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NC Supreme Court Holds that Media Entities May Seek Access to Law Enforcement Recordings by Filing a Petition

In March 2021, several news organizations filed a petition in Alamance County Superior Court seeking the release of law enforcement recordings of an “I Am Change” march that took place in Graham, North Carolina in October 2020. Marchers and law enforcement had clashed, and several people were arrested. The superior court held a hearing and ultimately ordered all of the requested recordings released without redaction.

After assessing the eight statutory considerations, the superior court explained that even though the release of the recordings would reveal highly sensitive and personal information that could harm a person’s reputation or safety, it did “not have the authority to [c]ensor this information absent a legitimate or compelling [] state interest to do so.”  In re The McClatchy Co., No. 29A23, ___ N.C. ___ (May 23, 2024). The court noted that it gave “great weight to transparency and public accountability with regard to police action” and that failure to release the information could “undermine the public interest and confidence in the administration of justice.” Id. The Graham Police Department (GPD) appealed.

The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, vacated the release order and remanded for additional findings of fact. The petitioners appealed. On appeal, the GPD argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because the media companies were required to file a civil action rather than a petition. See In re Custodial L. Enf’t Agency Recording, 288 N.C. App. 306, 311 (2023) (so holding).

The North Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Allen, rejected GPD’s contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioners filed a petition instead of a complaint. The Court then proceeded to hold that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its authority in ordering release, explaining that a trial court granting such release may place any conditions or restrictions on the release that it deems appropriate.

This post will review G.S. 132-1.4A, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion in In re The McClatchy Co., ___ N.C. ___ (May 2024) [hereinafter McClatchy], and will consider McClatchy’s import for those seeking and considering release.

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News Roundup

Three years ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Corbett, 2021-NCSC-18, ___ N.C. ___, 855 S.E.2d 228, 252 (2021), affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of the defendants’ convictions for second degree murder. The case garnered national and international attention. The victim, Jason Corbett, was a citizen of Ireland, who had relocated to Davidson County, North Carolina, in 2011 following the 2006 death of his first wife, who was the mother of his two children. Jason moved to North Carolina with his two children and his then-romantic partner, Molly Martens, who had been his children’s au pair in Ireland. Jason and Molly married later that year.

Molly’s parents, Thomas and Sharon Martens, who lived in Tennessee, visited the Corbett home on August 1, 2015. Thomas, a retired FBI agent and former attorney, testified that he awoke to the sounds of a struggle in the middle of the night and discovered Jason choking Molly. Thomas said he attempted to stop Jason by hitting him with an aluminum baseball bat. Molly also hit Jason with a brick paver. Jason’s skull was fractured from multiple blows, and he died at the scene. Both Thomas and Molly were charged with murder. The North Carolina Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred by (1) excluding hearsay statements from the children that their father was abusive toward Molly and that their father had become angry that evening upon his daughter awakening him, and (2) by excluding testimony from Thomas that he heard Molly yell “don’t hurt my dad” during the altercation.

Molly and Thomas were released from prison on Thursday: Molly from the the North Carolina Correctional Institution for Women in Raleigh and Thomas from the Caldwell Correctional Center in Lenoir. Following the state supreme court’s decision, each entered pleas to voluntary manslaughter and served about seven more months behind bars.

Keep reading for more criminal law news.

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When May the State Use Evidence of a Defendant’s Silence Before Trial?

A couple of weeks ago, I wrote about the prohibition against the State commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify, or, in other words, a defendant’s silence at trial. Such comments are disallowed as they abridge a defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence. This post addresses a related issue:  When and how may the State in a criminal trial use evidence of a defendant’s silence before trial to establish a defendant’s guilt or impeach a defendant’s credibility? (This is not the first time we have written about this topic on the blog. Jessie Smith did so here in 2012; nevertheless, a few relevant cases have been decided since then, and I thought it would be helpful to revisit the issue.)

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News Roundup

The week began with tragedy. Four law enforcement officers were killed Monday afternoon in Charlotte when they attempted to serve arrest warrants on 39-year-old Terry Clark Hughes, Jr., who shot at the officers when they arrived at his East Charlotte home. Officers returned fire, and Hughes was eventually shot and killed.

