The Supreme Court on Miranda: Shatzer and Powell

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The Supreme Court on Miranda: Shatzer and Powell

Posted on February 25, 2010 by Jeff Welty

The United States Supreme Court has decided two Miranda cases in the past two days. The prosecution won both cases.

Tuesday, the Court decided Florida v. Powell. In Powell, the defendant was arrested, apparently for robbery. Before questioning him, the police told him, inter alia, that “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and that “[y]ou have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.” The defendant agreed to talk, admitted to owning a gun the officers had found during the course of the arrest, and was ultimately charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The defendant moved to suppress his statement, citing the language in Miranda requiring that a suspect “be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” Specifically, he contended that the police only told him that he could talk to a lawyer before questioning, but failed to advise him that he could have a lawyer present during the interrogation. The trial court didn’t buy the defendant’s argument, and he was convicted at trial. On appeal, the state intermediate appellate court and the Florida Supreme Court concluded otherwise, finding that the warnings were inadequate.

The United States Supreme Court disagreed. (The vote was 7-2, with Justice Ginsburg writing for the Court and Justices Stevens and Breyer dissenting.) It stated that it has never “dictated words” or a “precise formulation” that must be used to administer the Miranda warnings, and it found that the warnings here “reasonably conveyed [the defendant’s] right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times.” The Court rejected the notion that law enforcement agencies would read its decision as an invitation to make their Miranda warnings ambiguous, doubting that officers would think the benefits of such a course worth the risk of suppression. I tend to agree with that, so I doubt that the effect of Powell will be very far-reaching.

Yesterday, the Court decided Maryland v. Shatzer, a case that is likely more significant. The defendant in Shatzer was in prison for crime X when an officer came to interview him about unrelated crime Y. The officer read him his Miranda rights, and he invoked his right to counsel. Two and a half years passed. A new officer decided to make another run at the interview. The defendant was still in prison. The new officer again read him his Miranda rights, but this time, the defendant waived his rights and made incriminating statements. He did the same at another interview a few days later. He was charged with crime Y, and moved to suppress the incriminating statements, arguing that under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), because he invoked his right to counsel when the first officer approached him, the second officer was not permitted to initiate contact, and his waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid.

The trial court disagreed, and the defendant was tried and convicted. The state appellate court reversed, holding that ““the passage of time alone is insufficient to [end] the protections afforded by Edwards,” and finding that, because the defendant remained in prison between the two interviews, there was no “break in custody” that might have attenuated the defendant’s rights under Edwards.

The Supreme Court, more-or-less unanimously (opinion by Justice Scalia, with six other Justices concurring, and Justices Thomas and Stevens concurring in the judgment), reversed the state court. The Court began by finding that when there has been a substantial “break in custody,” the reasons behind the Edwards rule lose their force:

When . . . a suspect has been released from his pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has been coerced. He has no longer been isolated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends. And he knows from his earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt; and that investigative custody does not last indefinitely. In these circumstances, it is far fetched to think that a police officer’s asking the suspect whether he would like to waive his Miranda rights [is coercive].

Of course, a break in custody that lasts only a short time might not have these effects. So, for the sake of establishing a bright-line rule, the Court held that a 14-day break in custody is the point at which the police may again attempt to approach a defendant. The defendant then argued that there was no break in custody, in that he remained in prison between the interviews. But the Court rejected this argument too, finding that the defendant’s return to the general prison population ended his time in custody for Miranda purposes:

When they are released back into the general prison population, [inmates] return to their accustomed surroundings and daily routine—they regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation. Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with their accusers. They live among other inmates, guards, and workers, and often can receive visitors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone.

Based on the foregoing, the Court found nothing improper about the second officer’s decision to approach the defendant, and determined that the defendant’s statements were not subject to suppression. Because it resolved the case in that way, the Court didn’t reach another argument advanced by the state — that the two-and-a-half year time lapse renders Edwards inapplicable even assuming that there was no break in custody. That issue will come up again, I’m sure.

A useful summary of the two decisions is here, though it may be redundant if you’ve made it this far through this post. Of course, reading the opinions themselves — or at least the syllabi — is the way to go if you can make the time. I may have some additional thoughts after I’ve spent a little more time with the cases myself. If so, I’ll post an update. If you have thoughts or reactions, please post a comment.

Category: Search and Seizure, Uncategorized | Tags: break in custody, custodial, custody, interrogations, miranda, powell, shatzer

Personal Characteristics and “Custody” for Miranda Purposes

Posted on December 28, 2009 by Jeff Welty

The North Carolina Supreme Court recently decided In re J.D.B., a close and interesting juvenile case. I mentioned it briefly here when it divided the court of appeals. It has implications well beyond the juvenile context, which I’ll unpack at the end of this post.

The basic facts are as follows: Chapel Hill police suspected a seventh-grade student, who participated in special education classes, of breaking into several houses. An investigator went to the juvenile’s school and had him removed from class and escorted to a conference room by a school resource officer. The investigator questioned the juvenile in the presence of the SRO, the assistant principal, and an intern. The door of the conference room where the interview took place was closed but not locked. The juvenile was not given Miranda warnings or the “juvenile Miranda” warnings required prior to custodial interrogations by G.S. 7B-2101, and he made incriminating statements. He was allowed to leave and catch the bus home, but later was charged. He moved to suppress his statements based on the lack of Miranda and statutory warnings.

