Did the General Assembly Just Remove the “Nighttime” Element of Burglary?

A few weeks ago, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed into law, S.L. 2025-71. The bill makes quite a few changes to the criminal law. It creates new crimes, like a larceny offense specific to gift cards; enhances the penalties for existing crimes, including certain racing and reckless driving offenses; and creates sentencing enhancements when a gun is used in connection with specified drug crimes and offenses involving breaking or entering. Today’s post focuses on the bill’s amendment to G.S. 14-51, which addresses “first and second degree burglary.” Does the amendment quietly remove the  element of burglary that requires the offense to be committed in the nighttime?

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Not-Quite-Defective Indictments

Ordinarily, a pleading that fails to accurately allege every element of the offense is defective and is treated as a jurisdictional nullity. See, e.g., G.S. 15A-924(a)(5) (“as a prerequisite to its validity, an indictment must allege every essential element of the criminal offense it purports to charge”); State v. Harris, 219 N.C. App. 590 (2012) (indictment is invalid and confers no jurisdiction on the trial court if it “fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense”).

The limited exception to this rule is the somewhat relaxed pleading standard for a citation, which may still be sufficient even if it fails to state every element, as long as it reasonably identifies the crime charged. Shea Denning and Jeff Welty covered that issue in a series of posts available here, here, and here.

Several recent cases from the Court of Appeals have offered a good reminder about another important corollary to the general rule for pleadings:  although an indictment must “allege every element” in order to be valid, the state has quite a bit of flexibility in how that standard can be met.

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Counsel’s Unconsented-to Admission to Elements Isn’t a Harbison Error

In State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that when defense counsel admits the defendant’s guilt to the jury without the defendant’s consent per se ineffective assistance of counsel occurs. The Harbison Court reasoned that when counsel admits guilt without consent, it is essentially the same as entering a guilty plea on the defendant’s behalf without the defendant’s consent. It concluded: “ineffective assistance of counsel, per se in violation of the Sixth Amendment, has been established in every criminal case in which the defendant’s counsel admits the defendant’s guilt to the jury without the defendant’s consent.” Id. at 180.

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Aiding and Abetting

Under the common law doctrine of aiding and abetting, a person is considered to be a principal to a crime when: (1)  a crime is committed by another, (2)  the person knowingly advises, instigates, encourages, procures, or helps the other person commit the crime, and (3)  his or her actions or statements caused or contributed … Read more