Two Recent Cases on Sentence Administration

Two recent cases—one from the North Carolina Court of Appeals and one from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—resolve questions of sentence administration that I’ve written about in the past. The first case is McDonald v. N.C. Department of Correction, __ N.C. App. __ (March 20, 2012), and it deals with … Read more

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License Revocations and Limited Driving Privileges for High-Risk Drivers

I wrote here about several types of driver’s license revocations that can result from a person being charged with and convicted of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 as well as about a driver’s ability to obtain a limited driving privilege to mitigate the effects of the revocation that occurs upon conviction. The earlier post omitted … Read more

Justice Reinvestment and the “Commit no Criminal Offense” Probation Condition

Under the Justice Reinvestment Act (S.L. 2011-192), for probation violations occurring on or after December 1, 2011, the court may only revoke a person’s probation for a violation of the “commit no criminal offense” condition in G.S. 15A-1343(b)(1) or the new statutory absconding condition in G.S. 15A-1343(b)(3a). The court may revoke probation for other violations … Read more

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Notice of Aggravating Factors Under G.S. 20-179

Last July, Jamie Markham provided this refresher on aggravating factors in structured sentencing cases in which he discussed, among other provisions, the requirement that the State provide a defendant with written notice of its intent to prove aggravating factors.  A reader requested that we follow up by discussing the related notice provision in G.S. 20-179(a1). … Read more

Consecutive Sentences for Misdemeanors Sentenced at Different Times

In prior posts (here and here) I have discussed Structured Sentencing’s limit on consecutive sentences for misdemeanors. The basic rule, set out in G.S. 15A-1340.22, is that the cumulative length of the sentences of imprisonment for consecutive misdemeanor sentences may not exceed twice the maximum sentence authorized for the class and prior conviction level of … Read more

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Another Look at the DWI Super-Aggravator in G.S. 20-179(c)(4)

Last summer I wrote this post about amendments to the fourth grossly aggravating factor applicable to sentencing for impaired driving, namely the factor in G.S. 20-179(c)(4) that elevates punishment for driving while impaired with a child in the vehicle. Amendments effective for offenses committed on or after December 1, 2011 render this factor applicable if … Read more

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DWI Parole: How Does It Really Work?

A few months ago, I taught a session on DWI sentencing to a group of judges.  As part of that session, I reviewed the rules for determining the parole-eligibility of a defendant convicted of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 and sentenced to an active term of imprisonment under G.S. 20-179. The upshot of those rules, … Read more

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Men Behaving Very Badly

As part of its ongoing coverage of the John Edwards trial, The News and Observer reported today that Edwards’ lawyer cross-examined former Edwards aide Andrew Young by reading from pages of Young’s memoir “The Politician.”  I’m guessing that Young’s recounting of his arrest for impaired driving in Chapter 8 of the book, fittingly titled “Men … Read more

Advanced (Un)Supervised Release

In this earlier post I wrote about Advanced Supervised Release (ASR), a new program created by the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA) that allows certain defendants to be released from prison before serving their minimum sentence. The law is set out in G.S. 15A-1340.18. To sum it up, defendants who fall in certain grid cells who … Read more

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Re-sentencing under G.S. 20-38.7: Who Gets It and What’s Game for Consideration?

I’ve written before about the General Assembly’s enactment of G.S. 20-38.7 to prevent defendants from manipulating the procedure for appealing district court convictions to superior court in order to escape enhanced punishment in impaired driving cases based upon prior convictions. G.S. 20-38.7(c) provides that “for any implied‑consent offense that is first tried in district court … Read more