The slain officers are Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas Weeks, CMPD Officer Joshua Eyer, and Sam Poloche and Alden Elliott of the Department of Adult Correction. Four other CMPD Officers were injured, but are expected to make a full recovery.

Two women, one of whom is 17, were in the home during the shooting. They were taken into custody, but neither has been charged with a crime, and it is unclear whether more than one person fired shots. An AR-15 rifle and a .40 caliber handgun were recovered from the scene. The Charlotte Observer has the story here.

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Just Say No to Commenting on the Defendant’s Failure to Testify

While a prosecutor in a criminal trial may comment on a defendant’s failure to produce witnesses or evidence to contradict or refute the State’s case, a prosecutor may not make any reference to or comment on a defendant’s failure to testify. Such remarks violate both a defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence (see U.S. Const. Amend. V, N.C. Const. art. I, § 23) and G.S. 8-54, which provides that no person charged with a crime may be compelled to testify or “answer any question tending to criminate himself.” This rule rests on the notion that allowing extended reference by the court or counsel concerning the defendant’s failure to testify would “nullify the policy that failure to testify should not create a presumption against the defendant.” State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 206 (1984).

The prohibition against such remarks encompasses even those that parrot the pattern jury instructions by acknowledging that a defendant may elect not to testify and that such an election may not be used against him. See State v. Reid, 334 N.C. 551, 554 (1993). Thus, when a prosecutor makes such remarks and the defendant objects, the trial court must undertake curative measures to inform the jury both that the remarks were improper and that the defendant’s failure to testify may not be used against him. Id. at 556. If the trial court fails to take such remedial measures and an appellate court deems the error prejudicial, a new trial will be ordered. Id. at 557. The Court of Appeals applied these principles recently in State v. Grant, No. COA23-656, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2024).

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Does Waiver by Conduct Remain a Third Way to Lose the Right to Representation?

The North Carolina Court of Appeals first recognized the concept of waiver by conduct in State v. Blakeney, 245 N.C. App. 452 (2016). There, the Court set forth three ways in which a criminal defendant might lose his right to representation by counsel: (1) the defendant may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel; (2) the defendant may engage in such serious misconduct that he forfeits the right to counsel; and (3) following a warning that the defendant may lose his right to representation if he continues to engage in dilatory tactics, the defendant continues to engage in behavior designed to delay or disrupt court proceedings. This third way, which was acknowledged but not applied in Blakeney, has been called “waiver by conduct.”

While a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of counsel has long been recognized by both the North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals as authorizing a defendant to proceed unrepresented, only recently has the state’s highest court expressly held that a defendant may forfeit his right to counsel. In State v. Simpkins, 373 N.C. 530 (2020), the North Carolina Supreme Court — citing consistent precedent from the court of appeals — held for the first time that a defendant may forfeit the right to counsel by engaging in egregious misconduct that frustrates the purpose of the right to counsel itself and prevents the trial court from moving the case forward. Simpkins recognized two types of conduct that may be sufficiently egregious to warrant forfeiture: (1) serious obstruction of the proceedings (for example, refusing to obtain counsel after multiple opportunities to do so, refusing to say whether he wishes to proceed with counsel, refusing to participate in the proceedings, or continually hiring and firing counsel and thereby significantly delaying the proceedings); and (2) assaulting one’s attorney. Id. at 538. The Simpkins Court expressly declined, however, to consider whether “waiver by conduct” is a method by which a defendant may be required to proceed without counsel. Id. at 535 n. 4.

Ensuing opinions from the state supreme court have reinforced the high bar for the misconduct required to constitute forfeiture and have extended the second category of misconduct recognized in Simpkins to include other types of aggressive, profane or threatening behavior. See State v. Harvin, 382 N.C. 566, 587 (2022); State v. Atwell, 383 N.C. 437, 449 (2022); see also Brittany Bromell, N.C. Supreme Court Weighs in, Again, on Forfeiture of Counsel, N.C. Criminal Law Blog (Feb. 7, 2023). They have not, however, mentioned waiver by conduct as an alternative way of dispensing with the right to counsel. Indeed, in Atwell, the Court wrote that there can be “no ‘effective’ waiver” of the right to counsel, emphasizing that “waiver of counsel is a voluntary decision by a defendant and that where a defendant seeks but is denied appointed counsel, a waiver analysis upon appeal is both unnecessary and inappropriate.” Id. at 448.

