This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on November 19, 2024. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.
Defendant’s behavior at trial did not show incompetence despite the nature of her testimony, and trial court did not err by failing to order competency hearing sua sponte.
State v. Jones, COA24-241, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Nov. 19, 2024). In this Rowan County case, defendant appealed her convictions for first-degree arson, larceny of a dog, and attempted first-degree murder, arguing error in not ordering a competency hearing. The Court of Appeals found no error.
Defendant came to trial for the offenses in August of 2023. After the conclusion of State’s evidence, defense counsel indicated that defendant would testify. The trial court examined defendant before her testimony and she willingly waived her Fifth Amendment privileges. Defendant then testified about hearing voices caused by “voice-to-skull” technology that she blamed on the victim. She recounted spending several hours at the victim’s home, trying to light the victim’s porch on fire, tampering with the victim’s pool, and leading his dog away to her car. On cross-examination, defendant admitted to using methamphetamine to help her function. Defendant was subsequently convicted.
Considering the competency hearing argument, the Court of Appeals explained that G.S. 15A-1001(a) establishes a statutory right to a competency hearing, but “nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor, defense counsel, Defendant, or the court raised the question of Defendant’s capacity to proceed at any point during the proceedings,” meaning defendant waived her statutory right to a hearing. Slip Op. at 6. Despite the statutory waiver, the Due Process Clause requires a defendant to be competent to stand trial. Under applicable precedent, a court must order a competency hearing sua sponte when there is “a bona fide doubt” of the defendant’s competency to stand trial. Id. at 8. Here, the court did not see substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence at the time of trial, noting that defendant only identified evidence of her behavior prior to trial to support her argument that she was incompetent. The court pointed out that defendant “conferred with her attorney about issues of law applicable to her case” and the record showed her “testimony was responsive and appropriate to the questions, even if her responses indicated that her troubling thoughts led to her actions in this case.” Id. at 9.
Two separate outbursts of profanity in the same hearing justified two counts of direct criminal contempt.
State v. Lancaster, COA24-152, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Nov. 19, 2024). In this Craven County case, defendant appealed the adjudication of two counts of direct criminal contempt, arguing error as only one count was warranted. The Court of Appeals found no error.
In September of 2023, defendant appeared at a pre-trial hearing, where defense counsel asked the trial court to examine defendant about proceeding pro se. Defendant told the court he was dissatisfied with his attorney but wanted to proceed with counsel. Defendant then requested a trial date in October, although defense counsel had not yet received discovery from the State. The trial court set a trial date in November, at which point defendant began arguing with the trial court about the delay, using profanity to address the court. The trial court found him in contempt, at which point defendant again used profanity, leading to a second finding of contempt.
On appeal, defendant argued that “his repeated use of profanity within a short period of time ‘could reasonably be interpreted as one episode of contempt.’” Slip Op. at 4. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that G.S. 5A-11 was not ambiguous about what constituted “behavior” for an episode of contempt. Instead, the court concluded “[e]ach of Defendant’s outbursts were separate episodes of behavior delineated by separate adjudications of contempt under [G.S.] 5A-11(a).” Id. at 7.
Despite conflicting evidence of who was the aggressor in the confrontation, defendant was entitled to self-defense instruction on attempted murder and assault charges.
State v. Myers, COA24-435, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Nov. 19, 2024). In this Union County case, defendant appealed his convictions for attempted first-degree murder, discharging a weapon into an occupied property, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, arguing error in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. The Court of Appeals agreed, granting defendant a new trial.
In December of 2021, defendant and two friends stopped at a local store to purchase snacks, and defendant recognized another man, a purported gang member, from an Instagram video where he threatened to shoot up defendant’s home. Defendant and his friends got into a dispute with this man and another possible gang member, eventually leading to shots being fired. Based on defendant’s testimony, he initially attempted to prevent the gun violence, but after shots were fired, he retaliated, hitting the eventual victim. Defendant cooperated with law enforcement the next day, surrendering his firearm and giving a statement. At trial, defense counsel requested an instruction on self-defense, but the trial court denied the request, as the trial court felt case law precluded giving the instruction in this case.
Taking up the self-defense argument, the Court of Appeals noted that “a defendant who presents competent evidence of self-defense at trial is entitled to a jury instruction on this defense.” Slip Op. at 6. After establishing the statutory basis for self-defense under G.S. 14-51.3(a) and the applicability of perfect and imperfect self-defense, the court examined the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant. The court concluded “the evidence is sufficient to support an instruction of at least imperfect self-defense, if not perfect self-defense” and conflicting evidence about the initial aggressor “[must] be resolved by the jury, after being fully and properly instructed.” Id. at 10.
Trial court’s failure to give “not guilty” mandate for voluntary manslaughter charge was not prejudicial; trial court erred when ruling a hearsay statement several minutes after the shooting was not an excited utterance, but error was not prejudicial.
State v. Teel, COA24-233, ___ N.C. App. ___ (Nov. 19, 2024). In this Wake County case, defendant appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arguing (1) error or plain error in failing to provide a “not guilty” mandate for the voluntary manslaughter instruction, (2) error in ruling a hearsay statement was not an excited utterance and inadmissible, and (3) cumulative errors depriving him of a fair trial. The Court of Appeals found no prejudicial error.
In September of 2021, defendant and a group of friends traveled from Greenville to go out at a bar in Raleigh. At the end of the night, a fight began in the parking lot and the victim and one of defendant’s friends were on the ground hitting each other when a shot was fired. Defendant testified that he also fired a shot at the victim, but this was after the first shot was fired. During trial, defense counsel tried to introduce a statement from the friend involved in the fight that he had shot the victim, but the trial court excluded this statement as hearsay and found that it was not an excited utterance because some minutes had passed after the shooting. During the charge conference, the parties collaborated on the jury instructions, and defense counsel did not object to the instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The instruction as given to the jury did not include a “not guilty” mandate on voluntary manslaughter, but did include a mandate for first- and second-degree murder.
Taking up (1), the Court of Appeals first established that defendant’s participation in crafting the instruction did not represent invited error. Defendant argued that the issue was properly preserved for appellate review as the trial court deviated from a pattern instruction, but because “Defense counsel worked collaboratively with the State in crafting the voluntary manslaughter instruction . . . any deviation in the pattern instruction was one to which Defendant impliedly consented.” Slip Op. at 12. As a result, the court applied plain error review, and looked to State v. Gosnell, 231 N.C. App. 106 (2013), for the applicable standard when a trial court omits the “not guilty” mandate from a jury instruction. Slip Op. at 13. The court noted that here, the court gave the proper “not guilty” instruction in other charges, and noted in the self-defense instruction that defendant would be not guilty of any murder or manslaughter, showing the trial court’s error “had no probable impact on the jury’s finding of guilt.” Id. at 14.
Moving to (2), the court explained that to qualify as an excited utterance, a statement must (i) “relate[] a sufficiently startling experience suspending reflective thought,” and (ii) “be a spontaneous reaction, not resulting from reflection or fabrication.” Id. at 17-18. The court found both of these requirements met in the current case, looking to State v. Allen, 162 N.C. App. 587 (2004), for an example of a statement given twenty minutes after a shooting as an excited utterance. However, the court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s conclusion of voluntary manslaughter, and explained defendant could not demonstrate prejudice as “there is not a reasonable probability that, but for the trial court’s exclusion of [the] hearsay statement, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 19.
Finally, in (3), the court concluded after reviewing the record and “comparing the evidentiary error and alleged instructional error to the State’s evidence,” defendant could not show cumulative error. Id. at 20.