The United States Supreme Court held in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every impaired driving case that justifies a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw. In so holding, the court rejected the state’s call for a categorical rule—based solely on the evanescent nature of alcohol—that would authorize warrantless blood draws over a defendant’s objection whenever an officer has probable cause to believe the defendant has been driving while impaired. Some states have continued to argue, however, that nonconsensual warrantless blood draws in impaired driving cases are categorically permissible based on implied consent laws enacted by their state legislatures. Two state supreme courts recently rejected such arguments, holding that implied consent statutes in Nevada and Idaho that do not allow a driver to withdraw consent to testing are unconstitutional. That reasoning might be applied to invalidate the provision of North Carolina’s implied consent law that categorically allows the warrantless testing of unconscious drivers.
implied consent
State v. Granger Adds to State’s Missouri v. McNeely Jurisprudence
State v. Granger, decided last week, is the latest case in which the North Carolina Court of Appeals has considered, in light of Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), whether an exigency supported the warrantless withdrawal of an impaired driving suspect’s blood over the person’s objection. Readers may recall that the … Read more
Maybe Implied Consent is Real After All
Courts across the country continue to wrestle with whether and how the Supreme Court’s opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), affects the lawfulness of testing carried out pursuant to a state’s implied consent laws. McNeely held, in the context of a blood draw performed over a defendant’s objection, … Read more
Re-examining Implied Consent after McNeely, Part III
The first two posts in this series (here and here) discussed opinions from state supreme courts in Arizona and Minnesota considering, post-McNeely v. Missouri, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), whether a suspect’s submission to implied consent testing was voluntary consent within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This post discusses why that sort of analysis is … Read more
Re-examining Implied Consent After McNeely, Part II
Yesterday’s post discussed challenges to implied consent laws raised by defendants following the Supreme Court’s decision last spring in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). The post summarized the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that, independent of the state’s implied consent law, the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee’s consent to be voluntary to justify a … Read more
Re-examining Implied Consent After McNeely, Part I
The United States Supreme Court held last term in Missouri v. McNeeIy, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a person’s bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every impaired driving case sufficient to excuse the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. McNeely’s holding comported with the analysis that the North Carolina … Read more
No, Virginia, there is no implied consent
I’m eagerly awaiting the Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. McNeely. I want to know whether the exigency created by the dissipation of alcohol in the body, without more, permits the police to compel the withdrawal of blood from an impaired driving suspect without a warrant. But there’s one thing I already know: The legal … Read more
State v. Wilson: Constitutional Violations Associated with DWI Blood Draw Not a Basis for Dismissal of Charges
Kelvin Wilson’s DWI case made the front page of Lawyer’s Weekly last January. Wilson was arrested for impaired driving in Winston-Salem and taken to the hospital. When he physically resisted having his blood drawn, a police officer sat on him to facilitate the extraction. The blood evidence was suppressed (with the State’s agreement) at Wilson’s … Read more
State v. Osterhoudt and motions procedures in implied consent cases
Jeff wrote earlier this week about the court of appeals’ opinion in State v. Osterhoudt (August 21, 2012). Jeff’s post dealt with the court’s substantive analysis of whether the police officer who stopped the defendant had the reasonable, articulable suspicion required to render the stop lawful under the Fourth Amendment. I want to focus on … Read more
Notice of Implied Consent Rights: West Coast Edition
Two earlier posts (here and here) explore whether North Carolina’s implied consent statutes or the U.S. Constitution require that notice of implied consent rights be provided in language that a person speaks or understands. As those posts report, the answer is unclear. There are no North Carolina appellate court decisions on point and courts in … Read more