Articles related to Evidence

This is Part II of a two-part blog discussing changes in the law surrounding criminal gang activity and gang enhancements brought about by House Bill 1173, S.L. 2026-37, Jaleeyah’s Law. […]

Earlier this year, I attended the North Carolina Oral Fluid Summit sponsored by the Governor’s Highway Safety Program and the Foundation for Advancing Alcohol Responsibility. The focus of the Summit […]

In mounting a diminished capacity or voluntary intoxication defense in a first-degree murder case, the defense attempts to “negate” the element of specific intent, premeditation, or deliberation. To negate in […]

Child welfare records maintained by a department of social services (DSS) contain sensitive information that parties in various proceedings are often interested in seeing. A complex web of state and federal law governs the disclosure of these records – more than I can cover here. For purposes of this post, it’s sufficient to know that G.S. 108A-80 is a broadly applicable confidentiality statute that applies to DSS and covers client information generally. Absent limited statutory exceptions, G.S. 108A-80(a) prohibits disclosure of information related to individuals who apply for or receive public assistance or social services, including child welfare services.

Child welfare information is also subject to an additional set of confidentiality restrictions under Chapter 7B of the North Carolina General Statutes. For example, G.S. 7B-302 makes information that is obtained by DSS related to a juvenile’s alleged abuse, neglect, or dependency (A/N/D) confidential. Similarly, G.S. 7B-2901(b) requires DSS to maintain confidential records of juveniles it has in its custody. Both statutes provide exceptions to the confidentiality requirement.

This post explores how the exceptions in G.S. 7B-302 and 7B-2901(b) apply when a party—either in a North Carolina civil case where DSS is not a party or in a criminal or delinquency matter—wants DSS child welfare records about someone other than themselves. Note that in this post I use the term ‘DSS records’ to refer to child welfare records maintained by DSS, including those from juvenile A/N/D proceedings.

In light of the recent Court of Appeals opinion State v. Moore, this post is a follow-up to the 2018 blog post State v. Fincher: No Foundation Required for DRE Testimony by my colleague Shea Denning.

Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 702(a) requires the proponent to show that the expert testimony is based on sufficient facts or data (Rule 702(a)(1)), the product of reliable principles and methods (Rule 702(a)(2)), and the result of the witness reliably applying the principles and methods to the facts of the case (Rule 702(a)(3)). That said, there are circumstances where the proponent is not required to make these showings. Rule 702(a1)(2) permits a witness to give expert testimony about whether a person was impaired, and by what category of impairing substance, “notwithstanding any other provision of law” when the witness holds a current certification as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE). In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals held that the proponent of expert testimony by a witness properly certified as a DRE must nonetheless meet the showing required by Rule 702(a)(3) that the testimony is the result of the witness reliably applying the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Read on for more detail.

Special thanks to Sloan Godbey, Summer Law Fellow at UNC SOG, for their significant contributions to this post.

In March of last year, I did a thorough review of North Carolina cases addressing the authentication of surveillance video. I created a chart to understand what ingredients are adequate (and inadequate) to lay a foundation. That chart can be found here, and the related blog here.

However, a case came down in March of this year that raises significant questions about how video is authenticated, or at least introduces a new potential avenue for authenticating video. I’m afraid my cherished chart may soon be of limited utility. But such is the way the law develops!

A common evidence question that arises is how to properly authenticate digital communications. We have written on the topic in several blogs: How Can a Party Show Authorship of a Social Media Post or Other Electronic Communication?, Authenticating Photographs Obtained from Social Media Platforms, Business Records: Posts, Chats, and Texts, New Guidance on Authenticating Social Media, Admissibility of Electronic Writings: Emails, Text Messages, and Social Networking Posts, and more.

Last year, I created a chart to highlight the ingredients of authentication our appellate courts found to be adequate or inadequate as a foundation for surveillance video (also see the accompanying blog, Surveillance Video- When It Comes In and When It Doesn’t). I’ve received positive feedback on the chart and practitioners have asked for more evidence content in this format. For a second installment, I chose digital communications.

Video evidence authentication has received a fair amount of treatment on this blog. The topic remains an area of practical significance given the prevalence of video evidence in criminal trials and how common it is for the prosecution’s case to hinge on the admission of video. We are increasingly a video-focused society. Between home security cam, doorbell cam, body-worn cam, in-car cam, pole cam, and even parking lot cam, juries increasingly expect to see video, whether the incident in question occurred outside a home, near a business, or on the roadside.

In this post, I will focus on surveillance video.

My colleague, Phil Dixon, blogged about the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Joyner, 284 N.C. App. 681 (2022), here. In Joyner, the court ruled that the State did not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause when it introduced the victim’s testimony from a civil 50C hearing at the defendant’s criminal trial. Last year, the court decided State v. Smith, 287 N.C. App. 614 (2023) (unpublished), a case that provides an interesting counterpoint to Joyner. In Smith, the State recorded the victim’s testimony from the probable cause hearing in district court and moved to admit the testimony at trial in superior court after the victim became unavailable. The trial court admitted the testimony, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that the opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the probable cause hearing was not “adequate” to comport with constitutional requirements, vacated the convictions for first-degree kidnapping and human trafficking, and ordered a new trial.

Although the opinion is unpublished, the State did not seek further review, and the Smith decision has important implications for practitioners. This post examines those issues and offers advice for defenders when the State attempts to introduce recorded testimony from a probable cause hearing at trial.

In my last post, I wrote about how a party might authenticate a Facebook direct message or other text-based electronic communication. That post focused on how the proponent of the evidence might establish who wrote the message, i.e., authorship. But what if a party wants to introduce a photograph that was posted on a social media platform? The concept of authorship doesn’t really apply, and in the age of Photoshop and AI-generated images, courts may have serious concerns about the accuracy of online images.