Fourth Amendment rights are enforced primarily through the exclusionary rule, which provides that evidence derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure is generally inadmissible at trial. Under the good faith exception, however, evidence will not be suppressed when the investigating officer reasonably relied upon prior judicial authorization for the search, such as a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Until recently, under State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709 (1988), the general warrants clause of the state constitution (Art. 1, § 20) also yielded an exclusionary rule but without any good faith exception. In State v. Rogers, No. 377PS22 (N.C. Oct. 17, 2025), the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly overruled Carter, concluding that there is a good faith exception to any exclusionary rule arising from the state constitution. This post considers the opinion in Rogers.
The Exclusionary Rule and The Good Faith Exception
Bob Farb discussed the good faith exception in his first post about fifteen years ago, and Jonathan Holbrook revisited the topic in 2020. A brief refresher is provided below.
Like many provisions of the Bill of Rights, the protections against searches and seizures were inspired by actual events: in the 1760s, general warrants had been used to harass John Wilkes and his associates in England, and writs of assistance (which functioned much like general warrants) issued to customs officers had famously and unsuccessfully been challenged in colonial Boston. Accordingly, the drafters of North Carolina’s first constitution (adopted 1776) included a provision specifically prohibiting the issuance of general warrants, whereby any officer “may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence.” N.C. Const. Art. 1, § 20. Similarly, the Framers of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (adopted 1791) provided that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
Like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment applied originally only to the federal government. Hence, the first iteration of the exclusionary rule, adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), also applied only in federal court. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment to the states, and the exclusionary rule followed with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a good faith exception to this exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). Though it arose from cases involving subsequently invalidated warrants, the good faith exception has expanded to include other cases when exclusion of evidence would not advance the purpose of deterring police misconduct. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (reliance on appellate precedent); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (reliance on statute).
Statutory Exclusion and State v. Carter
Before Mapp, state courts in North Carolina applied the common law rule that evidence was not rendered inadmissible by any illegality in its discovery. See State v. McGee, 214 N.C. 184 (1938). The General Assembly first enacted an exclusionary rule by statute in 1937, rendering inadmissible facts discovered by virtue of an illegal warrant. G.S. 15-27 (1937). Still, state courts continued to apply the common law rule to cases beyond the express terms of the statute, as when a search was conducted without any warrant whatsoever. See State v. Vanhoy, 230 N.C. 162, 165 (1949).
The General Assembly later amended the statutory exclusionary rule to apply also to facts discovered without a legal search warrant when a search warrant was required. G.S. 15-27 (1951). This required the State, upon objection, to produce evidence of a valid warrant. State v. McMilliam, 243 N.C. 771, 773 (1956). It did not, however, render inadmissible evidence discovered absent a search warrant when a warrant was not necessary to conduct a legal search. See State v. Moore, 240 N.C. 749, 751 (1954) (consent); State v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. 656, 658 (1953) (plain view).
In Carter, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared that the state constitution, “like the Federal Constitution, requires the exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 712 (1988). It recognized that the United States Supreme Court had limited the scope of the federal exclusionary rule. Id. at 714-15. But, “[s]ince 1937 the expressed public policy of North Carolina has been to exclude evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 719. Ultimately, the Court held that no good faith exception exists to the exclusionary rule under the state constitution. “If a good faith exception is to be applied to this public policy,” it said, “let it be done by the legislature, the body politic responsible for the formation and expression of matters of public policy.” Id. at 724.
By this time, the statutory exclusionary rule had been reformulated and recodified. Under G.S. 15A-974, evidence must be suppressed if (1) its exclusion is required by the state or federal constitution, or (2) it is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provisions of Chapter 15A (criminal procedure). G.S. 15A-974. In 2011, the legislature amended the statute to provide a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for a substantial violation of Chapter 15A. (To the extent the statute codified a constitutional exclusionary rule, the legislature could not evade it by statute.) The legislature also asked the Supreme Court to reconsider Carter and overrule its holding that the good faith exception that exists under federal law does not apply under state law.
