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State v. Osterhoudt and motions procedures in implied consent cases

Jeff wrote earlier this week about the court of appeals’ opinion in State v. Osterhoudt (August 21, 2012).  Jeff’s post dealt with the court’s substantive analysis of whether the police officer who stopped the defendant had the reasonable, articulable suspicion required to render the stop lawful under the Fourth Amendment. I want to focus on … Read more

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All You Ever Wanted to Know about DWI Sentencing But Were Afraid to Ask

I’ve heard folks say that there is criminal law . . . and then there is impaired driving law.  What I think they mean is that while impaired driving is, of course, a crime, subject to the rules of criminal procedure and constitutional provisions that apply generally to the investigation, charging, trial, conviction and sentencing … Read more

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Authorization for Continuous Alcohol Monitoring Expanded by S.L. 2012-146

Five years ago, the General Assembly authorized judges to require that defendants placed on probation for a Level One or Level Two impaired driving offense abstain from consuming alcohol for at least thirty but not more than sixty days as verified by a continuous alcohol monitoring system. Continuous alcohol monitoring systems (CAM) employ ankle transmitter … Read more

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Notice of Implied Consent Rights: West Coast Edition

Two earlier posts (here and here) explore whether North Carolina’s implied consent statutes or the U.S. Constitution require that notice of implied consent rights be provided in language that a person speaks or understands.  As those posts report, the answer is unclear. There are no North Carolina appellate court decisions on point and courts in … Read more

Weaving and Reasonable Suspicion

Drunk drivers have difficulty driving in a straight line. Therefore, police officers frequently stop drivers who are weaving, suspecting them of impaired driving. Until very recently, it seemed that the law was settled that weaving alone could not support a DWI stop. Rather, “weaving plus,” or weaving combined with some other circumstance suggesting impairment, was … Read more

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The Beginning Date for License Revocations Following Conviction for DWI

Several recent stories in the News and Observer (here, here, here, and here) have chronicled the SBI’s investigation into orders entered in certain impaired driving cases by former Wake County District Court Judge Kristin Ruth, who resigned last month. Newspaper reports characterize the orders at issue as purporting to alter the conviction date for impaired … Read more

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License Revocations and Limited Driving Privileges for High-Risk Drivers

I wrote here about several types of driver’s license revocations that can result from a person being charged with and convicted of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 as well as about a driver’s ability to obtain a limited driving privilege to mitigate the effects of the revocation that occurs upon conviction. The earlier post omitted … Read more

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Notice of Aggravating Factors Under G.S. 20-179

Last July, Jamie Markham provided this refresher on aggravating factors in structured sentencing cases in which he discussed, among other provisions, the requirement that the State provide a defendant with written notice of its intent to prove aggravating factors.  A reader requested that we follow up by discussing the related notice provision in G.S. 20-179(a1). … Read more

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Another Look at the DWI Super-Aggravator in G.S. 20-179(c)(4)

Last summer I wrote this post about amendments to the fourth grossly aggravating factor applicable to sentencing for impaired driving, namely the factor in G.S. 20-179(c)(4) that elevates punishment for driving while impaired with a child in the vehicle. Amendments effective for offenses committed on or after December 1, 2011 render this factor applicable if … Read more

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DWI Parole: How Does It Really Work?

A few months ago, I taught a session on DWI sentencing to a group of judges.  As part of that session, I reviewed the rules for determining the parole-eligibility of a defendant convicted of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 and sentenced to an active term of imprisonment under G.S. 20-179. The upshot of those rules, … Read more