incidents of assaults on his wives was explained by the defendant’s incarceration and lack of marital discord); State v. Frazier, 121 N.C. App. 1, 11 (1995) (gaps between the defendant’s acts of sexual abuse on children were explained by the defendant’s lack of access to victims). However, in order for a period of time to be excluded from the analysis, the proponent must introduce competent evidence of the period of the interruption. State v. Gray, 210 N.C. App. 493, 509 (2011) (declining to toll the time period during the defendant’s incarceration because the State failed to offer competent evidence as to the length of his incarceration); State v. Delsanto, 172 N.C. App. 42, 51-52 (2006) (State failed to establish interruption).

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The DSM V

May 20th, 2013
By Jeff Welty

DSM VThe American Psychiatric Association is about to release the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, commonly abbreviated DSM-V and pronounced “DSM five.” This is important to criminal lawyers because mental health issues are litigated in so many criminal cases, and the DSM is the generally accepted authority on mental health diagnoses. By all accounts, the new DSM will be a significant departure from prior editions. There are several implications of interest to criminal lawyers:

  • The new DSM is controversial. While previous editions of the DSM have been widely accepted, the new version has received considerable criticism. Dr. Allen Frances, a Duke psychiatry professor who chaired the committee that produced the previous edition of the DSM, wrote in Psychology Today that the approval of the DSM-V was the saddest moment in his professional career. He views the DSM-V as “deeply flawed . . . unsafe and scientifically unsound.” In his view, the new DSM paves the way for overdiagnosis and overmedication by creating new disorders and expanding existing ones without justification. Furthermore, the National Institutes of Mental Health, which administers federal grants for research into mental illness, has announced that it will be “re-orienting its research away from DSM categories,” because of the manual’s “lack of validity” and the fact that DSM diagnoses are not “based on any objective laboratory measure,” but instead reflect the collective judgment of a group of practitioners. Scientific American reports on NIMH’s stance here. The President of the APA argues for the excellence of the new DSM here. NPR has a terrific 8-minute report on the new DSM here.
  • The controversy may spill over into criminal cases. Whether a defendant suffers from a particular mental disorder, and if so, how that relates to his or her sanity, capacity, or appropriate sentencing, are familiar issues in criminal cases. But they have generally been litigated within the framework established by the DSM. The disagreement about the validity of the new DSM may result in an increasing number of disputes about whether a particular mental disorder listed in the book even exists, or whether the diagnostic criteria in the DSM properly define the disorder. These would largely be new frontiers. (Of course, it is also possible that the controversy will blow over and the book will continue in its role as “the Bible” of the mental health community.)
  • More mental illnesses may mean more litigation about mental illness. Because it expands the number and scope of diagnoses, more people, including more criminal defendants, will be classified as mentally ill. This will lead to more disputes about sanity, capacity, and mitigation, including whether a defendant is eligible for the mitigating circumstance set forth in G.S. 15A-1340.16(e) (“suffering from a mental or physical condition [that] . . . significantly reduced the defendant’s culpability”). In other words, mental health concerns likely will play an ever-larger role in criminal litigation.
  • The new definition of mental retardation may impact capital cases. The DSM-V changes the definition of intellectual disability, the disorder formerly called mental retardation. Reuters summarizes: “Earlier editions of the DSM defined mental retardation as an IQ score below 70 accompanied by an inability to meet certain developmental norms . . . . Based on that IQ benchmark, the . . . Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia . . . that it is illegal to execute a mentally handicapped person. But the editors of DSM-V have dropped the 70 IQ score as an indicator of mental retardation and instead recommend that clinicians consider IQ scores while analyzing an individual’s behavior to determine if he or she meets the developmental standards.” Litigation over mental retardation in North Carolina capital cases has focused heavily on IQ scores. Because G.S. 15A-2005(a)(1) defines mental retardation for purposes of the state’s statutory ban on executing the mentally retarded as an IQ of 70 or below plus limitations in “adaptive functioning,” that strain of litigation will continue. But the more flexible definition in the DSM-V may make it easier for defense attorneys to argue that a defendant with an IQ above 70 is still mentally retarded for purposes of the Supreme Court’s constitutional prohibition on executing the intellectually disabled. And that argument may find some support in the current definition of intellectual disability adopted by the American Academy of Intellectual and Developmental Disability. As explained here, the Academy believes that “[g]enerally, an IQ test score of around 70 or as high as 75 indicates a limitation in intellectual functioning.”

