Grants Pass: Local Government Authority and the Constitutionality of Laws Against Camping or Sleeping in Public

According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, well over half a million people are unhoused on any given night in America. Given the magnitude of the crisis, local governments face immense challenges in addressing the underlying causes of homelessness while managing public health and safety concerns. Some local governments, including many in North Carolina, have adopted anti-camping and/or anti-sleeping ordinances as part of their response.

The Supreme Court of the United States recently considered whether the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause barred an Oregon city’s adoption of ordinances restricting camping on public property in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 603 U. S. ____ (2024). One of us previewed the case and commented on the oral arguments a few months ago. On June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court upheld the city’s public camping laws, concluding that their enforcement does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. This blog post analyzes the Court’s decision and offers guidance to local governments regarding anti-sleeping and anti-camping ordinances.

[Editor’s note: This post is cross posted on Coates’ Canons, the School of Government’s local government law blog.]

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Case Summary: Jones v. Mississippi

In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Supreme Court held that a person who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may not be mandatorily sentenced to life without parole; the sentencing judge must have discretion to impose a lesser punishment. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the Court held that Miller applies retroactively. When Montgomery was decided, I wondered (here) whether it did more than merely address Miller’s retroactive application. Language in the case indicated that a sentence of life without parole would be constitutionally permissible for only the most the most troubling young defendants—“those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Id. at 209. In Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___ (2021), decided last week, the Court made clear that the Constitution does not require a sentencer to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a defendant to life without parole.

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