My colleagues have been blogging about some of the changes to our criminal law wrought by recent legislation. Session Law 2025-70 also amends G.S. 15A-1415, which governs the grounds that a defendant may assert by motion for appropriate relief (MAR), and establishes limitations as to time. Whereas the statute previously listed grounds that a defendant may assert by MAR at any time after the verdict, the recent amendments create a seven-year limit on most noncapital MARs. This post addresses the changes to G.S. 15A-1415 (effective Dec. 1, 2025).
motions for appropriate relief
When is a Procedural Bar Not a Procedural Bar? MARs, Gatekeeper Orders, and the Procedural Bar
We get a lot of questions about motions for appropriate relief (“MARs”). Post-conviction can be a daunting area for practitioners and judges alike. On the state and federal levels, the procedural issues alone can feel like a maze. A recent(ish) case from the Court of Appeals, State v. Blake, ___ N.C. App. ___, 853 S.E.2d 838 (Dec. 31, 2020), shines some light on aspects of the procedural bar in state post-conviction proceedings and is the subject of today’s post.
Challenging a Plea
Suppose that after judgment is entered a defendant wants to challenge a plea. Maybe he alleges that the plea wasn’t knowing and voluntary. Or maybe he claims that the judge imposed an illegal sentence. Can the defendant do this? I like to break this question into two parts: (1) Does the claim survive the plea? (2) If so, what procedural mechanism can be used to assert it? This post addresses both issues.
State Supreme Court on State’s Ability to Obtain Review of MAR Rulings
Last month, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided State v. Stubbs, an important case regarding appellate review of orders granting motions for appropriate relief.