Under G.S. 14-34.10, it is a felony for any person to discharge a firearm within any occupied enclosure, such as a motor vehicle, with the intent to incite fear in another. G.S. 14-34.10. In State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025), the Court of Appeals held that the plain language of this statute was satisfied by a defendant who fired a gun from inside his car, injuring a victim in another car. More recently, in State v. Hardaway, No. COA24-538 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025), the Court of Appeals, over a doubtful concurrence, found itself bound by Jenkins. This post considers the statutory construction of G.S. 14-34.10 in Jenkins and Hardaway.
Statutory Construction
A brief review of the general rules is in order. The overriding objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent. The intent of the legislature may be found first from the statute’s plain language. State v. Langley, 371 N.C. 389, 395 (2018). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to the plain meaning of the words without resort to judicial construction. State v. Fields, 374 N.C. 629, 633 (2020). The court may consult a dictionary to determine the plain meaning of statutory terms. State v. Fletcher, 370 N.C. 313, 326 (2017).
The door to judicial construction is opened by absurdity or ambiguity. When a literal interpretation of the statute will lead to absurd results, the reason and purpose of the law will control. State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185, 195 (2022). The absurdity canon applies, however, only when the ordinary interpretation of a statute leads to consequences so dangerous and absurd that they could never have been intended. Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 919 S.E.2d 199, 205 (N.C. 2025).
Similarly, when the language of a statute is ambiguous, the court must determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature by other means. State v. Fritsche, 385 N.C. 446, 449 (2023). A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to multiple interpretations. State v. King, 386 N.C. 601, 605 (2024). Ambiguity in criminal statutes will be construed in favor of lenity to the accused. State v. Ellison, 366 N.C. 439, 443 (2013); State v. Hinton, 361 N.C. 207, 211 (2007).
To determine legislative intent beyond the plain language, courts may consider statutes dealing with the same subject matter, so as to construe them in pari materia (in like manner). State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 157, 160 (2010). Other sources of legislative intent include the legislative history of the act, earlier statutes on the same subject, and the common law as it was understood at the time of the enactment. State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 596 (1998). The court may also consider the broader statutory context, the structure of the statute, and certain canons of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent. Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 919 S.E.2d 199, 204 (N.C. 2025).
State v. Jenkins
In State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025), the defendant was driving his gray Honda on a local road in June 2020 when he pulled up beside the victim’s Dodge Caravan and fired a gun into the car, shattering the window and seriously injuring the victim. The defendant was tried and convicted of, among other things, discharging a firearm within an occupied enclosure to incite fear under G.S. 14-34.10. On appeal, he argued the evidence was insufficient because, he said, the statute requires both the defendant and the victim to be within the same enclosure. (The State conceded the issue, but the Court of Appeals disregarded the concession.) Slip Op. p. 2-5.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with the plain words of a statute, albeit not G.S. 14-34.10. Rather, it started with G.S. 14-34.1, discharge of a firearm into occupied property (enacted 1969), which it called the “foundational statute.” Only later (2013) did the legislature enact G.S. 14-34.10, criminalizing the discharge of a firearm within an enclosure to incite fear. Material terms, the Court of Appeal said, will be construed by applying ordinary rules of grammar and according to general canons of statutory interpretation. As a last resort “before finding a statute ambiguous,” it said, clarifying amendments would be examined for evidence of legislative intent. Slip Op. pp. 10-12.
Turning to G.S. 14-34.10, the Court of Appeals tasked itself with deciding what noun is modified by the phrase “within any occupied . . . motor vehicle.” The phrase, it said, most reasonably modifies the word person. The Court of Appeals recognized that the word within could also modify the word firearm, but “certainly not” the subsequent words in another. Slip Op. pp. 12-15.
As for the word “occupied,” the dictionary defines the term as when a person takes possession or control of a place. It was undisputed that the defendant here was inside a motor vehicle. The plain meaning of discharging a firearm within any motor vehicle, the Court of Appeals said, “clearly encompasses these facts.” According to the plain meaning of G.S. 14-34.10, it said, the only person who must be within a motor vehicle was the person who discharged a firearm. Slip Op. pp. 16-17.
This interpretation of G.S. 14-34.10, the Court of Appeals said, was supported by an analysis of G.S. 14-34.9 (discharging a firearm from within an enclosure). Slip Op. pp. 17-21. Here, the evidence showed that the defendant, from the interior part of his own Honda, fired a gun into the victim’s occupied Dodge Caravan. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to show the defendant discharged a firearm within an occupied motor vehicle in violation of G.S. 14-34.10. Slip Op. p. 21.
