Can the Fact that Daryl Had a Glock Yesterday Be Used to Prove that He Had an AK-47 Today?

When a defendant is charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, may the prosecution introduce, under Rule 404(b), evidence that the defendant previously possessed a different firearm? Courts nationally are divided. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina just ruled in State v. Williams that the answer is no.

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Charging R/D/O: Alleging the Duty the Officer Was Discharging

I was teaching a class about charging documents recently when the conversation turned to the rule that a charge of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in violation of G.S. 14-223 must describe the particular duty that the officer was discharging at the time of the resistance. A member of the class asked whether it would suffice to describe the duty as “protecting and serving.” I gave my best guess about the answer but I thought I would see how others react to the question. So take the poll below, then read the rest of the post for a little history about the rule, a summary of a recent case, and a discussion of authority about the sufficiency of a general description like “protecting and serving.”

When charging R/D/O is "protecting and serving" a sufficient description of the duty the officer was discharging?

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Capital Punishment Update

Later this week, a group of superior court judges will gather at the School of Government to participate in a course on handling capital cases. In preparation for my role as a facilitator of the course, I have been reading up on death penalty news. Both in North Carolina and nationally, data show clear trends toward fewer capital cases, fewer death sentences, and fewer executions. This post briefly explores those developments and considers whether they are likely to continue.

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Should Prosecutors Consider Collateral Consequences?

Prosecutors have wide discretion to decide how to charge defendants. In exercising that discretion, a prosecutor certainly may consider the sentence associated with each possible charge, and may choose to pursue the charge or charges that is most likely to result in the outcome that the prosecutor sees as just. But the criminal sentence may not be the only outcome of a criminal case. A variety of collateral consequences may be imposed by law, such a change in immigration status, a requirement to register as a sex offender, or loss of professional licensure. Other consequences may also follow certain convictions, such as loss of employment or housing. May prosecutors consider collateral consequences when making charging decisions and when evaluating possible plea bargains? Should they do so? Must they?

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May an Officer Run a Motorist’s Criminal Record During a Traffic Stop?

An officer who stops a motorist for a traffic infraction may run a computer check on the driver’s license and may check for outstanding warrants. The results of these checks may determine how the officer proceeds. For example, if a check reveals that the driver’s license is revoked, the officer may charge the driver with DWLR and may direct the driver that he or she cannot drive the vehicle away from the location of the stop.

May an officer also check a motorist’s criminal record? Such historical information is less likely to dictate the officer’s course of action. But knowing whether a motorist has a record of violent crimes may help an officer determine how cautious he or she must be while completing the stop. This post discusses whether an officer may take time to run a motorist’s criminal record, and summarizes two recent cases on point.

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Insanity, Clinical Standards, and Expert Testimony

In Moore v. Texas, which I discussed here, the Supreme Court of the United States held that courts must rely on current clinical standards when determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled and so exempt from the death penalty. Must courts also defer to clinical standards when determining whether a defendant is insane and so exempt from criminal culpability? I don’t think so, for the reasons below.

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Is It Armed Robbery if a Defendant Has a Gun but Doesn’t Expressly Menace the Victim?

Last week, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina decided State v. Wright, a case that answers an interesting question: Does a defendant commit armed robbery when he takes a victim’s property after displaying a gun, even if he doesn’t point the gun at the victim or expressly threaten to shoot the victim — and even if the victim denies having being scared?

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Moore v. Texas: The Supreme Court Presses States to Comport with the Evolving Medical Understanding of Intellectual Disability

Last week, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Moore v. Texas, the third major case the Court has decided about intellectual disability (formerly, mental retardation) and the death penalty. This post summarizes the case and considers its impact on North Carolina.

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Court of Appeals Caseload Information

House Bill 239 would reduce the number of judges on the court of appeals from 15 to 12. It has passed the House and awaits Senate consideration. Proponents of the bill (mostly Republicans) say that the court should contract because the number of appeals has fallen in recent years. The bill’s opponents (mostly Democrats) say that the court remains extremely busy, and that the real purpose of the bill is to prevent Governor Cooper from appointing replacements for three Republican judges who are nearing mandatory retirement age. This post presents some historical and statistical information that may help readers assess the bill for themselves. [Update: I have received several comments pointing out other factors, beyond caseload, that should be considered when determining the size of a court. Clearly, factors like disposition times, number of law clerks and staff attorneys, and case mix are all pertinent. This post presents caseload data because caseload information is relevant and readily available, but it isn’t intended as a complete analysis — interested readers are encouraged to consider the full spectrum of pertinent information. To get a sense of how complex measuring and comparing court performance is, see, e.g., W. Warren H. Binford et al., Seeking Best Practices among Intermediate Courts of Appeal: A Nascent Journey, 9 J. App. Prac. & Process 37 (2007) (noting that “[c]ourt productivity is difficult to define, let alone measure,” but finding the Court of Appeals of North Carolina to be above average in both “productivity” and “efficiency”).]

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