The N&O series: Deadly Force. Today the News and Observer published the last article of its four part investigative series Deadly Force, a series that chronicles numerous physical confrontations between Harnett County sheriff’s deputies and citizens and the deaths and injuries that resulted.
Shea Denning
Only Experts Can Testify About HGN
Author’s note: I added the conclusory paragraph at the end of this post shortly after its initial publication in response to helpful questions from readers about the significance of State v. Godwin and State v. Torrence.
Like Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious, horizontal gaze nystagmus is a mouthful. Unlike Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious, not just anyone can utter horizontal gaze nystagmus and sound wise beyond her years. Two recent court of appeals opinions hold that that a witness be qualified as an expert before testifying about the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test.
Warrant Required for Testing of Unconscious DWI Suspect
The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments this morning in three cases involving the chemical testing of impaired drivers. The question before the court in each case is whether, in the absence of a warrant, a state may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood. I’m eager to hear what the high court has to say about this issue and to learn whether it will impact North Carolina’s implied consent laws, which, like the laws in every other state, do provide for warrantless chemical testing, but which do not criminalize refusal to be tested. But we don’t have to wait for the Supreme Court’s opinion to see how our state’s implied consent laws are evolving in a post-Missouri v. McNeely world. The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided a significant case yesterday, ruling in State v. Romano, __ N.C. App. ___ (2016), that the warrantless withdrawal of blood from an unconscious impaired driving suspect violated the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding a state statute that permits such actions.
Bartenders’ Duty to Cut Off Service to Intoxicated Patrons
Servers who work for restaurants and bars that sell alcoholic beverages pursuant to an ABC permit are prohibited by G.S. 18B-305(a) from knowingly selling or giving alcoholic beverages to a person who is intoxicated. Violation of this provision is a Class 1 misdemeanor and may result in suspension of the establishment’s ABC permit. In cases where overserving results in injury, the restaurant or bar also may be liable for the damages that result. I’ve often wondered how servers know when to say when. After all, they are engaged in the business of selling alcoholic beverages—drinks that affect the brain functioning of everyone who consumes them. When does the statutory duty override their business interests?
Fix It and Forget It—Without Making a Trip to the Courthouse
A few years ago, my babysitter texted me that she was going to be late because she had been pulled over by a police officer on the way to our house. When she arrived, I was in full-on substitute parent and attorney mode. Are you okay, I asked? What happened? She was nonplussed by the whole affair. Her registration had expired a few months before. She hadn’t noticed. The officer explained that if she renewed her registration and provided proof of that to the assistant district attorney on her court date, the charges would be dismissed. Oh, I said (slightly deflated that she needed absolutely no input from me—a so-called expert). But she did have to go to court to clear all this up. And that required parking in downtown Raleigh on a weekday, finding her way to the appropriate courtroom and standing in line to pay her ticket. A new procedure, soon to be rolled out statewide by the Administrative Office of the Courts, will do away with this last step, preventing hundreds of thousands of citizens from having to appear in court to have their motor vehicle law charges dismissed upon proof of compliance with the law.
Storycorps: DWI Edition
On Fridays, National Public Radio features recordings from its Storycorps booth. These recordings sometimes feature a teacher and student, a parent and child, spouses, or a single person discussing a life-changing experience. They are always thought-provoking, and often are heart-wrenching.
I’m not looking to steal Storycorps’ thunder nor aiming to make anyone cry (a common Storycorps side effect), but I am interested in creating a broadcast for the School of Government that relates to impaired driving. I want to start by hearing from people who have been convicted of misdemeanor impaired driving. I want to know whether and how that experience altered the course of their lives–for the better or for the worse.
State v. Miller Confirms that the DWI Motions Statutes are a Hot Mess
No, Justice Ervin didn’t use the words hot mess. But anyone who slogs their way through the tortured procedural swamp that led to State v. Miller, __ N.C. __ (March 18, 2016), is bound to agree that the procedures adopted in 2006 for appeals in DWI cases have created a nearly impenetrable bog for the parties involved. I’m going to do my best here to succinctly explain what happened in Miller. Then I’ll share an idea for freeing litigants and judges from the procedural muck in which they are currently mired.
What’s the Proper Charge When the Violation of a Traffic Law Causes Someone’s Death?
In 2014, 1,284 people were killed in traffic accidents in North Carolina. Most of those people were occupants in a passenger car, though motor vehicle crashes also claimed the lives of 172 pedestrians, 190 motorcyclists and 19 bicyclists. Seventy percent of the fatalities resulted from crashes that did not involve an alcohol-impaired driver. While it is fairly easy to determine the appropriate criminal charge when a person drives while impaired and proximately causes the death of another, it is less obvious what the appropriate charge is when a driver’s violation of another type of traffic statute proximately causes someone else’s death.
Do DWI Suspects Have a Right to the Least Intrusive Chemical Test?
In its seminal opinion establishing the State’s right to withdraw blood from a DWI suspect over his objection and without a warrant when there are exigent circumstances, the United States Supreme Court left a significant question unanswered. The court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 747 (1966), noted that the petitioner “is not one of the few who on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple might prefer some other means of testing, such as the ‘Breathalyzer’ test petitioner refused. . . . We need not decide whether such wishes would have to be respected.” Id. at 771.
So how have courts in the ensuing four decades answered this question? Must an impaired driving suspect be offered the least intrusive type of chemical test available or a choice about the type of testing when he or she has a sincere objection to a particular test?
State v. Osteen: Court of Appeals Approves Admission of Lay and Expert Opinion Testimony Regarding Drug Impairment
Proving that a driver was impaired by alcohol is not all that difficult, particularly when the driver submits to a breath test and the result is .08 or more. Proving that a driver was impaired by drugs or by a combination of alcohol and drugs is considerably more challenging. But an opinion released yesterday by the court of appeals demonstrates one way in which it can be done, even without a confirmatory chemical test.