Recent Blog Posts Page 45 on North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

On Monday, the Louisiana Senate unanimously passed a bill that would make it a crime to knowingly import, transport, buy, sell, manufacture, or possess a child sex doll. According to proponents of the bill, the dolls resemble children 12 and younger and are used for sexual gratification (for all the Law & Order: SVU fans, this issue was illustrated in an episode of the current season). Depending on the circumstances, intent, and whether or not the doll is imported, a conviction could result in up to two years imprisonment and a fine of up to $20,000. A number of other states have passed laws outlawing child sex dolls since 2019, including Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, South Dakota, and Tennessee.

This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on March 19, 2024. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.

This post summarizes published criminal law and related cases released by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals during February 2024. Cases of potential interest to state practitioners are summarized monthly. Previous summaries of Fourth Circuit cases are available here.

This post is co-authored with SOG faculty member Kristina Wilson and is cross-posted to the Coates’ Canons blog.

When and how can state and local government officials and employees record government meetings or their interactions with citizens? Does it matter if the recording is done openly or secretly? Recording may be tempting, particularly where there is a controversial matter at issue. The ability to record can be a useful tool, but there are several laws that government actors need to know if they want to use this tool legally and effectively. This post focuses on the issues surrounding government officials and employees recording oral communications outside of the law enforcement context. A later post will examine the issues surrounding video recording.

Last week, in the first part of this two-part series, I talked about the “crime of domestic violence” ground of deportability for noncitizens and what role convictions of North Carolina offenses play in triggering that ground. This post covers immigration consequences of the “stalking” and “violation of protection orders” grounds of deportability.

Raleigh is ending its red-light camera program after two decades of operation. The News and Observer has the story here. Red-light camera programs across North Carolina have steadily folded following court rulings that their funding model (in which the camera vendor is paid more than 10 percent of the net proceeds of fines) runs afoul of the fines and forfeiture clause of the state constitution.

Of course, the city still wants people to stop at red lights. Last year, it installed reflective backplates, a border on traffic signals to make them stand out, at red-light-camera-intersection signals.

Keep reading for more local, national, and international criminal and court-related news.

Author’s Note: The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Chambers, 56PA24,  __ N.C. __ (May 23, 2025), reversed the opinion below, holding that provisions of G.S. 15A-1215(a) permitting the substitution of an alternate juror after the jury has begun deliberations comport with the state constitutional requirement for unanimous jury. The Supreme Court’s opinion is summarized here.

When a deliberating juror in Eric Chambers’ April 2022 murder trial told the presiding judge that he could not be available in court the next day because of a medical appointment, the trial judge discharged the juror, substituted an alternate juror, and instructed the jury to restart its deliberations. In doing so, the trial judge followed the procedures set forth in G.S. 15A-1215(a) for substituting an alternate juror after deliberations have begun. Chambers, who represented himself at trial, did not object. The reconstituted jury subsequently found Chambers guilty of first-degree murder and a related felony assault, and the judge sentenced Chambers to life in prison.

Chambers failed to properly enter a notice of appeal and subsequently sought certiorari review by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court granted review and reversed Chambers’ conviction based on the substitution of the alternate juror. State v. Chambers, No. COA22-1063, ___ N.C. App. ___ , ___ S.E.2d ___ (2024). The Court held that notwithstanding statutory amendments to G.S. 15A-1215(a) enacted in 2021 to authorize the substitution of alternate jurors after deliberations begin, it was bound by the North Carolina Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253 (1997), that substitution of an alternate juror in a capital sentencing proceeding after deliberations began was structural error. This post will review the holding in Chambers, the precedent upon which it relied, and the provisions of G.S. 15A-1215(a) that Chambers, if it remains undisturbed, effectively eviscerates.

This post summarizes McElrath v. Georgia from the Supreme Court of the United States, decided on February 21, 2024. This summary will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.

Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity is Acquittal for Purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause.

McElrath v. Georgia, 601 U. S. ____ (2024). In this case concerning the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, Damian McElrath petitioned for relief after the Supreme Court of Georgia held its state’s repugnancy doctrine allowed the retrial of McElrath for malice murder after the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, but found McElrath guilty of related charges. In an opinion authored by Justice Jackson, the Court unanimously rejected Georgia’s interpretation and held that McElrath could not be tried for malice murder a second time because the jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity represented an acquittal.

Two recent opinions from the Court of Appeals illustrate the remarkable controversy currently underway over the specificity required of indictments.  In State v. Coffey, No. COA22-883, 2024 WL 675881 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2024), our Court of Appeals ruled an indictment for felony obstruction of justice was facially defective for failure to allege an essential element of the offense: the purpose of hindering or impeding a judicial or official proceeding or investigation.  By contrast, in State v. Jackson, No. COA22-280, 2024 WL 925480 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2024), our Court of Appeals ruled an indictment for habitual misdemeanor assault was sufficient though it failed explicitly to allege an element: causing physical injury.  This post attempts to reconcile the divergent analytical approaches taken in Coffey and Jackson.

A noncitizen can lose status—that is, the right to be in the U.S.—and be forced to leave if he or she comes within a ground of deportability. In general, the grounds of deportability apply to noncitizens who have been lawfully “admitted.” This includes both lawful permanent residents (“green card” holders) and holders of temporary, nonimmigrant visas.

There are several criminal grounds of deportability in the federal immigration statutes, provided in Title 8, Section 1227 of the United States Code. One of these grounds is conviction of a crime of domestic violence. In order to be a crime of domestic violence under federal immigration law, the offense must meet the federal definition of a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16 and must also be against a person in a domestic relationship with the defendant. This provision of the statute also includes deportation for crimes of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment, but discussion of those grounds is outside the scope of this post.

This post is the first in a two-part series and examines immigration consequences of convictions of offenses involving domestic violence under North Carolina law. It is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of immigration law; rather, it assesses the immigration consequences of selected North Carolina offenses and only within the scope of the domestic violence ground of deportability.