A Nice Knock-Down Argument: Statutory Construction in Jenkins and Hardaway.

Under G.S. 14-34.10, it is a felony for any person to discharge a firearm within any occupied enclosure, such as a motor vehicle, with the intent to incite fear in another. G.S. 14-34.10. In State v. Jenkins, No. COA24-889 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025), the Court of Appeals held that the plain language of this statute was satisfied by a defendant who fired a gun from inside his car, injuring a victim in another car. More recently, in State v. Hardaway, No. COA24-538 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025), the Court of Appeals, over a doubtful concurrence, found itself bound by Jenkins. This post considers the statutory construction of G.S. 14-34.10 in Jenkins and Hardaway.

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Summer 2025 Motor Vehicle Law Changes

The legislature enacted a raft of changes this summer to motor vehicle and criminal law. This post examines three session laws that enhanced criminal penalties and revised regulations for motor vehicle offenses and operation. The changes cover broad ground, including changing vehicle inspection requirements, authorizing speed-measuring cameras, and heightening penalties for certain motor vehicle offenses that result in injury. Read on to learn more.

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Filling in the Gaps: Changes on the Horizon for Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence

Several times a year, I teach different groups about criminal domestic violence laws in North Carolina. Last year, I highlighted the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV) under G.S. 14-32.5 in many of the sessions, but there were many unresolved questions. Earlier this month, the General Assembly passed Session Law 2025-70 (Senate Bill 429) which, among other things, answers many of those questions. This post reviews the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and the pending changes to the law.

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Did the General Assembly Just Remove the “Nighttime” Element of Burglary?

A few weeks ago, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed into law, S.L. 2025-71. The bill makes quite a few changes to the criminal law. It creates new crimes, like a larceny offense specific to gift cards; enhances the penalties for existing crimes, including certain racing and reckless driving offenses; and creates sentencing enhancements when a gun is used in connection with specified drug crimes and offenses involving breaking or entering. Today’s post focuses on the bill’s amendment to G.S. 14-51, which addresses “first and second degree burglary.” Does the amendment quietly remove the  element of burglary that requires the offense to be committed in the nighttime?

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COA Shuts Down Second Amendment Challenges to Firearm by Felon

Back in February, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Nanes, COA24-487, ___ N.C. App. ___; 912 S.E.2d 202 (Feb. 19, 2025) (summarized here). The case considered and ultimately rejected facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to G.S. 14-415.1, our state prohibition on possession of firearms by a felon. Nanes squarely rejected the idea that G.S. 14-415.1 was facially unconstitutional but left open the possibility that the statute may be unconstitutional as applied to a different defendant. In State v. Ducker, COA24-373, ___ N.C. App. ___ ; ___ S.E.2d ___(May 7, 2025) (summarized here), the Court of Appeals closed the door on that possibility, ruling that Second Amendment rights do not apply to convicted felons and rejecting the need for a felony-by-felony analysis for as-applied Second Amendment challenges. Both Nanes and Ducker also considered and rejected related claims under Article I, Sec. 30 of the North Carolina Constitution. Today’s post examines these decisions.

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Variations on State v. Singleton: Surplus Theory in State v. Tate.

After State v. Singleton, 386 N.C. 183 (2024), an indictment is not rendered facially invalid by failure to allege all the elements of a crime. One issue that remains unresolved is the consequence of failure to allege the State’s theory. Two post-Singleton cases decided last year found reversible error when the trial court instructed the jury on a theory not alleged in the indictment. See State v. Wilson, 910 S.E.2d 407 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2024); State v. Little, 296 N.C. App. 424 (2024). More recently, in State v. Tate, No. COA24-450 (N.C. Ct. App. June 18, 2025), the Court of Appeals cited Singleton in support of its conclusion that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on a theory that was not alleged in the indictment. This post examines the opinion in Tate.

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Accomplices in Error: Improper Argument in State v. Meadows

The defendant in State v. Meadows, No. COA24-149 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2025), was convicted of murder based on evidence that he and two other men broke into the victim’s home and shot the victim to death. Despite evidence that the defendant was not alone, the trial court refused to instruct on acting in concert. During closing argument, however, the prosecutor told the jury that the State need not prove the defendant “actually fired the shot that actually killed the victim. If he committed one act that contributed to the victim’s death, he is just as guilty as everybody else.” This argument, the Court of Appeals said, was improper. This post examines the opinion in Meadows.

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More on Units of Prosecution

Author’s Note: The Court of Appeals withdrew the State v. Watlington decision—on which this post is partially based—on April 7, 2025 and reissued the decision on April 16, 2025. The relevant section of this post has been modified from its original.

It has long been held that the allowable unit of prosecution for an offense is within the discretion of the legislature. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).  When the legislature does not clearly express legislative intent, the court must determine the allowable unit of prosecution. State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439 (1988).

North Carolina courts have resolved issues related to units of prosecution in some contexts—including kidnapping, possession of firearms, and theft crimes—while there are questions that remain unanswered in other contexts. Some answers are clearer and more direct than others. I previously wrote a bulletin reviewing case law on permissible units of prosecution for certain offenses against the person, possession offenses, and theft offenses. Since then, the courts have specified units of prosecution for a few more offenses. This post provides more insight into those offenses and reviews the rule of lenity in navigating the unresolved.

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State v. Watlington: Court Clarifies Unit of Prosecution for Hit and Run

Author’s Note: This post has been modified from its original based on the reissuance of the opinion on April 16, 2025. 

Earlier last month, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Watlington, COA23-1106, ___ N.C. App. ___ (2025). Among other issues, in its decision the Court addressed an open question: what is the unit of prosecution for a hit and run? May the defendant be charged once for leaving the scene of a crash that causes injury, or instead may a separate charge be issued for each person injured? (Shea Denning wrote about that issue and the framework for analysis in 2014, noting then that the question had not been directly addressed by our appellate courts). We now have an answer: the unit of prosecution is the number of crashes from which the defendant fled, not the number of people injured. Read on for further details.

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Spring 2025 Cannabis Update

I have been covering developments around the legalization of hemp in North Carolina since 2018. Never did I suspect then that I would still be working on the topic all this time later, but here we are. My last post on In Re: J.B.P. covered the then most recent developments around probable cause and the odor of cannabis. That opinion was withdrawn and has yet to reissue, but subsequent cases have basically affirmed the logic on which the case was decided. This month, the Court of Appeals released State v. Ruffin, COA24-276,  ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 5, 2025), weighing in on evidentiary challenges to opinion evidence identifying a substance as marijuana, as well as on jury instructions for marijuana cases. This post examines these and other recent legal developments impacting the state’s criminal cannabis law. Read on for the details.

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