I’m sure that others are more versed on the intersection of criminal law and mental health than I am, may have followed the evolution of the new DSM more closely than I have, and may have additional or different thoughts about the issues presented by the new edition. If so, please post a comment about the significance of the new manual.

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News Roundup

May 17th, 2013
By Jeff Welty

There was lots of news this week about judges new and old, so let’s start with that, then move on to the rest:

  • Jeff Hunt, until now the elected district attorney for district 29B (Henderson, Polke, and Transylvania counties), has been named a special superior court judge. Assistant district attorney Doug Pearson will be the acting district attorney. Congratulations to both. Details here.
  • Superior Court Judge Gary Trawick became just the seventh judge to hold court in all 100 counties. Chief Justice Parker was on hand to mark the milestone, which, as explained in this article from the Ashe Mountain Times, may never be reached again as budget realities constrain judges’ travel.
  • The National Law Review has this interview with new court of appeals judge Mark Davis. His top pet peeve? Tyops.
  • Sentencing Law and Policy notes here that a career federal public defender – and Duke alumna – has been confirmed to a seat on the Eighth Circuit and is already generating talk about a possible future Supreme Court nomination.
  • Turning from judges to legislators, today is “crossover day” at the General Assembly. Basically, bills that don’t pass at least one chamber by today get put on the shelf for this session. The News and Observer has this rundown of what’s still alive, including a possible repeal of the Racial Justice Act and a bill expanding prosecutors’ authority to convene investigative grand juries, as they are able to do in the federal system.
  • The National Traffic Safety Board issued a recommendation that states set .05 as the new blood alcohol limit for impaired driving, down from the .08 that is uniformly the threshold under current law. The USA Today has the story here, including the response from the American Beverage Institute (opposed) and an assessment of the likelihood of states adopting the lower limit (low for now).
  • The Justices of the Supreme Court are increasingly diverse, at least in terms of race and sex. The lawyers who appear before the court? Not so much. This Huffington Post article begins, “In roughly 75 hours of arguments at the Supreme Court since October, only one African-American lawyer appeared before the [J]ustices, and for just over 11 minutes.” It goes on to discuss Latino lawyers, female lawyers, and whether this issue will solve itself over time. (Side note about diversity among the Justices: Unless I am mistaken, all of the sitting Justices went to law school at Harvard or Yale, with Justice O’Connor, who slummed it at Stanford, being the last Justice who went elsewhere.)
  • Finally, check out this story from the Shelby Star. It begins: “A Kings Mountain woman was arrested Saturday and charged with assault inflicting serious injury after beating another woman with a Bible, according to arrest warrants.” I knew that the Good Book had many uses, but that’s one I hadn’t thought of. (It sounds like the victim wasn’t hurt too badly, and I certainly hope that’s the case.)

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Alleging Probation Violations in a Post-JRA World

May 16th, 2013
By Jamie Markham

How specific does a probation violation report need to be about which condition the probationer allegedly violated? Until last week, I would have said “not very.” A new case from the court of appeals has made me change my answer.

The case is State v. Tindall. In it, a woman was ordered to attend a substance abuse program as a condition of probation. Less than a month into the program the defendant was caught partying and doing drugs with other program residents. She admitted to “snorting ten lines of cocaine.” Slip op. at 3. In response, her probation officer filed a violation report alleging two violations: (1) a violation of the “not use, possess or control any illegal drug or controlled substance” condition; and (2) a violation of the “participate in . . . treatment . . . and comply with all further therapeutic requirements” condition.  Both violations occurred in February 2012—well after December 1, 2011, and thus subject to the revocation limitations of the Justice Reinvestment Act. Under the JRA, revocation is allowed only for a new criminal offense, absconding, or for a defendant who has already received two periods of confinement in response to violation. The trial court nonetheless revoked the defendant’s probation, recasting one of the alleged technical violations (the drug use) as a new criminal offense (probably possession of a controlled substance) and then using it as a justification for revocation.

