Last year, I wrote this post asking whether the probation tolling law in former G.S. 15A-1344(d) survived a 2009 statutory change. In State v. Sitosky, decided on the last day of 2014, the court of appeals held that it does not.
Failing to advise a defendant of his implied consent rights requires suppression of the test results . . . except when it doesn’t
In opinions spanning four decades, North Carolina’s appellate courts have suppressed chemical analysis results in impaired driving cases based on statutory violations related to their administration. When the violation consists of the State’s failure to advise a defendant of her implied consent rights, the appellate courts’ jurisprudence has been straightforward and consistent: The results of an implied consent test carried out without the defendant having first been advised of her implied consent rights are inadmissible. Indeed, the court of appeals reaffirmed that principle last June in State v. Williams, __ N.C. App. ___, 759 S.E.2d 350 (2014), holding that the State’s failure to re-advise the defendant of his implied consent rights before conducting a blood test under the implied consent statutes required suppression of the test results. A court of appeals opinion issued in the waning hours of 2014 indicates, however, that the rule is subject to at least one exception.
Competency and the Residual Hearsay Exception
I previously wrote (here) about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent cert grant in Ohio v. Clark, a case in which the Court will decide whether a three-year-old child’s statements to his preschool teachers are testimonial. Hiding in plain sight in that case is an issue as interesting as the Crawford question that the Court will decide. In Clark, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the child’s statements to his teachers identifying the defendant as the perpetrator were testimonial. It further held that the trial court violated the defendant’s confrontation clause rights when it admitted the child’s out of court statements to his teachers at trial, after finding the child—L.P. —incompetent to testify. L.P. was found to be incompetent six months after uttering the statements at issue.
New Year’s Resolutions for Lawyers
Still looking to make a new year’s resolution or two, besides reading this blog daily? This post recaps several suggestions from the ABA and NC Lawyers Mutual.
News Roundup
This will be the last blog post of 2014. It is also a full and interesting post — if I do say so myself — as it has been quite a busy news week, from the Supreme Court on down.
Most Serious Offense for Consolidation Purposes
When a defendant is convicted of more than one offense at the same time, the court may consolidate the offenses for judgment. The sentence for that judgment is driven by the “most serious offense” among the consolidated convictions. G.S. 15A-1340.15(b). Today’s post considers some issues related to the determination of which offense in a consolidated judgment is the most serious.
DWLR + DWI Does Not (Automatically) Equal a Grossly Aggravating Factor
Author’s note: The law was amended in 2015 to alter this analysis. The amendments are discussed here.
Grossly aggravating factors matter in DWI sentencing. And there’s one factor that seems to be confusing folks, particularly when it comes to ignition interlock violations. Here’s hoping this post clears it up.
United States Supreme Court Rules that Reasonable Suspicion May Be Based on Reasonable Mistakes of Law
Shea blogged here about State v. Heien, the case in which the court of appeals ruled that having one burned-out brake light was not a violation of G.S. 20-129 and so did not support a vehicle stop. (The stop led to a consent search of the defendant’s vehicle, which led to the discovery of drugs and to drug trafficking charges.) The prosecution sought review in the state supreme court. That court assumed that the court of appeals was correct about the scope of the statute but determined (1) that an officer might reasonably think otherwise, given ambiguities in the statute, and (2) that reasonable suspicion may be based on a reasonable mistake of law. Conclusion (2) was the subject of a split of authority across the country, so the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the case. It issued its opinion yesterday.
US Supreme Court to Decide Whether Child’s Statements to Teacher Were Testimonial
In early October the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an Ohio case, State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio 2013), cert. granted __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014), that will require it to decide two questions. First, whether a person’s obligation to report suspected child abuse makes the person an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the confrontation clause. And second, whether a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher’s concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements. The case is important for a number of reasons. One is that like Ohio, North Carolina has a mandatory child abuse reporting statute. G.S. 7B-301. North Carolina’s statute is incredibly broad—it applies to everyone, not just teachers and doctors but also to family members, neighbors, and friends. Id. (“[a]ny person or institution”). Thus, an answer to the first question could have significant impact in North Carolina. The case also is important because Crawford has raised difficult questions in child abuse prosecutions about the testimonial nature of children’s statements to a host of people, including teachers, nurses, doctors, and social workers. Clark is the Court’s first Crawford case involving child abuse and many hope that its decision will provide answers to those questions.
News Roundup
The nation and the state continue to discuss events in Ferguson, Missouri and in Staten Island, New York. One direct impact of the controversy in North Carolina is that the Legislative Black Caucus plans to introduce legislation in the 2015 session that would require law enforcement officers to wear body cameras, according to this WRAL story. The details of the proposal are not yet clear.