State v. Rogers and a Good Faith Exception
The defendant in State v. Rogers, No. 377PA22 (N.C. Oct. 17, 2025), charged with drug crimes, challenged the legality of an order that allowed law enforcement to track his cell phone. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, and the defendant pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal. Upon review, the Court of Appeals ruled that the order was not supported by probable cause and awarded a new trial. Citing Carter, it rejected the State’s argument that the evidence should be admitted under a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court granted review.
The North Carolina Supreme Court started with a comprehensive history of the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception. As for the good faith exception created by G.S. 15A-974, the Court recognized that, by its terms, the exception applies only to evidence obtained in violation of Chapter 15A. The General Assembly, it said, “did not—and indeed, could not—prescribe a good faith exception to evidence that would be excluded pursuant to any exclusionary rule arising out of our state constitution.” Rogers, Slip Op. pp. 18-19.
Turning to whether suppression of the evidence was required by the state or federal constitution, the Supreme Court first concluded that the federal constitution did not require its exclusion. Applying the federal good faith exception, the Court noted that it was not the investigating officer’s role to “second-guess the trial court’s probable cause determination.” Rogers, Slip Op. p. 25. Rather, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to rely on the trial court’s determination of probable cause, and excluding the evidence would not deter police misconduct “because there was no such misconduct.” Rogers, Slip Op. p. 28.
As for the state constitution, the Court noted that Article I, Section 20 does not provide what is to be done with evidence that has been obtained in violation. Hence, “Article I, Section 20 does not require exclusion of such evidence at trial.” Rogers, Slip Op. p. 30. This textual conclusion, it said, was confirmed by history and precedent prior to Mapp, under which illegally obtained evidence was routinely admitted unless rendered inadmissible by statute. As for Carter, a “confused opinion,” its finding of an exclusionary rule in the state constitution was “dubious.” Rogers, Slip Op. p. 34. Noting that Carter had said it was the legislature’s prerogative to adopt a good faith exception to the constitutional rule that Carter pronounced, the Supreme Court now said that this legal impossibility “underscores Carter’s lack of persuasiveness.” Rogers, Slip Op. p. 36. Given that later opinions declined to provide greater protection under the state constitution than required by the Fourth Amendment, the Court found Carter isolated and expressly overruled it. Rogers, Slip Op. p. 37. Further, the North Carolina Supreme Court now adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Leon and held that “there is a good faith exception to any exclusionary rule arising from Article I, Section 20 of our state constitution.” Rogers, Slip Op. p. 38.
Conclusion
The outcome in Rogers will be of most benefit to prosecutors, as it provides another avenue for the admission of challenged evidence. By statute, evidence still must be suppressed if its exclusion is required by the state or federal constitution. G.S. 15A-974. After Rogers, the state constitution, like the Fourth Amendment, recognizes a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, meaning that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights will not be suppressed upon a showing that the officer reasonably relied on prior judicial authorization for the search.
The place for this showing is the suppression hearing. Upon a proper motion to suppress evidence, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether exclusion is constitutionally required. G.S. 15A-977(d). At the hearing, the burden is on the State to establish the admissibility of the challenged evidence. As a recent Court of Appeals opinion indicates, however, the State’s failure to raise the good faith exception as a basis for admissibility at the suppression hearing may result in a waiver of the argument. See State v. Hickman, No. COA24-893 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2025).
In the end, Rogers is less about rights than it is about remedies. Indeed, Rogers declines (much to the chagrin of the dissent) to address whether the state constitution demands an exclusionary rule at all. It holds only that any such rule yields to a good faith exception. Hence, prosecutors seeking to make the most of Rogers will approach suppression issues with three principal legal arguments (given appropriate facts): (1) that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search, (2) that the search did not violate the defendant’s rights, and (3) that the evidence should not be suppressed in any event when the investigating officer reasonably relied on prior judicial authorization.