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Placing a video camera on a utility pole and conducting surveillance can be a useful law enforcement tool to gather information without requiring an in-person presence by officers at all times. But this tool may be subject to the Fourth Amendment restrictions. This post reviews the evolving case law, particularly since the United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

Jeff Welty in a 2013 post reviewed video surveillance generally, not just pole cameras, and discussed Jones and the few cases decided in light of its ruling. This post, after reviewing Jones, will discuss a few pole camera cases decided in federal courts since his post and whether officers should seek approval from a court before conducting pole camera surveillance.

On behalf of the North Carolina Judicial College and the School of Government, I’m pleased to announce the launch of a new podcast about the court system. It’s called Beyond the Bench, and it is intended to be of interest to judges, lawyers, clerks, officers, and others who work in and around the court system. This post provides more detail about the project, but if you are ready to listen, you can get the podcast on the web here, or through the iTunes podcast store or on Stitcher.

Two officer-involved fatal shootings are making national headlines this week, in part because video of each shooting has been published on the internet.  On Tuesday, Alton Sterling was shot and killed by a Baton Rouge police officer during an encounter at a convenience store where Sterling made a living selling CDs in the parking lot; Sterling reportedly had brandished a gun which prompted a 911 call and the police response.  The front page of The Advocate, a Louisiana newspaper, has comprehensive coverage of the story.  Wednesday, Philando Castile was fatally shot by a police officer during a traffic stop in a suburb of Saint Paul, Minnesota.  Details of the story were developing at the time of writing.  The New York Times has an early report here which suggests that a passenger in the car livestreamed the aftermath of the shooting to Facebook.

In Session Law 2016-77, the General Assembly made some changes the law of probation, post-release supervision, and parole. Though styled as “an act to amend provisions of the Justice Reinvestment Act,” the latest legislation makes some changes that go beyond the 2011 JRA. Today’s post summarizes one of the changes: a new requirement for supervised felony probationers to make a prospective waiver of extradition.

(Author’s note:  The concluding paragraph of this post was amended after its publication to include the number of outstanding warrants and orders for arrest on July 1, 2016.)

Every year, the June trifecta throws me off my game. First, school lets out so I have to acclimate to a schedule of camps that vary in operating hours, locations, necessary equipment, and participating child. Second, the district court judges convene for their annual conference where I join them to oversee the program and to lecture about criminal law cases decided since the previous October. Third, the United States Supreme Court winds up its term, invariably deciding significant criminal law cases the very week of the conference. Since judges are no better than my children in cutting me a little slack (Am I really the only mother who didn’t know you needed to bring a racket to tennis camp?), they bombarded me the day the conference began to ask about the attenuation doctrine and its application in Utah v. Strieff (decided the day before). I mumbled something about the Christian burial speech and quickly asked how their summers were going. Now that June is behind me, I’ve collected my thoughts and am prepared to talk about Strieff.

Suppose that when a criminal defendant appears in court, he is advised of the right to have counsel appointed if indigent, tells the judge he wants to hire his own lawyer, and signs a written waiver of his right to appointed counsel. When the defendant next appears in court, he does not have a lawyer. May the judge rely on the waiver of appointed counsel to require the defendant to proceed, without inquiring whether the defendant wants the assistance of counsel?

With experts predicting that this Fourth of July weekend will be one of the busiest travel weekends in history, the News Roundup has tips for staying safe and obeying the laws on North Carolina roads. The NCDOT wants North Carolinians to be aware that new provisions in the State’s motor vehicle laws will go into effect beginning today, July 1st. Notably, registered mopeds now are required to carry liability insurance, and a new late fee has gone into effect for vehicle owners who fail to pay their registration renewal by the expiration date. Motorists can avoid road rage by taking note of construction work that may affect travel lanes along the interstates and lead to frustrating delays. Finally, the DOT warns that celebrations can quickly go from festive to fatal if you choose to drive after drinking – law enforcement agencies across the state are participating in Operation Firecracker, a campaign to get drunk drivers off the road. Stay safe, stay free, and keep reading for more news.

May the judge sentencing a conviction now order that it run consecutively to sentences the defendant might get in the future?

The U.S. Supreme Court waded into the murky waters of implied consent law this term in Birchfield v. North Dakota. The opinion it issued last week clarified important aspects of the relationship between chemical testing for impairment and the Fourth Amendment, but failed to distill a coherent theory of implied consent. Here’s what we know after Birchfield:

• Warrantless breath testing of impaired driving suspects is permissible under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to arrest. A person who refuses to submit to such testing may be subjected to sanctions ranging from license revocation to criminal prosecution.
• Warrantless blood testing of impaired driving suspects is not permissible under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to arrest. Thus, a warrant or a suspect’s consent is required to conduct such testing. A person who refuses to submit to such testing may not be criminally prosecuted for that refusal.

G.S. 15A-245 provides that information other than that contained in a search warrant affidavit may not be considered by the issuing official in determining whether probable cause exists to issue the warrant unless the information is either recorded or contemporaneously summarized in the record or on the face of the warrant by the issuing official. This is commonly known as the “four corners” rule because the issuing official and later a judge at a suppression hearing may only consider information within the four corners of the search warrant (with the limited exception mentioned above). The issue does not arise often in appellate court opinions. However, it was involved in the June 21, 2016, North Carolina Court Appeals case of State v. Brown, available here, and is the subject of this post.