The trial court found that such warnings were not required because the interview was not custodial. The court of appeals affirmed 2-1. The majority and the dissent agreed that whether the juvenile was in custody depends on whether a reasonable person in the juvenile’s circumstances would have believed that he was under arrest or subject to a degree of restraint typically associated with an arrest. The two opinions disagreed about whether the “reasonable person” in question should share the juvenile’s personal characteristics, such as his age and the fact that he was enrolled in special education classes. The dissent thought that those characteristics were relevant, and argued, in effect, that a reasonable seventh grade special education student would have felt compelled to respond to questions in the setting described above. The majority believed that those characteristics were not relevant, and that a reasonable person would not have believed he was de facto under arrest given that he was not handcuffed, the door was not locked, and the interview was relatively brief.

Because the court of appeals was split, the juvenile was entitled to review by the supreme court. The supreme court affirmed 4-3. The majority and the dissent differed on two crucial points. First, the majority concluded, based on a suggestion in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), that the custody issue must be resolved without reference to the juvenile’s personal characteristics. (It noted, however, that such characteristics are relevant to the question of whether a person has knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda.) Second, the majority held that custody, in a school context, requires a substantial restraint of liberty beyond what is inherent in the school setting. Based in part on those two premises, the majority ruled that the juvenile was not in custody, because the door was not locked or guarded, the investigator asked the juvenile if he was willing to answer questions rather than ordering him to do so, and in fact, the investigator eventually let the juvenile go.

Justice Brady’s dissent argued that the juvenile’s personal characteristics are relevant to the custody inquiry, and suggested that the investigator sought a “tactical advantage” by questioning the juvenile at school in a formal setting, with the adults dressed either in police uniforms or in business attire. Justice Hudson, joined by Justice Timmons-Goodson, took a similar position. She observed that Yarborough was no more than a suggestion and argued that the standard for what counts as “custody” should be lower, not higher, at school because it is a structured environment. She would have held that the interview was custodial given that the juvenile was “escorted” to it and in light of the large number of adults involved and the formality of the setting.

The importance of this case in the juvenile context is apparent: it gives the green light to conducting juvenile investigations at school, and suggests that most interactions between the police and students conducted at school will be viewed as non-custodial by the courts. But the implications extend also to other categories of people who might be especially prone to believe that interactions with the police are effectively compulsory, such as those with limited intellectual functioning, those with mental illnesses, and those who have limited proficiency in English. Consider, for example, a borderline mentally retarded defendant, stopped on the street by three officers and questioned about a crime. Before J.D.B., such a defendant might have argued that even if a person with an average IQ would have recognized the interaction as a noncustodial Terry stop, a reasonable borderline mentally retarded person would have viewed it as indistinguishable from an arrest, making it custodial for Miranda purposes. After J.D.B., that argument appears to be a loser.

Category: Search and Seizure, Uncategorized | Tags: custodial, custody, J.D.B., juvenile, miranda, personal characteristics

Knowing and Voluntary Miranda Waivers

Posted on March 16, 2009 by Jeff Welty

The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently decided a very interesting Miranda case. Garner v. Mitchell, available here, is a capital case. The defendant stole a woman’s purse, took a taxi to her house, robbed it, and set it on fire to conceal his fingerprints, killing five of the six children who were sleeping in the house. Police arrested him and administered Miranda warnings, and he confessed to setting the fire. He was prosecuted for murder, convicted, and sentenced to death.

The case made its way through the state appellate and post-conviction process, and eventually, the defendant filed a federal habeas petition, arguing, among other things, that he lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, by virtue of his IQ of 76. (Apparently, he hadn’t raised this issue, at least not in quite this way, in the state courts, but the federal courts decided to hear the issue anyhow, for reasons that aren’t relevant to this discussion.) The defense presented considerable evidence of the defendant’s abusive upbringing, low educational level, and borderline intellectual functioning. The defense also presented evidence from an expert who had administered an instrument called the Grasso test to the defendant. The test attempts to measure an individual’s ability to understand the Miranda warnings; the defendant’s results on the test were mixed.

On the other side of the ledger, there was testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing that the defendant had expressed his understanding of his Miranda rights and had executed a written waiver of them, and that he seemed “perfectly normal” and “very coherent” during his interview with the police. Further, the crime that the defendant committed involved some forethought and planning.

The federal district court found that the defendant’s waiver was valid. A panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the defendant likely lacked the mental capacity to execute a knowing and voluntary waiver. The en banc court allowed review and reversed again. The majority was plainly skeptical of the defendant’s claim that he lacked capacity, and was not at all enamored of the opinion of the expert who had given the Grasso test, but it actually decided the case on a different basis. It ruled that “[t]he underlying police-regulatory purpose of Miranda” means that whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary must be determined “from the perspective of the police,” and because “the police had no reason to believe that [the defendant] misunderstood the warnings, the defendant’s statement was admissible regardless of whether the defendant had the capacity to understand the warnings or not.

This is a big deal, given (a) that about ten percent of the population fall in, or below, the borderline intellectual functioning range, and (b) the possible application of this holding in related contexts, like defendants with limited English skills. The majority’s conclusion is certainly defensible — in fact, the court was following a Seventh Circuit case to the same effect — but it isn’t the only plausible view, and at least four of the Sixth Circuit’s judges didn’t agree with it, adhering instead to the view that a knowing and voluntary waiver must be knowing and voluntary on the part of the person executing the waiver.

This is almost certainly an issue that will come up with increasing frequency, as mental health issues are litigated more and more often. We don’t have a North Carolina case on point yet, but there’s a North Carolina murder case now on federal habeas review that may result in a district court opinion on this issue. It’ll be interesting to see how that comes out — and whether the Fourth Circuit, and eventually the Supreme Court, decide to jump in the fray.

Comments on the Sixth Circuit’s opinion are invited. Stay tuned for further developments.

Category: Search and Seizure, Uncategorized | Tags: borderline, miranda, retardation, waiver

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