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New Law on Juvenile Capacity to Proceed

The current law that governs a juvenile’s capacity to proceed in a delinquency matter matches part of the criminal law that governs a defendant’s capacity to proceed. The Juvenile Code expressly incorporates G.S. 15A‑1001, ‑1002, and ‑1003—the criminal provisions that establish a capacity standard and establish procedure to raise and determine capacity to proceed. G.S. 7B-2401. The criminal provisions that address safeguarding the defendant to return for trial should the defendant subsequently become capable of proceeding and return of the defendant for trial upon gaining capacity are notably absent from the Juvenile Code.

Beginning with offenses committed on January 1, 2025, the Juvenile Code will contain new laws, different from the criminal law, that establish a juvenile capacity standard, establish procedures to raise and determine capacity, and create new procedures for remediation of incapacity. This blog summarizes the new juvenile capacity standard and outlines the procedure to raise and determine capacity under the new law. More information on criminal procedure related to capacity to proceed can be found at https://benchbook.sog.unc.edu/criminal/capacity-proceed.

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A Common Calendaring Concern: The Unilateral Reset

A question that arises with some frequency is whether the district attorney is free to unilaterally “reset” a matter in superior court by changing the trial date after a date has been set by the court.

At the outset, it’s important to distinguish between the scenario in which the State intentionally resets a case and that where a clerical error results in a case being unintentionally left off a trial calendar. Where the omission arises from an administrative error, the delay will likely be attributed to the State as part of any future speedy trial analysis, and it may be considered negligent, or at least “neglectful,” delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); State v. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. 387, 395 (1985). But what about when the State intentionally resets a case after it has been scheduled for a particular trial date? In this scenario, the court has set a trial date, but when it comes time for the State to publish the trial calendar, the case is missing because the State intentionally omitted it or moved it to another setting.

Depending on where you practice, you may be thinking, “Of course the DA cannot unilaterally reset the case. The trial date was established by court order, and neither party is free to disregard a court order.” Alternatively, you may be thinking, “Doesn’t the DA have calendar control?” See G.S. 7A-61 (“the district attorney shall prepare the trial dockets”). See generally, Michael Crowell, Control of the Calendar in Criminal District Court, UNC Sch. of Gov’t (July  2010).

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News Roundup

Regular readers know that I am interested in the criminal prosecution of Sam Bankman-Fried, who is currently serving 25 years in federal prison for fraudulent activity related to his operation of failed cryptocurrency exchange FTX. I reviewed Michael Lewis’s book about Bankman-Fried and have posted several times about the case. There are now several new developments to report. First, Bankman-Fried has appealed. Reuters reports here that his principal claim is that the trial judge erred by excluding evidence that FTX actually had – at all relevant times – sufficient assets to cover all customer deposits. (The bankruptcy trustee has, in fact, recovered more assets than necessary to pay all creditors, including customers, in full.) Second, Lewis has posted this “personal verdict” about the case, which assuredly will not change the opinions of those who see Lewis as an apologist for Bankman-Fried. Third, Caroline Ellison, Bankman-Fried’s business partner and sometime girlfriend turned prosecution witness, is soon to be sentenced herself. Her presentence report says that under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, her guideline sentence is life without parole. Remarkably, the report recommends probation based on her cooperation. Sentencing Law and Policy has more here, including some interesting details about what Ellison is doing to stay busy while awaiting her (next) day in court. Keep reading for more news.

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State v. McLean Clarifies the Timeframe for Giving Oral Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals

Attorneys practicing in criminal superior court are likely familiar with the process of giving notice of appeal to the appellate division. Under Rule 4(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant can give notice by either (1) giving oral notice of appeal “at trial,” or (2) by filing a written notice of appeal within 14 days after entry of judgment and serving it on the State. A recent case explains what counts as “at trial” for purposes of giving notice of appeal. Under State v. McLean, COA 23-100, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Aug. 6, 2024), oral notice of appeal is considered made “at trial” and therefore timely as long as it is given within the session of superior court, which is typically one week. “[T]he period of time for Defendant to provide timely notice of appeal at trial commenced following sentencing and ended when the court session adjourned sine die.” McLean Slip op. at 8 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Although the defendant in McLean gave oral notice of appeal the morning after the pronouncement of the judgment in his case, the timing of the notice was proper, because the session had not yet ended. This post examines the holding and implications of the McLean decision.

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News Roundup

It’s Friday the 13th, and a corpse was found in a Raleigh Food Lion freezer earlier this week, according to a story from the N&O. Chillingly, the incident “is not the first time a body has been found in a workplace freezer.” The investigation continues. Read on for more criminal law news.

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New Publication on Driver’s License Revocations, Restorations and Privileges

I am thrilled to announce the availability of a new publication, Driver’s License Revocations, Restorations, and Limited Driving Privileges in North Carolina. This is the first School of Government publication that combines information on triggering events and convictions that lead to the revocation of a person’s North Carolina driver’s license, how and when driving privileges may … Read more

Outsourcing Reasonableness: Redefining Defensive Force in State v. Phillips.

Coke claimed the common law was the perfection of reason. Our Supreme Court began its recent opinion in State v. Phillips, No. 281A23 (N.C. Aug. 23, 2024), by citing Coke, albeit for a different proposition (i.e., a person’s home is his castle). Construing G.S. 14-51.2, our Supreme Court held that the legislature has abrogated the common law rule that prohibited excessive force in defense of the home. The trial court erred therefore in instructing the jury that the defendant homeowner did not have the right to use excessive force. This post examines the recent opinion in Phillips.

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