A UNC School of Government Blog
In a recent post, I suggested that by establishing a good foundation, the State may be able to overcome a confrontation clause objection to its use a substitute analyst in a drug case. In its recent opinion in State v. Brewington, the N.C. Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error by … Read more
As summarized in Jeff’s recent blog post, in State v. Brennan, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied Locklear and Mobley and held that the defendant’s confrontation clause rights were violated by the testimony of a substitute analyst in a drug case. My own summaries of Locklear and Mobley are available here and here. Jeff … Read more
The court of appeals released a new batch of opinions today. I may post on others eventually, but the one that jumped out at me immediately is State v. Brennan. Brennan is a Confrontation Clause case. Most readers of this blog know that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), breathed new life into the … Read more
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachussetts, the United States Supreme Court held that forensic laboratory reports—such as those identifying a substance as a controlled substance—are testimonial and subject to the new Crawford Confrontation Clause rule. For more detail on that decision, you can review a paper posted here. Under the Crawford rule, testimonial statements by declarants who … Read more
In previous posts [editor’s note: her prior posts are here and here] I have written about the developing North Carolina law on the use of substitute analysts after Melendez-Diaz. In writing about State v. Locklear and State v. Galindo, both of which rejected substitute analyst testimony, I noted a common feature of those cases that … Read more
On October 20, 2009, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided State v. Galindo, holding that a Crawford violation occurred when the State’s expert gave an opinion, in a drug trafficking case, as to the weight of the cocaine at issue, based “solely” on a laboratory report by a non-testifying analyst. To put the decision … Read more
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachussetts, as most readers of this blog know, is the United States Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on the Confrontation Clause. Generally, it holds that forensic laboratory reports — like chemical analyses of drugs, DNA tests, and so on — are “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes. That means a laboratory report generally may not … Read more
Last Friday, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided State v. Locklear, holding, in part, that a Crawford violation occurred when the trial court admitted opinion testimony regarding a victim’s cause of death and identity. Because the case raises questions about the viability of offering a “substitute analyst” to avoid a Crawford problem, I offer this … Read more
If a 0.15 alcohol concentration is not admitted at trial or sentencing, does it count for limited privilege purposes? I discussed in an earlier post circumstances in which the Confrontation Clause may bar the admission at a sentencing hearing in an impaired driving case of a chemical analysis offered to prove an aggravating factor based … Read more
In my last post on this topic, I addressed the “new rule” prong of Teague retroactivity analysis as it applies to Melendez-Diaz. I ended that post by noting that another aspect of retroactivity analysis that has been raised regarding Melendez-Diaz is whether the Teague test applies in North Carolina motion for appropriate relief proceedings in … Read more