State v. Hardaway
In State v. Hardaway, No. COA24-538 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025), the defendant wielded the firearm in a drive-by shooting on September 9, 2019, that killed Myson Russell. The defendant was tried and convicted of felony murder based on, among other things, the underlying felony of discharging a firearm within an occupied enclosure to incite fear under G.S. 14-34.10. On appeal, the defendant argued the evidence of the underlying felonies was insufficient. Slip Op. pp. 3‑6.
As in Jenkins, the defendant in Hardaway argued that the word within in G.S. 14-34.10 requires a showing that the requisite conduct occurred inside a single enclosure. He claimed that the language of G.S. 14-34.10 is clear and unambiguous. The defendant argued that discharging a firearm from a car into another enclosure is covered by other statutes, and the existence of these other statutes indicates the legislature did not intend G.S. 14-34.10 to apply to this scenario. Slip Op. pp. 14-15.
The Court of Appeals majority found itself bound by Jenkins to reject the argument. Jenkins held that, “because the defendant was within an enclosure when he discharged the firearm[,] his conduct was contemplated by the statute, regardless of whether the victim was within that same enclosure.” Hence, the defendant’s argument in Hardaway was “foreclosed by our precedent.” Slip Op. p. 15.
Curiously, the per curiam (i.e., unsigned) opinion in Hardaway yielded two concurring opinions. Chief Judge Dillon, with a nod to the holding in Jenkins “that G.S. 14-34.10 is not ambiguous,” wrote separately to express his doubt (not raised by the defendant) that G.S. 14-34.10 was intended to serve as an underlying felony for felony murder. Slip Op. p. 1-3 (Dillion, C.J., concurring).
Judge Hampson, concurring dubitante, acknowledged that the panel was bound by Jenkins, but he believed that Jenkins “incorrectly interpreted” G.S. 14-34.10 and was wrongly decided. Slip. Op. p. 1 (Hamson, J., concurring). Giving the term within its plain meaning, he said, the statute refers to an incident occurring inside an enclosure, not one emanating from it. This interpretation, he said, is supported by legislative history and comparison with other statutes, G.S. 14-34.1 (discharging a firearm into occupied property) and 14-34.9 (discharging a firearm from within an enclosure). Id. at 2. Section 14-34.10’s “only reference to potential victims,” he said, is its reference to occupied enclosures; thus, “the only victims contemplated are other persons within the same enclosure as the shooter.” Id. at 4. It is clear, he said, that the legislature did not intend for G.S. 14-34.10 to describe firing from one enclosure into another “because other, related statutes govern firing from within or into an enclosure.” Id. at 6. Noting that the evidence here showed that the firearm was at least partially outside the car, Judge Hampson concluded the trial court should not have submitted G.S. 14-34.10 as a basis for felony murder. Id. at 6-7.
Conclusion
In terms of methodology, the conflicting opinions in Jenkins and Hardaway are remarkably similar. Both are concerned with the plain language of the statute under examination. Neither finds any ambiguity in the statutory text. Yet both look to additional indicia of legislative intent to ascertain meaning. Treating the statutory terminology as ambiguous in fact, if not in law, both opinions scour legislative history and examine adjoining statutes to contextualize the relevant language. Both insist their conclusions reflect legislative intent. Needless to say, they reach different conclusions.
Scholars recognize that the canons of statutory construction may not all point the same way. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 800 (1983). Those who would retain them insist that the canons are not thereby rendered useless. See Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges, 45 (2008). Perhaps, as Judge Easterbrook has said, words don’t have intrinsic meanings but acquire significance only through the understanding of an interpretive community. Frank H. Easterbrook, Forward to Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, xxvi (2012). If that is so, then practitioners may reasonably wonder, as Alice does: The question is whether you can make words mean so many different things.
At the end of his doubtful concurrence in Hardaway, Judge Hampson encourages the North Carolina Supreme Court “to review Section 14-34.10” and provide a definitive interpretation. Hardaway, Slip Op. p. 11 (Hampson, J., concurring). Until then, Jenkins controls, binding future panels of the Court of Appeals to its prior judicial interpretation of legislative intent. Maybe, as some scholars have posited, legislative intent is merely a legal fiction. Maybe in the last analysis, as Humpty Dumpty replies to Alice: the question is, which is to be master – that’s all.