Thus, following Atwell, there was some question as to whether waiver by conduct remained even a potentially viable theory under North Carolina law. Two recent opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals reflect that court’s view that it does. This post will review the concept of waiver by conduct and its recent application in State v. Moore, 290 N.C. App. 610 (2023) and State v. Jones, No. COA23-647, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2024).

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News Roundup

Raleigh is ending its red-light camera program after two decades of operation. The News and Observer has the story here. Red-light camera programs across North Carolina have steadily folded following court rulings that their funding model (in which the camera vendor is paid more than 10 percent of the net proceeds of fines) runs afoul of the fines and forfeiture clause of the state constitution.

Of course, the city still wants people to stop at red lights. Last year, it installed reflective backplates, a border on traffic signals to make them stand out, at red-light-camera-intersection signals.

Keep reading for more local, national, and international criminal and court-related news.

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Court of Appeals Holds that State Constitution Prohibits Substitution of Alternate Jurors After Deliberations Begin

When a deliberating juror in Eric Chambers’ April 2022 murder trial told the presiding judge that he could not be available in court the next day because of a medical appointment, the trial judge discharged the juror, substituted an alternate juror, and instructed the jury to restart its deliberations. In doing so, the trial judge followed the procedures set forth in G.S. 15A-1215(a) for substituting an alternate juror after deliberations have begun. Chambers, who represented himself at trial, did not object. The reconstituted jury subsequently found Chambers guilty of first-degree murder and a related felony assault, and the judge sentenced Chambers to life in prison.

Chambers failed to properly enter a notice of appeal and subsequently sought certiorari review by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court granted review and reversed Chambers’ conviction based on the substitution of the alternate juror. State v. Chambers, No. COA22-1063, ___ N.C. App. ___ , ___ S.E.2d ___ (2024). The Court held that notwithstanding statutory amendments to G.S. 15A-1215(a) enacted in 2021 to authorize the substitution of alternate jurors after deliberations begin, it was bound by the North Carolina Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253 (1997), that substitution of an alternate juror in a capital sentencing proceeding after deliberations began was structural error. This post will review the holding in Chambers, the precedent upon which it relied, and the provisions of G.S. 15A-1215(a) that Chambers, if it remains undisturbed, effectively eviscerates.

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State v. C.K.D.: Knoll What?

I have written before about the cache associated with a handful of unpublished opinions from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Sure, they aren’t binding, but they can be persuasive. My guess is that the Court’s December 2023 opinion in State v. C.K.D.. No. COA23-204, 2023 WL 8748032, ___ N.C. App. ___, 895 S.E.2d 923 (2023) (unpublished), has been used as a persuasive tool in more than a few impaired driving cases since it was decided.

The C.K.D. Court upheld the dismissal of impaired driving charges based on the detention of the defendant for 11 hours following his initial appearance pursuant to an impaired driving hold. The Court determined that (1) there was no clear and convincing evidence that the defendant who had registered a 0.17 alcohol concentration posed a danger, and (2) holding the defendant for 11 hours irreparably prejudiced the defendant’s case by depriving him of the opportunity to have others observe his condition, even though the defendant indicated he did not wish to call anyone to witness his condition in the jail or to assume responsibility for him as a sober, responsible adult. I was a bit surprised by the outcome. I would have thought that the alcohol concentration standing alone would have been sufficient to support the hold. I also would have thought that the defendant’s failure to attempt to contact anyone from jail would have defeated his claim of irreparable prejudice. As noted, I would have been wrong on both counts.

This post will discuss C.K.D., explore how it differs from other court of appeals decisions following Knoll, and consider what the takeaways may be for magistrates imposing such holds.

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Book Review: The Other Dr. Gilmer

It may have something to do with my day-job, but in my free time I generally prefer to read fiction. I made an exception recently for Dr. Benjamin Gilmer’s 2022 nonfiction work, The Other Dr. Gilmer: Two Men, A Murder, and an Unlikely Fight for Justice. I’m glad I did.

The book is a page-turning memoir and legal thriller chock full of North Carolina people and places (Governor Cooper even has a cameo). It also is an indictment of how American society treats (or leaves untreated) the mentally ill, particularly those who are imprisoned.

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