North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

The news story that captured my attention this week is not exactly, or not entirely, a criminal law story. Mahmoud Khalil, who helped lead pro-Palestinian protests at Columbia University, was arrested this week by ICE agents at the university-owned apartment where he lived. (Khalil apparently was a graduate student at the university until December.) Khalil is a lawful permanent resident of the United States – that is, a green card holder – but the agents indicated that his status would be revoked as a result of what the Trump administration views as his anti-Semitic advocacy. He remains in custody but has lawyered up, raising interesting questions about the government’s ability to revoke legal permanent residency based on speech. A federal judge has ordered that he not be deported pending further proceedings. The AP has more here and here. Keep reading for more news.

Under G.S. 15A-1346(b), a sentencing court has the authority to order a probationary sentence to run consecutively to an undischarged term of imprisonment. Probation officers refer to that as a “contingent” sentence, because for them, it is—the start of the probation is contingent on the person’s release from prison. A contingent probationary sentence can be helpful when, for example, a defendant owes a lot of restitution, and the court wants to make sure there’s plenty of time on probation remaining after the defendant finishes any active sentences. To be clear, this is not a matter of whether the suspended term of imprisonment, if revoked, will run concurrently with or consecutively to some other term of imprisonment. This is about when the period of probation itself begins. A recent Court of Appeals decision changes things.

The defendant in State v. Greenfield, No. COA23-597 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025), argued the trial court erred by admitting evidence and allowing argument about an attempted armed robbery charge for which he had previously been acquitted. The Court of Appeals posited that evidence is inadmissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause only when it falls within the scope of the collateral estoppel doctrine, which precludes relitigation of an issue of fact previously determined by a final judgment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by failing to intervene in the closing argument here, but its formulation of the rule begs the question: under what circumstances will double jeopardy require the exclusion of evidence? This post attempts to answer that question.

This post summarizes the published criminal opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals released on March 5, 2025. These summaries will be added to Smith’s Criminal Case Compendium, a free and searchable database of case summaries from 2008 to the present.

A man is scheduled to be executed by firing squad this evening, which would be the first firing squad execution in the United States in the last 15 years. On Wednesday, Brad Sigmon’s final appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court was denied. In South Carolina, death row inmates may choose between firing squad, lethal injection, and electrocution.  Sigmon said he felt forced to choose execution by firing squad over lethal injection because of a lack of information about the drugs used and the “fear of a tortuous death.” He also said he didn’t choose electrocution because he didn’t want to suffer “by being cooked alive.” Sigmon’s attorneys attempted to delay the execution to get a fuller hearing in court to learn more information about the drugs used in lethal injection, but their request was denied. Sigmon plans to ask Governor Henry McMaster for his sentence to be commuted, although no South Carolina governor has granted clemency since the death penalty restarted in 1976. Read on for more criminal law news.  

A few weeks ago, I wrote about the circumstances in which one judge may pick up case-related duties that another judge is unable to complete. Yesterday, the court of appeals decided a case in this area, determining in State v. Fearns, COA23-650, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2025), that a judge lacked authority to enter an order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss when the hearing on that motion was held by another judge. This post will discuss Fearns.

In previous posts, I’ve addressed the expedited scheduling requirements and opportunities for permanent release of motor vehicles seized pursuant to G.S. 20-28.3. Today, I’ll address the ways a motor vehicle may be released temporarily pending trial or final disposition of the underlying offense. Generally speaking, this temporary release permits a motor vehicle owner to obtain temporary possession of the vehicle conditioned on meeting certain prerequisites and agreeing to return the motor vehicle on the day of the forfeiture hearing. Read on for more. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution limits the use of testimonial hearsay statements by an unavailable witness at a criminal trial, as does its state counterpart in Article I, Sec. 23 of the North Carolina Constitution. A hearsay statement is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. A statement is testimonial if the primary purpose of the statement was to establish past facts for use at a later prosecution. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245 (2015). The Confrontation Clause does not protect against the admission of nontestimonial statements (although hearsay statements still must meet an exception or exemption). In a recent decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court analyzed a challenge to the admission of the defendant’s phone records offered by the State at trial. Overruling the Court of Appeals on the point, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the phone records were nontestimonial as purely machine-generated data.” The case is a good reminder of the distinctions between testimonial and nontestimonial statements and may have implications for future confrontation issues. Read on for the details.

We have covered the extensive post-conviction and appellate proceedings of Richard Glossip’s death sentence many times before on the blog (most recently here). Glossip has been on death row in Oklahoma since his 1998 conviction for allegedly orchestrating the brutal killing of a hotel owner. On Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Glossip a new trial after finding that the prosecution knowingly failed to correct false and misleading testimony at trial. Specifically, the prosecution knew its star witness, Sneed, was lying when he denied having seen a psychiatrist and denied having been prescribed lithium, a medicine typically used to treat severe mental illnesses. Sneed admitted to killing the victim and agreed to testify against Glossip in exchange the State taking the death penalty off the table for Sneed’s role in the crime. According to the 5-3 majority: “Correcting Sneed’s lie would have undermined his credibility and revealed his willingness to lie under oath. . . Hence, there was a reasonable likelihood that correcting Sneed’s testimony would have affected the judgment of the jury.” Justices Alito and Thomas dissented, while Justice Barrett concurred and would have sent the case back to the Oklahoma appellate court (Justice Gorsuch recused himself from the case). If tried again, it would be Glossip’s third capital trial related to the killing. SCOTUSblog has the story here, or you can read the case for yourself here. Read on for more criminal law news.

Last September, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Thomas, No. COA23-210, __ N.C. App. __ (2024), a case involving law enforcement’s retrieval of ankle monitor location data gathered while the defendant was on post-release supervision.

This is the first North Carolina appellate case to address whether it is constitutional for law enforcement to retrieve ankle monitor data without a warrant. This post will discuss the reasoning in Thomas and its implications for related questions.