The court of appeals reversed, holding that revocation was not allowed because the defendant was not on notice that revocation was a possible outcome of the hearing. The court rejected the State’s contention that the violation report put the defendant on notice of the alleged offending conduct (possessing drugs), even if it didn’t peg the behavior to the precise condition ultimately violated. That argument found support in State v. Hubbard, 198 N.C. 154 (2009), which you can read about here. The court of appeals distinguished Hubbard because it was decided at a time when any single violation was a sufficient grounds for revocation. After Justice Reinvestment, the court said, the defendant may only be revoked if he or she receives (or waives) notice of a revocation-eligible violation.

Suppose the notice had been proper, or that the defendant had waived her right to notice of a “new criminal offense” violation at the hearing. Would it have been okay to reframe a technical violation as a new criminal offense to set the table for revocation? I am asked about that all the time. The most common example I hear about is a positive drug screen being recast as the crime of possession of a controlled substance. A positive drug screen, standing alone, is not sufficient to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, State v. Harris, 361 N.C. 400 (2007), but it might suffice to prove a violation of probation premised on the commission of that crime, given the lower standard of proof at a probation violation hearing. More generally, our existing case law suggests that Community Corrections and the State may pursue a “new criminal offense” probation violation based on a pending criminal charge or even uncharged conduct (an issue I discussed at length here). Nevertheless, I wouldn’t be shocked if the appellate courts revised their take on that rule in a post-JRA world—just as they refined the rule on proper notice in Tindall.

But that’s just speculation. For now, the practical bottom line from Tindall is that revocation is improper without notice of a revocation-eligible violation, two prior CRV periods, or a waiver.

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New Edition of the Capital Case Law Handbook Now Available

May 15th, 2013
By Jeff Welty

CCLHAlthough the number of capitally-tried cases has declined in recent years, capital cases remain important, complex, and hotly contested. So I’m happy to announce that a new edition of the North Carolina Capital Case Law Handbook is now available. I’m the author, though the new edition is built upon the sturdy foundation of the previous versions, which were written by my colleague Bob Farb.

The marketing blurb: “A research reference for North Carolina judges and lawyers who handle capital cases, this 300-page book is designed to help them understand statutes and case law affecting the trial and sentencing of defendants charged with first-degree murder in which the state seeks the death penalty. Although its primary focus is the sentencing process, it also discusses selected pretrial and trial issues that commonly arise in first-degree capital murder trials. The third edition updates and builds on previous editions and includes the following features:

  • Summaries of appellate cases rendered through the end of 2012
  • Relevant statutory law that has also been updated
  • More expanded analysis and discussion than previous versions
  • A new chapter on the Racial Justice Act
  • The book also contains an index of cases cited and a subject index”

Information about AOC purchases: Some court employees will get a copy through the Administrative Office of the Courts. The AOC has advised us that “a bulk purchase [of the book] has been made by using funds available. Upon receipt of the books, distribution will be made to the Senior Resident Superior Court Judges and the District Attorneys by inclusion in the regularly scheduled supply deliveries. Distribution should be complete by the end of June. Indigent Defense Services (IDS) has arranged to participate in this project, and deliveries will be made to IDS/Public Defenders also by inclusion in the regular supply deliveries. Distribution should be complete by the end of June.” I don’t know exactly how many copies each office will receive.

More information: You can get more information, and buy the book if you are so inclined, here. I welcome feedback of all kinds about the organization and content of the book.

