The United States Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), that sworn forensic reports prepared by laboratory analysts for purposes of prosecution are testimonial statements, rendering…
…lack of consent. Some sexual offense crimes include force as an element. See, e.g., G.S. 14-27.4 (first-degree forcible sexual offense). As such, the relevant conduct is never constitutionally protected. However,…
…show the likelihood of his or her consent. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 295 N.C. 399 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54 (1993). A 1977…
…Conditional discharge under G.S. 90-96(a) is mandatory for consenting, eligible defendants unless the court determines, with a written finding, and with the consent of the district attorney, that the defendant…
…The defendant said that the car and the phones belonged to a friend. The officer proceeded to do a consent examination of the phones, then – according to the court…
…a Class B1 offense based on another malice theory, the court concluded that there was no evidence in support of depraved-heart malice in this case. Neither the defendant’s testimony, which…
…a theory not legally available to the State, the erroneous instruction was grave error which amounted to a denial of Defendant’s fundamental right to be informed of the accusations against…
I wrote a post in July asking whether conditional discharge under G.S. 90-96(a) is discretionary or mandatory for a consenting defendant. A case decided this week offers some clarification. The…
…and with the consent of the trial judge, waive the right to trial by jury. When a defendant waives the right to trial by jury under this section, the jury…
