Last year, a panel of the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015). The panel ruled that “the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it obtains and inspects a cell phone user’s historical [cell site location information (CSLI)] for an extended period of time. . . . Its inspection by the government, therefore, requires a warrant, unless an established exception to the warrant requirement applies.” I discussed Graham here and here. Last week, the en banc Fourth Circuit reversed the panel, ruling that under the third-party doctrine, a cell phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site location information that he or she shares with a service provider, so it isn’t a Fourth Amendment “search” when law enforcement obtains such information, and a warrant isn’t required. The en banc opinion is here. This post discusses the opinion and considers the possibility of Supreme Court review or action by Congress.
News Roundup
Reuters reports that following rehearing en banc of a case decided last year, the Fourth Circuit has ruled that police do not need a warrant to obtain historical cell site location information from cell phone service providers. The majority opinion concluded that the third party doctrine precludes a person from claiming a legitimate expectation of privacy in the location information because it has been voluntarily conveyed to the service provider. The court’s opinion is available here. Keep reading for more news.
U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection
[Editor’s note: Emily Coward, the author of today’s post, is an attorney who works with the indigent defense education team at the School of Government. She is a co-author of Raising Issues of Race in North Carolina Criminal Cases.]
In Foster v. Chatman, a 7-1 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prosecutors in Georgia discriminated on the basis of race during jury selection in a 1987 death penalty trial. This post explains the ruling and considers its impact on Batson challenges in North Carolina.
What Level of Suspicion Is Required to Arrest for a Probation Violation?
There aren’t very many federal cases about North Carolina probation. When we get one, I’m inclined to write about it. In Jones v. Chandrasuwan, __ F.3d __ (4th Cir. 2016), the Fourth Circuit announced a new rule about the level of suspicion required to arrest a probationer for a suspected probation violation.
Lessons Learned on Vacation: 2016 Edition
Memorial Day weekend isn’t technically the beginning of summer, but it feels like it. Temperatures rise and many families head east toward water on Friday afternoons. That’s what my family did last Friday. Given that I try to stay reasonably informed about the law and I read my local paper, I thought I was well prepared to keep all of us on the beach and out of the slammer through the course of the weekend.
It turns out that there are a lot of rules that responsible adults and parents can break on vacation. I’m not just talking about bedtime rules and no-ice-cream-before-dinner rules. I’m talking about the criminal kind—the ones that can land you in jail or at least in a district court down east on a hot Monday morning. I’ve written about a few of these rules before. And this recent article in the News and Observer put everyone on notice that children under 16 cannot drive golf carts. But I’ve recently learned a new rule: You cannot have a mixed drink on the beach.
News Roundup
As the Baltimore Sun reports, a criminal trial against one of the Baltimore police officers charged in connection with the death of Freddie Gray last year ended this week with the officer, Edward Nero, being acquitted on all charges. According to the report, Nero’s acquittal on several misdemeanors came after a five-day bench trial that involved a novel theory of assault based on Nero detaining Gray without justification. The Baltimore Sun also has an opinion piece from former Baltimore police officers that argues that Nero, characterized as having only a tangential role in the incident that culminated in Gray’s death, should not have been criminally charged. Cases against other officers facing more serious charges are scheduled to be tried in the future. Keep reading for more news.
Deferred Prosecution: Who Steers the Ship?
The district attorney decides when to defer prosecution. But if that deferral includes probation under G.S. 15A-1341(a1), the court has a role in the process—including what to do in response to a violation of the deferred prosecution agreement. Sometimes the State and the judge are on the same page. Sometimes they aren’t.
A political science professor, a civil rights lawyer and a police chief walk into a classroom . . .
I haven’t figured out the punch line to this joke. It was my opening line for a traffic stops session taught last month in the special topics seminar, Race Issues in the Courts, by UNC Professor Frank Baumgartner, Southern Coalition for Social Justice Staff Attorney Ian Mance, and Fayetteville Police Chief Harold Medlock. One reason that it is hard to finish the joke is that these three were on the same page, which is somewhat surprising given the roles they occupy.
I immediately thought of that talk yesterday when I saw this News and Observer photograph of United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch standing next to Chief Medlock. Lynch traveled to Fayetteville as part of her nationwide community policing tour. She chose Fayetteville in part because of the work the presenters discussed at our April conference.
The Meaning of Custody During Traffic Stops Under Miranda v. Arizona and Berkemer v. McCarty
The 50th anniversary of the landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), will occur in a few weeks on June 13. As everyone knows, the case required a set of warnings and waiver of rights before a statement obtained during custodial interrogation could be introduced during the government’s presentation of its evidence at trial. The case spawned many thousands of appellate cases throughout federal and state courts. And the United States Supreme Court has issued several rulings that have clarified, extended, or confined Miranda’s scope.
This post will briefly review the meaning of custody during traffic stops by focusing on the Supreme Court’s most significant opinion on this issue: Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). [For a discussion of all significant aspects of Miranda, see the text on pages 534-52 and case summaries on pages 578-640 of Arrest, Search, and Investigation in North Carolina (4th ed. 2011), and pages 87-89 (text) and 95-100 (case summaries) of the 2015 supplement.]
Feds Focus on Fines and Fees
The U.S. Department of Justice recently issued a letter regarding its “strong interest” in putting a stop to unconstitutional court fines and fees that target the poor. According to the authors, Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Department, and Lisa Foster, Director of the Office for Access to Justice, “[T]he harm caused by unlawful practices . . . can be profound. Individuals may confront escalating debt; face repeated, unnecessary incarceration for nonpayment despite posing no danger to the community; lose their jobs; and become trapped in cycles of poverty that can be nearly impossible to escape.” The DOJ sent the letter to judges and court administrators in all fifty states on March 14, 2016, directing them to review their procedures on imposing and enforcing fines and fees. An article from the New York Times states that the DOJ rarely issues “Dear colleague” letters of this sort; the last one went out in 2010 and concerned the need to provide interpreters for people who don’t speak English.