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Street Names and Nicknames

May 14th, 2013
By Jeff Welty

Suppose that a murder defendant goes by the street name “Hit Man.” The prosecution wants the investigating officer to testify that she received a tip that “Hit Man” committed the crime, and that she knew that the defendant used the nickname “Hit Man.” Defense counsel moves to prohibit all references to the nickname during the trial, arguing that it is de facto character evidence, which is generally prohibited under Rule 404(a), and that it is in any event far more prejudicial than probative and so barred under Rule 403. How should the judge rule?

Case law suggests that a brief reference to a defendant’s unflattering street name is permissible. However, the officer and the prosecutor should not unduly emphasize the nickname.

North Carolina cases. Our appellate courts have decided several nickname cases, and in every case, the courts have ruled in favor of the state:

  • In State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417 (1998), the court ruled that a witness’s references to defendant’s nickname, “Homicide,” were not prejudicial given that defense counsel and the defendant used the same term. In any event, the court stated, it is not error to refer to the defendant by the name by which he is generally known.
  • In State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383 (1976), the court said, “we do not believe it would have been error to refer to defendant by the name by which he was generally known [in this case, “Poison Ivy” or “Poison”]. The fact that his nickname may have been demeaning does not create error per se. Defendant had an opportunity to explain his nickname.”
  • In State v. Riley, 159 N.C. App. 546 (2003), the court concluded that an officer’s reference to defendant’s nickname, “Dirty,” was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and so was not plain error.

These cases don’t completely close the door to defense objections about nicknames. The nicknames in Swift and Riley, while unflattering, were not unambiguous references to criminal activity. The nickname at issue in Bonnett was much worse, but the defendant’s appeal was undermined by the fact that defense counsel and the defendant used the name themselves.

National cases. Although the vast majority of decisions nationally have rejected appeals based on references to defendants’ nicknames, a few cases have found the use of a defendant’s nickname to be so prejudicial as to require a new trial. The leading case is United States v. Farmer, 583 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2009), where the Second Circuit condemned the prosecution’s repeated references to the defendant’s nickname, “Murder.” The court distinguished other nickname cases in which no prejudicial error was found, noting that those cases generally involved less damning nicknames, fewer references to the nicknames, or limiting instructions regarding the nicknames. See also Taylor v. State, 23 A.2d 851 (Del. 2011) (awarding a new trial on other grounds to a murder defendant and recommending that “in the retrial, the court should make an effort to delete all references to [the defendant’s nickname, “Murder”] if possible”). But see Com. v. Williams, 58 A.3d 795 (Pa. Super. 2012) (no error in allowing prosecutor and prosecution witnesses to refer to the defendant by his nickname, “Killa”; prosecution “did not use [the] nickname to suggest [the defendant] had a violent character, but used it to show that the witnesses recognized [him] . . . even though the witnesses did not know [his] real name”); Burtts v. State, 499 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 1998) (no error where witnesses identified the defendant as “Killer Corey” because they did not know his full name; “the use of a nickname does not place the character of an accused in issue”).

Practice pointers. The upshot for the prosecution is to exercise restraint. The more frequently a defendant’s nickname is used, the more closely it relates to criminal activity, and the more careful the defendant is to avoid using the nickname himself and to object when it is used by others, the more likely that the use of the nickname will be deemed improper. If a defendant’s nickname is likely to feature prominently in a trial, it would be wise to ask the judge to give a limiting instruction.

The defense should tread carefully, too. Sometimes the shoe is on the other foot and the defense wants to make the defendant’s nickname known to the jury. But that can carry unintended consequences, as in State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490 (2002). In that case, a murder defendant elicited testimony that his nickname was “Crazy K,” “apparently in an attempt to tie the nickname to defendant’s purported lack of mental stability.” But that “gave the State the opportunity to establish the source of the nickname,” which was gang-related.

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Rule 404(b): The Requirement of Similarity

May 13th, 2013
By Jessica Smith

Even when Rule 404(b) evidence is relevant to an issue other than propensity or disposition, admissibility is “constrained by the requirements of similarity and temporal proximity.” State v. Beckelheimer, __ N.C. __, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012) (quoting State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154 (2002)). In this, my fourth post on Rule 404(b) evidence, I’ll explore the requirement of similarity.

