Under G.S. 14-34.10, it is a felony for any person to discharge a firearm within any occupied enclosure, such as a motor vehicle, with the intent to incite fear in another. G.S. 14-34.10. In State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025), the Court of Appeals held that the plain language of this statute was satisfied by a defendant who fired a gun from inside his car, injuring a victim in another car. More recently, in State v. Hardaway, No. COA24-538 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025), the Court of Appeals, over a doubtful concurrence, found itself bound by Jenkins. This post considers the statutory construction of G.S. 14-34.10 in Jenkins and Hardaway.
State v. Jenkins
Some Other Provision of Law
Several criminal statutes include the provision that a person who commits the offense prescribed is guilty of a designated class of offense “unless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment.” E.g., G.S. 14-33(c). Two recent cases illustrate the application of such provisions. In State v. French, No. COA24-704 (N.C. Ct. App. July 2, 2025), the Court of Appeals upheld three consecutive sentences for greater and lesser assaults, despite the inclusion in the relevant statutes of a some-other-provision-of-law clause. By contrast, in State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug 6, 2025), the Court of Appeals reversed an additional sentence for discharging a firearm within an enclosure because G.S. 14-34.10 contains a some-other-provision-of-law clause. This post examines the intent and scope of the SOPL clause.