On October 13, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Montgomery v. Louisiana, a case that presents the question whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), applies retroactively to convictions that became final before Miller was decided. In Miller the Court held that under the Eighth Amendment a sentencing scheme that mandates life without parole for defendants less than 18 years old at the time of their crimes is unconstitutional. Miller did not categorically ban a life without parole sentence for juvenile offenders; rather it mandated that the sentencer must consider an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before imposing such a penalty. Miller applies to all cases that were pending when it was decided as well as to all future cases. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). The question of retroactivity is whether the Miller rule applies to cases that became final before the decision was issued. As I noted in a blog post here, the lower courts are divided on the issue. The Court’s decision in Montgomery might finally resolve it.
State v. Perry, Cell Site Location Information, and the Exclusionary Rule
Last week, the court of appeals decided State v. Perry. It’s the appellate division’s first foray into cell site location information and a case that raises questions about the status of the exclusionary rule in North Carolina.
News Roundup
For the second time in two weeks, I’ll start with a heartwarming, positive story about a police officer. In 2014, Raleigh Officer J.D. Boyd broke up an altercation involving a man named Cory Sanders. Sanders confronted Officer Boyd and swung at him with a knife; Boyd drew his pistol on Sanders. Sanders eventually surrendered and was charged with assault. This week, Boyd encountered Sanders again. Sanders apologized for his behavior and told Boyd that he was now working at a good job and was staying out of trouble. On social media, Boyd posted pictures of Sanders and himself and wrote “I was glad it ended well for us both that day, and I am ecstatic now to learn that he has turned his life around and we can embrace as friends.” A number of media outlets have the story, including WRAL here.
The Eighth Circuit Considers Implied Consent, but I Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For
I admit that I may have a problem. I am dedicated to (perhaps obsessed with) the pursuit of a legal theory that satisfactorily squares the doctrine of implied consent with the Fourth Amendment. A thousand Westlaw searches later, I have yet to find analysis such an analysis by a court. So I was a little surprised when the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained earlier this summer that the Supreme Court determined more than thirty years ago in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), that implied consent testing carried out under threat of license revocation comported with the Fourth Amendment. Did I miss something?
Extending Probation After Expiration
If a judge extends a defendant’s probation after probation has already expired, when does the extension begin?
Updated Traffic Stops Paper Now Available
I’ve updated my paper on traffic stops to include Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), and other recent cases. It’s available here. For those not familiar with the paper, it is a summary of the law regarding traffic stops, including typical reasons for such stops, the stops’ duration, the techniques … Read more
Restoring State Firearm Rights as a Condition for Restoring Federal Firearm Rights
In 2010, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted G.S. 14-415.4, which allows a person convicted of a nonviolent felony to regain his or her firearm rights if he or she meets the statutory criteria for restoration (including, among other things, waiting twenty years after completing his or her sentence). The law took effect February 1, 2011, meaning that a person who meets the statutory criteria is eligible to utilize the restoration procedure whether his or her offense or conviction occurred before or after February 1, 2011. See S.L. 2010-108 (H 1260), as amended by S.L. 2011-2 (H 18) (clarifying effective date). A restoration order has the effect of lifting the state law ban, in G.S. 14-415.1, on possession of a firearm by a felon. See G.S. 14-415.4(a), (b). It also removes the ban on issuance of a handgun permit, G.S. 14-404(c)(1), and a concealed handgun permit. G.S. 14-415.12(b)(3).
News Roundup
The old media motto is “if it bleeds, it leads.” But today, I’m leading with a good news story of danger averted. Dan Hicks, a Raleigh PD officer, talked a man off the edge of a freeway overpass Wednesday night and gave him a hug. Officer Hicks explained to WRAL that the man in question “got a big old Dan Hicks bear hug, whether he wanted it or not. . . . [H]e was not going to be given the opportunity to go over that bridge again. He got to stand there with me for a second and get that hug. Call it tactical, call it compassionate, I think it was probably both.” Well done, Officer Hicks.
Pleading Defects and Double Jeopardy
I recently taught a class of law students about criminal pleadings. We discussed proper pleadings and defective pleadings, and the State’s ability to bring new charges against a defendant after a case is dismissed due to a fatal defect in the pleading. It was an interesting conversation, and it prompted me to look into the matter a bit more. This post summarizes the law.
Daubert Doesn’t Look Much Different from Howerton When it Comes to Retrograde Extrapolation
The court of appeals gave the green light last week for law enforcement officers to continue to testify as scientific experts in DWI cases involving retrograde extrapolation–notwithstanding the legislature’s amendment of Rule 702 to adopt the Daubert standard. The court held in State v. Turbyfill that a field technician for the Forensic Test for Alcohol Branch of DHHS (FTA), who was trained as a law enforcement officer and chemical analyst (which authorized him to conduct implied consent testing on breath testing instruments), was properly allowed to testify about a retrograde extrapolation calculation he performed using an FTA form. The technician’s inability to explain whether the rate he used to make the calculation was an “average,” a “mid-point,” or a “conservative” rate—he used all three terms to describe it—did not disqualify him as an expert since he “provided the trial court with a list of some thirty-nine articles . . . regarding blood alcohol research,” and “with North Carolina cases in which this Court upheld the use of retrograde extrapolation to establish blood alcohol content.”