As a general rule, 404(b) evidence must be sufficiently similar to the act in question. The evidence is sufficiently similar if there are unusual facts present in both incidents. Beckelheimer, 726 S.E.2d at 159. However, the similarities need not “rise to the level of the unique and bizarre.” Id. (quotation omitted). Nor must the incidents be identical. Id. at 160. As the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated: “near identical circumstances are not required; rather, the incidents need only share some unusual facts that go to a purpose other than propensity.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Khouri, __ N.C. App. __, 716 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2011) (in a child sex case, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the defendant’s sex acts with another child were different from those charged because one occurred in private and the other occurred in public).

By the same token, for most 404(b) purposes, some degree of similarity is required; when the requisite similarity is lacking, the evidence is inadmissible. See State v. Davis, __ N.C. App. __, 731 S.E.2d 236, 239-42 (2012) (in a child sex case in which the defendant was charged with assaulting his six-year-old son, the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of the defendant’s writings in a composition book about forcible, non-consensual anal sex with an adult female acquaintance; the events described in the book were not sufficiently similar to the case at bar given that “the only overlapping fact was anal intercourse”; the actual force described in the book was “not analogous to the constructive force theory that applies with sexual conduct between a parent and child”; aside from anal intercourse, “the acts bore no resemblance to each other, involving different genders, radically different ages, different relationships between the parties, and different types of force”); State v. Flood, __ N.C. App. __, 726 S.E.2d 908, 913-14 (2012) (in a case involving a 2007 drug-related murder, the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence that the defendant was involved in a 1994 homicide in which he broke into an apartment, found his girlfriend in bed with the victim, and shot the victim to show identity; the acts where not sufficiently similar); State v. Gray, 210 N.C. App. 493, 510-13 (2011) (in a child sex case involving a five-year-old female victim and allegations of digital penetration, the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence that the defendant had anal intercourse with a four-year-old male 18 years earlier; although the incidents both involved very young children and occurred at a caretaker’s house where the defendant was a visitor, the nature of the assaults was very different).

When the prior acts are very old, the requirement of similarity may be heightened. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 197 N.C. App. 619, 623 (2009) (in a child sexual abuse case, evidence that the defendant abused two witnesses 21 and 31 years ago was improperly admitted requiring a new trial; in light the fact that the prior incidents were decades old, more was required in terms of similarity than that “the victims were young girls in the defendant’s care, the incidents happened in [the defendant’s] home, and [the defendant] told the [victims] not to report his behavior”).

By contrast, in certain circumstances, the requirement of similarity may not apply, such as when the 404(b) evidence establishes

  • identity by connecting the defendant to the weapon used in the current offense, State v. Dean, 196 N.C. App. 180, 191-92 (2009) (in a murder case, evidence of an assault committed by the defendant two days before the murder at issue was admissible to show identity when ballistics evidence established that the same weapon was used in both incidents; the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the incidents were dissimilar);
  • motive, State v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 682-83 (1991); and
  • chain of events leading up to the incident in question, State v. Golden, __ N.C. App. __, 735 S.E.2d 425, 429-32 (2012) (in perpetrating a hoax by use of a false bomb case, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence of the defendant’s acts against his estranged wife where those incidents were part of the chain of events leading up to the crime and thus completed the story of the crime for the jury; the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the prior acts were not sufficiently similar to the act charged on grounds that similarity was “not pertinent to the purpose for which the evidence was admitted”).

Finally, “[a]lthough the decision to join offenses for trial often involves considerations similar to those reviewed when determining whether to admit evidence of a prior offense under Rule 404(b), the decision to join or not to join offenses does not determine admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b).” State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 446 (2009).

