A UNC School of Government Blog
Part I of this post left for another day consideration of whether a defendant who does not speak English may be deemed to have willfully refused a chemical analysis when notice of the implied consent rights is provided only in English and whether providing notice only in English may violate such a defendant’s constitutional rights. … Read more
Several earlier posts a (here, here, and here) address the requirement that a person arrested for an implied consent offense be informed of statutory implied consent rights before being asked to submit to a chemical analysis. Posts (here and here) address the remedy for failure to adhere to these statutory requirements. None of those posts, … Read more
I won’t have time today for a regular blog post, so I’ll just make brief mention of something I’ve been meaning to blog about for a week or two, ever since a reader alerted me to it. Over the last couple of months, the court of appeals has decided two post-Gant search incident to arrest … Read more
Happy new year! It’s great to be back at work after a relaxing vacation. I’ve written before about traffic stops. Recently, I returned to the subject and completed a pretty detailed primer on traffic stops and the Fourth Amendment. The paper, which is available here, treats traffic stops chronologically. First it addresses when a traffic … Read more
State court decisions from other southeastern states seem to carry a bit more weight as persuasive authority than do cases from jurisdictions that are farther afield. Therefore, I thought I’d summarize a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals about searching cell phones incident to arrest. The case is Hawkins v. State. A police … Read more
I’ve written about law enforcement access to electronic communications, both on this blog and, more extensively, in this Administration of Justice Bulletin. One major issue is how and when law enforcement can obtain a suspect’s email from the suspect’s email provider. There are lots of wrinkles, but broadly, there’s a federal statute called the Stored … Read more
An involuntary confession can’t be used against a defendant at trial, not even to impeach him if he testifies. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). Whether a confession is voluntary is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, see, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), and asking whether “the … Read more
Today, the court of appeals decided State v. Baker. Baker explains when a trial judge is required to make findings of fact when hearing a motion to suppress, and it raises what I think is an interesting search and seizure issue. The facts were as follows. An officer was on patrol near a nursing facility … Read more
Stan Speedy is charged with impaired driving. He has filed a motion to suppress evidence of blood test results based on a violation of his Fourth Amendment and his statutory rights under Chapter 20. At the suppression hearing, a sheriff’s deputy testifies to the following facts: At 10 p.m. on the evening of May … Read more
To be valid, consent to search must be voluntary. Is consent voluntary when given after an officer thrreatens to obtain a search warrant if consent is withheld? Generally, yes. See State v. Kuegel, 195 N.C. App. 310 (2009) (consent to search was given voluntarily even though officer said that if consent was denied he “would … Read more