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News Roundup

May 10th, 2013
By Jeff Welty

Certainly the most shocking story of the week comes from Cleveland, where Ariel Castro has been charged with abducting three women, sexually abusing them, and holding them captive for ten years. CNN has the basics here. One important legal question is whether Castro could be eligible for the death penalty, based on allegations that he impregnated one of the women, then deprived her of food and punched her in the stomach repeatedly, causing her to miscarry. As Sentencing Law and Policy explains here, Ohio’s murder statute encompasses causing “the death of another or the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy,” seemingly opening the door to a capital prosecution.

In other news:

  1. Taxes on attorneys’ fees. The Republican leadership of the General Assembly has unveiled a plan to reduce state income tax rates but to expand the state sales tax to services, which generally aren’t covered now. The expansion would include lawyers’ fees, as the News and Observer reports here. Defense lawyers with substantial retained practices, what effect would the reform have on you?
  2. New judge. The News and Observer notes here that Governor McCrory has appointed Assistant District Attorney Ebern “Trip” Watson III a special superior court judge. Congratulations to Judge Watson.
  3. Judge Judy. Speaking of judges, though, Reader’s Digest is reporting that a TV judge, Judge Judy, received a higher popular approval rating than any of the nine sitting Supreme Court justices. (Crime and Consequences.) Sign of the apocalypse?
  4. Supreme Court. Speaking of the Supreme Court, and apocalypses, it came out this week that the Court has – or at least, had – plans to convene at the Grove Park Inn in Asheville in the event of a nuclear attack on Washington. The Wall Street Journal  reports here on the scheme, developed in 1956. The Inn’s marketing director says “there’s no termination date [on the agreement with the Court], so it really is up to the Supreme Court whether they enforce it or not. As far as the Grove Park Inn is concerned, we would be happy to welcome the court.”
  5. Gun news. A number of media outlets, including Gizmodo here, covered the recent firing of the world’s first entirely 3-D printed gun. Lawmakers are considering regulating or prohibiting such products, but that raises some interesting questions. For example, does Congress have authority under the Commerce Clause, or some other provision, to regulate the manufacture of guns entirely in one’s garage? Dust off the home grown wheat case and discuss. Meanwhile, I had a bit part in an interesting WRAL story about the effectiveness – or ineffectiveness – of the NICS background check system at preventing people with serious mental illnesses from gaining access to firearms. You can see the story here.
  6. Finally, sex offenders. The Associated Press reports here on efforts by the Bradford County, Florida Sheriff to place signs in the yards of convicted sex offenders reading “[Name] is a convicted sexual predator and lives at this location.” An example is pictured below. Post a comment if you have a perspective on the desirability or legality of this practice.

Sex Predator Signs

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Video Blog Post: Unstructured Sentencing

May 9th, 2013
By Jamie Markham

It’s been over two years since I recorded my first video blog post. With the help of School of Government multimedia developer Jamar Jones, I prepared another one for today. In it, I try to show how Structured Sentencing is not very structured for many defendants—especially when multiple convictions are sentenced together. I hope you’ll take a look!

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Been there . . . decided that

May 8th, 2013
By Shea Denning

Whether a suspect refused to submit to a breath test is a hotly contested issue in many impaired driving cases. That determination is critical to two proceedings: the administrative proceeding to determine whether the person’s license will be revoked as a result of the alleged refusal and the criminal trial at which a refusal may be considered as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

Refusal isn’t always easy to discern. Some defendants are injured in the incident leading to their arrest. Some have pre-existing medical conditions that may affect their breathing. Some are confused or disoriented. Some are grossly impaired.

Breath-test operators make the initial judgment as to whether a person has deliberately refused testing. Their determinations later may be reviewed by DMV hearing officers conducting license-revocation hearings, by superior courts reviewing revocation orders, and by trial courts at the district and superior level to determine whether evidence of a refusal is admissible at trial and, in superior court, how to instruct juries to consider such refusals.

Sometimes the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a court or DMV in a subsequent proceeding from reconsidering another court’s ruling on the refusal issue. In many circumstances, however, reconsideration of the issue is permissible.

Prior ruling bars reconsideration.

  • When a superior court determines, pursuant to an appeal under G.S. 20-16.2(e) from a DMV-issued refusal revocation, that a defendant did not willfully refuse a chemical analysis, the issue of refusal may not later be relitigated in the defendant’s criminal trial. See State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620 (2000) (decided under former version of G.S. 20-16.2(e), which provided for de novo review of revocation order in superior court; current G.S. 20-16.2(e) provides for more limited review).
  • When a trial court suppresses evidence for lack of probable cause to arrest, DMV may not reconsider, in an administrative revocation hearing conducted after final judgment in the criminal case, whether reasonable grounds existed for the impaired driving charge. See Brower v. Killens, 122 N.C. App. 685 (1996). Because one of the requirements for a refusal revocation is that the officer had reasonable grounds to charge the person, DMV may not issue a refusal revocation in these circumstances.

No collateral estoppel bar.

  • When a trial court determines in a criminal proceeding that the defendant’s statutory implied consent rights were violated, DMV may nevertheless consider in an administrative revocation hearing whether the defendant willfully refused a chemical analysis. See Powers v. Tatum, 196 N.C. App. 639, 645 (2009).
  • When DMV administratively determines that the defendant did not willfully refuse a chemical analysis, the trial court may reconsider that issue for purposes of the criminal trial. See Brower v. Killens, 122 N.C. App. 685 (1996) (holding that while DMV and district attorney both represent interests of the State, earlier appellate decisions had determined that interests of district attorney are not adequately protected in administrative license revocation proceeding; thus, collateral estoppel does not apply to bar State’s litigation of issue in criminal trial).
  • A defendant’s acquittal of impaired driving charges does not estop DMV from revoking his or her license based on a willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis. See Gibson v. Faulkner, 132 N.C. App. 728 (1999).
  •  A district court’s determination as to whether a defendant refused a chemical analysis does not bar reconsideration of that issue by the superior court upon trial de novo. See State v. Petty, ___ N. C. App. ___, 711 S.E.2d 509, 511 (2011) (citing well-established rule that “trial de novo in the superior court is a new trial from beginning to end, on both law and facts, disregarding completely the plea, trial, verdict and judgment below” (internal citations omitted)); cf. 15A-953 (“no motion in superior court is prejudiced by any ruling upon . . . the subject in district court”).

Yesterday’s court of appeals opinion in State v. Macon, ___ N.C. App. ___ (May 7, 2013), added one more circumstance to the “no collateral bar” list. A superior court retrying a defendant following a mistrial in superior court is not bound by the earlier court’s ruling on the refusal issue. In Macon, the superior court in the defendant’s first trial refused to instruct the jury that the defendant’s refusal could be considered as evidence of her guilt, based upon the judge’s determination that the instruction was not supported by the evidence. A mistrial was declared when the jury could not reach a verdict. The defendant was retried before a different superior court judge. The judge in the later trial determined that the refusal instruction was warranted and delivered it to the jury, which found the defendant guilty of impaired driving. The court of appeals held that on retrial de novo, the judge was not bound by jury instruction rulings made during the first trial.

Open questions. One issue not clearly addressed by our courts is whether a superior court’s ruling pursuant to G.2. 20-16.2(e) that the DMV did not err in revoking the person’s license for a willful refusal precludes the defendant from litigating the issue of refusal in his or her criminal trial. The parties are the same, and the issues appear to be the same. The Powell court in dicta, however, indicated that the State was required to prove a refusal beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard that, if applied, obviously differs from the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in the civil context. Moreover, while the State’s use of offensive collateral estoppel has been approved in other contexts, the courts have not explicitly sanctioned its application here.

It also is unclear whether a ruling by DMV that the person willfully refused that was not appealed to superior court would bar a defendant from relitigating that issue. While the parties arguably are the same, and the issue appears to be the same (though see the Powell caveat noted above), it is unclear whether our courts would apply collateral estoppel to bar the court from reconsidering an administrative agency’s decision adverse to the interests of a criminal defendant.

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